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Arbatov, Alexey. Space Weapons: Science Fiction, Real Threats and Arms Control Opportunities. : International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, May 2009. [ 8 quotes ]

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Now is the Key Time to Determine whether Space will become a New Arena for Conflict
 
At the end of the Cold War, under the conditions of an evolving multipolar system of international relations with intensive globalization and interdependence of the whole world, there was a chance to interrupt the historical process of accelerating arms races and military conflict and their transition to ever higher levels of technological complexity, affecting new areas of human activity. The growing commercial information and scientific value inherent in the use of space, and also its huge facilitating role for military action on Earth (including peacekeeping operations), is moving us in this direction, in order to achieve greater stability and facilitate the process of disarmament. In this sense, the accumulated mass of international legal norms regulating space activity is very important, as well as half a centurys experience of practical negotiations on arms limitation and disarmament, including in the area of strategic missile weapon systems and military activity in space. Insofar as the utilisation of space is concerned, mankind is now poised at an important historical juncture: space will either become a new arena for arms race and military conflict, or will remain an area for peaceful and exclusively ancillary military activity, and thus for promoting international cooperation, strategic stability and disarmament. Important choices in this direction will apparently be made in the next decade and perhaps even in the next few years.
Arbatov, Alexey. Space Weapons: Science Fiction, Real Threats and Arms Control Opportunities. : International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, May 2009. [ 8 quotes ] [ page 4 ]
Multilateral Treaty Negotiations less likely to Succeed because of Technical Secrecy
 
Multilateral Treaty Negotiations less likely to Succeed because of Technical SecrecyThe multilateral nature of the array of countries wishing to participate in the proposed drafting of such a Treaty gives rise to serious doubts. The highly complex technological systems that are involved are military and strategic in nature and are known only to a few states, and questions related to them are of an exceptionally sensitive nature. So any hope for practical negotiations on these problems in a multilateral format based on the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) is hardly justified. A more practical format would involve two or, at most, three parties (RFUSAPRC), and seems more practical, at least at the initial stage.
Arbatov, Alexey. Space Weapons: Science Fiction, Real Threats and Arms Control Opportunities. : International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, May 2009. [ 8 quotes ] [ page 10 ]
Consensus Definition of "Space Weapons" or "Space Arms"
 
Among specialists it is more or less accepted that by "space weapons" or "space arms" (SA) are meant weapons that are created and tested for their strike capability on any targets, and that are used from space objects (that is, objects that have completed at least one full turn in circumterrestrial orbit (other celestial bodies and their orbits are not mentioned so far)), as well as weapons that are created and tested for their attack capability on space objects (that is, objects that have completed at least one full turn in circumterrestrial orbit).
Arbatov, Alexey. Space Weapons: Science Fiction, Real Threats and Arms Control Opportunities. : International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, May 2009. [ 8 quotes ] [ page 10 ]
Many Difficulties with Trying to Craft Arms Control Agreement against Directed Energy ASATs
 
The banning of combat systems that are based on directed energy transmission, primarily lasers, is particularly complicated. They can be used for striking aircraft, satellites, ballistic missiles and their elements during flight, and also for the detection, probing and identification of ground, underwater and space objects, as well as for targeting other weapon systems and, in future, for the rapid transfer of immense amounts of information, i.e. for communications. Theoretically, effectiveness of lasers may be limited (thereby separating attack systems from ancillary purpose systems) by the ratio of power illumination to the area of the ray's cross-section (joules/steredian), which is an indicator integrating a laser's energy and the area of its mirror reflector.

