Home > Bibliography > View CitationView Citation
Katz-Hyman, Michael and Michael Krepon. Assurance or Space Dominance? The Case Against Weaponizing Space. Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, April 2003. [ 16 quotes ]
Evidence Related to this Citation
Adversaries Will Respond to U.S. Space Dominance by Attacking our Early Warning and Communication Satellites
At a minimum, an attempt by the United States to seek space dominance through deployed war-fighting capabilities is likely to generate the launch of relatively cheap, low-tech, but lethal ASATs by weaker adversaries. An unequal competition to weaponize space could still place at risk satellites that are essential for U.S. military communications and early warning in deep crisis. ( More ... )
Katz-Hyman, Michael and Michael Krepon. Assurance or Space Dominance? The Case Against Weaponizing Space. Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, April 2003. [ 16 quotes ]
[ page 78 ]
Adversaries Will Pursue Weapons of Mass Destruction to Counter U.S. Dominance in Space
States possessing nuclear weapons that might become adversaries to the United States could view U.S. initiatives to weaponize space as an attempt to negate their deterrents. Space-to-ground warfare initiatives to further extend U.S. military advantages could therefore prompt compensatory steps by weaker states, including the accelerated pursuit of unconventional weapons. ( More ... )
Katz-Hyman, Michael and Michael Krepon. Assurance or Space Dominance? The Case Against Weaponizing Space. Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, April 2003. [ 16 quotes ]
[ page 102 ]
U.S. policy on space weapons will determine actions of rest of world
Among the extraordinary powers that the United States now enjoys is the power to shape the agenda for the use of space in the twenty-first century. If Washington seeks to extend its military dominance by flight-testing and deploying space weaponry, other capitals would surely follow suit. They would not do so in as sophisticated or as expensive a manner, but they will compete as best they can. ( More ... )
Katz-Hyman, Michael and Michael Krepon. Assurance or Space Dominance? The Case Against Weaponizing Space. Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, April 2003. [ 16 quotes ]
[ page 125 ]
Space Weaponization Would Threaten Outer Space Environment by Increasing Space Debris
The weaponization of space is an environmental as well as a national security issue. The environmental degradation of space created by space-faring nations constitutes a danger to space exploration, the space shuttle, and other peaceful uses of space. Space litter also poses difficulties for the military uses of space. ( More ... )
Katz-Hyman, Michael and Michael Krepon. Assurance or Space Dominance? The Case Against Weaponizing Space. Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, April 2003. [ 16 quotes ]
[ page 120 ]
Space Weaponization Would Compound Space Debris Dangers Exponentially
Space warfare would not only constitute a threat to targeted satellites, it would also create debris fields that would threaten satellites operating in low earth orbit, including NTM, space transportation systems such as the U.S. space shuttle, and the International Space Station. The damage resulting from warfare that includes ASAT use could be more long lasting in space than on Earth. ( More ... )
Katz-Hyman, Michael and Michael Krepon. Assurance or Space Dominance? The Case Against Weaponizing Space. Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, April 2003. [ 16 quotes ]
[ page 122-3 ]
Backlash Against U.S. Deployment of Space Weapons Could Undermine U.S. Conventional Strength
Foreign leaders will not passively accept U.S. initiatives to implement a doctrine of space dominance. They will have ample, inexpensive means to take blocking action, as it is considerably easier to negate U.S. dominance in space than on the ground, at sea, and in the air. The introduction of space weaponry and ASAT testing are therefore likely introduce grave complications for the terrestrial military advantages that the United States has worked so hard, and at such expense, to secure. ( More ... )
Katz-Hyman, Michael and Michael Krepon. Assurance or Space Dominance? The Case Against Weaponizing Space. Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, April 2003. [ 16 quotes ]
[ page 89 ]
U.S. Weaponization of Space will Complicate Relations with Russia and China
The likely consequences of a dynamic, but uneven, space warfare competition are not hard to envision. Potential adversaries are likely to perceive American initiatives to weaponize space as adjuncts to a U.S. military doctrine of preemption and preventive war. Depending on the scope and nature of U.S. space warfare preparations, they could also add to Chinese and Russian concerns over the viability of their nuclear deterrents. ( More ... )
Katz-Hyman, Michael and Michael Krepon. Assurance or Space Dominance? The Case Against Weaponizing Space. Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, April 2003. [ 16 quotes ]
[ page 62 ]
Space Weapons are Destabilizing Because they Target Satellites Used Extensively by Noncombatants
Space weapons are destabilizing for other reasons, as well. Space warfare is unlikely to be confined to space, since the platforms that would be primary targets for attack support terrestrial military operations. Civil societies have worked diligently to affirm laws of war to limit dangers to noncombatants. The dictates of international law that warfare be pursued in a discriminating and proportional fashion -- guidelines that are reinforced by the "revolution in military affairs" pursued by the United States -- are undercut by space warfare, since satellites subject to attack provide essential services to noncombatants as well as to armies, navies, and air forces. ( More ... )
Katz-Hyman, Michael and Michael Krepon. Assurance or Space Dominance? The Case Against Weaponizing Space. Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, April 2003. [ 16 quotes ]
[ page 91 ]
Space Weapons Inherently Stuck in Risky High-Alert Posture
In space, as with terrestrial missile defenses, it is far more challenging to mount a successful defense than to penetrate a soft target. Because of their threatening nature and their vulnerability, weapons designed for space warfare, whether on the ground or in orbit, would become extremely high-value targets. To prevent a precarious and dangerous mix of satellites interspersed with ASATs, the United States would seek to prevent space mines and other attacking devices either from being launched or from being parked in orbit. ( More ... )
Katz-Hyman, Michael and Michael Krepon. Assurance or Space Dominance? The Case Against Weaponizing Space. Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, April 2003. [ 16 quotes ]
[ page 77 ]
Uneven Competition to Weaponize Space will be Destabilizing
The argument presented here is that terrestrial U.S. military dominance would be impaired, rather than enhanced, by American initiatives to weaponize space. While the United States clearly has the ability to outspend competitors, and to produce more advanced types of space weaponry, weaker adversaries will have affordable, asymmetric means to counter U.S. initiatives in space, as well as on earth. The net result of an uneven competition to weaponize space would be that prudent U.S. defense planners could not count on protecting space assets, and that weaker adversaries could not count on the negation of U.S. advantages. Neither could be certain of the outcome of space warfare, but both adversaries would have to fear the worst. Because of the vulnerability of space assets to ASATs, both would need to assume a dangerous “hair-trigger” posture in space—unless the United States employed preemptive military means to prevent the launch or deployment of presumably hostile space assets belonging to other states. ( More ... )
Katz-Hyman, Michael and Michael Krepon. Assurance or Space Dominance? The Case Against Weaponizing Space. Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, April 2003. [ 16 quotes ]
[ page 61-2 ]
Anti-Satellite Space Weapons are Inherently Escalatory
The particulars of escalation have necessarily changed from the Cold War to asymmetric warfare, but the inherently escalatory nature of ASAT use remains inescapable. The flight-testing and deployment of space weaponry by any nation would likely generate responses in kind, as well as asymmetric responses. U.S. battle stations in space would become prime targets in the event of warfare and thus magnets for space mines or other countering devices that would cost a small fraction of the platforms to be defended. ( More ... )
Katz-Hyman, Michael and Michael Krepon. Assurance or Space Dominance? The Case Against Weaponizing Space. Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, April 2003. [ 16 quotes ]
[ page 90 ]
Space Warfare Unlikely to be Confined to Space
Space weapons are destabilizing for other reasons, as well. Space warfare is unlikely to be confined to space, since the platforms that would be primary targets for attack support terrestrial military operations. Civil societies have worked diligently to affirm laws of war to limit dangers to noncombatants. The dictates of international law that warfare be pursued in a discriminating and proportional fashion -- guidelines that are reinforced by the "revolution in military affairs" pursued by the United States -- are undercut by space warfare, since satellites subject to attack provide essential services to noncombatants as well as to armies, navies, and air forces. ( More ... )
Katz-Hyman, Michael and Michael Krepon. Assurance or Space Dominance? The Case Against Weaponizing Space. Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, April 2003. [ 16 quotes ]
[ page 91 ]
U.S. Conventional Weapons already Capable of Accomplishing Long Range Strike Goals
In addition, Simon Worden and others have argued that precision, space-based weapons could provide the basis for a new deterrence strategy built on space and information dominance, thereby avoiding dilemmas associated with nuclear deterrence. Might these presumed benefits against weaker foes warrant space weaponization? These presumed benefits have already been demonstrated by U.S. power projection capabilities featuring conventional munitions of increasing range and lethality. Further advances can be expected, so advocates of U.S. space warfare capabilities have the added burden of explaining why these terrestrial advances are insufficient to support a dominant U.S. military capability, and what added value would accrue from even greater increases in lethality, promptness, and reach from space. Moreover, further improvements in the range, promptness, and lethality of terrestrial weapons are likely to come far sooner, and at a fraction of the diplomatic, political, and financial cost, than the advent of “space strike” capabilities. ( More ... )
Katz-Hyman, Michael and Michael Krepon. Assurance or Space Dominance? The Case Against Weaponizing Space. Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, April 2003. [ 16 quotes ]
[ page 51 ]
Attacks on U.S. Space Assets Unlikely to Determine Outcome of Conflict
The record of maverick leaders to date suggests that they are, indeed, capable of surprising steps but, above all, they are keenly interested in maintaining power. To initiate space warfare against the United States is not a good way to maintain power. But if irrationality rules behavior, and if a maverick leader were intent on using a nuclear weapon in a losing cause, why would that leader target satellites instead of an invading army? Asymmetric warfare in space does not favor the weak against the strong. The strong have greater means to reduce their weaknesses in space and to exploit the weaknesses of others. Moreover, weaker states have a greater chance of causing harm to the United States on the ground than in space. Attacks by weaker states against U.S. satellites would complicate and perhaps extend somewhat the Pentagon's military campaigns, but they would not change the outcome of warfare, given the dominating and growing power projection capabilities enjoyed by the United States. ( More ... )
Katz-Hyman, Michael and Michael Krepon. Assurance or Space Dominance? The Case Against Weaponizing Space. Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, April 2003. [ 16 quotes ]
[ page 48-9 ]
Inevitability Arguments often based on Unreliable Historical Determinism
Historical inevitability is a heavily freighted and much contested concept. History can certainly repeat itself, at least in thematic terms. Consequently, knowledge of history can be a useful reference for policy formulation. But every historical chapter also contains its unique passages that are read and weighted differently by historians. Moreover, the "historical record" usually contains many blank pages reflecting unanswered questions. Even heavily studied episodes, such as the Cuban missile crisis, yield new insights with the release of additional interviews and archival material. We also know that historical parallels can be forced and made to conform to policy preferences. Those committed to the study of history, and thus keenly aware of its intricacies, tend to shy away from arguments that begin with the words, "History teaches." Policy advocates who employ this line of argument usually majored in other subjects. Historical determinism can therefore be a flawed and dangerous enterprise. As Bernard Brodie has noted, "History is at best an imperfect guide to the future, but when imperfectly understood and interpreted it is a menace to sound judgment."
Katz-Hyman, Michael and Michael Krepon. Assurance or Space Dominance? The Case Against Weaponizing Space. Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, April 2003. [ 16 quotes ]
[ page 28-9 ]