But to come to an agreement regarding such limitations would be a complex undertaking if we take into account the different types of lasers ("pumping" methods) and the diverse areas through which they may pass (space, atmosphere). For example, a laser that does not have destructive potential in a dense atmosphere may be an effective weapon against satellites in space at long distances, or for striking booster stages of ballistic missiles at a shorter range when they leave the atmosphere, or missile warheads in space at a short distance.
Arbatov, Alexey. Space Weapons: Science Fiction, Real Threats and Arms Control Opportunities. : International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, May 2009. [ 8 quotes ] [ page 14 ]
Unchecked Space Arms Race could Spread Globally, Collapsing Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Regime
 
Currently, the economic and technological superiority of the USA in space is obvious and indisputable. However, if a space arms race is initiated, it will inevitably be joined by other countries, above all China, Russia, India, Brazil, Japan, and later possibly Iran, Pakistan, and others. As a result, the USA, despite its superiority in space, may lose more than all the rest because, in their military and civilian activities, they more than anyone else depend on the security of space vehicles. Historically, this is what happened with nuclear weapons and missile technology, where the USA initially had a monopoly or superiority, but now they see the proliferation of such weapons as the main threat to their own security.

In the long term, the growing threat of an arms race and, even more so, space conflicts, will inevitably lead to the "vertical" and "horizontal" proliferation of missiles and nuclear weapons, and to the irreversible crisis of the whole nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Additionally, outer space (which does not have natural borders and natural shelters) through its saturation by weapons, will present a grave threat from the point of view of accidents, incidents, false alarms, and navigational system failures.
Arbatov, Alexey. Space Weapons: Science Fiction, Real Threats and Arms Control Opportunities. : International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, May 2009. [ 8 quotes ] [ page 23 ]
Technically Difficult to Verify Ban on Aircraft-based ASAT systems
 
However, as applied to the aircraft-based systems of the type deployed during the '80s by the USA (F15 SRAMAltair) and the Soviet development of anti-satellite systems based on the MiG31 fighter plane, the verification of bans on their deployment would be extremely difficult due to the dual purpose and massive numbers of such aircraft in operation, as well as the small size of intercepting missiles that may be stored in any airfield's storage facilities. Of course, such satellite systems possess special systems for targeting and navigation, but their banning would interfere in the overall ground-based infrastructure of space complexes, and would therefore be unrealistic. Limitation of quantity of such systems is a more achievable goal, but requires wide transparency and agreement on the functional differences between aircraft and missiles, facilitation of verification measures, agreed locations for anti- satellite systems, as well as the possible acceptance of rights of inspection upon suspicion (with brief notification) of other airforce bases of the parties.
Arbatov, Alexey. Space Weapons: Science Fiction, Real Threats and Arms Control Opportunities. : International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, May 2009. [ 8 quotes ] [ page 17 ]
Not Technically Possible to Verify Space Assets are not Space Weapons in Deployment and Operational Stage
 
As opposed to this historical experience, space weapons will be the most difficult to ban and to limit at their deployment and operational stages, particularly where deployment in space is concerned, as it is in the Draft Space Weapons Treaty of 2008. To identify, through the use of NTMVs, banned satellites with weapons on board among approximately 700 space vehicles that are currently rotating in various orbits, would be exceptionally difficult. It could be even more difficult to prove that they are subject to a Treaty without their inspection in space or their being brought down to Earth (even if the Treaty could determine the technical characteristics of banned systems, and not just where they are based and where their possible targets are located).

This can also apply to future compact satellites used as a means of inspection of space vehicles in all orbits. Such on-site space inspection, as well as bringing vehicles down to Earth, is in many cases not technically possible, as well as being dangerous and, more likely than not, unacceptable for states because of military or commercial secrecy. Additionally, the creation of such systems and means of verification may of itself be interpreted as a type of anti-satellite weapon or combat operation.
Arbatov, Alexey. Space Weapons: Science Fiction, Real Threats and Arms Control Opportunities. : International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, May 2009. [ 8 quotes ] [ page 16 ]
Historically, On-Site Inspections of Space Launch Vehicles have been Ruled as Overly Intrusive and Technically Impractical
 
Verification on space launching pads before the launch also seems improbable in the foreseeable future because of military and commercial secrecy. By the way, this question was touched upon at the end of the '80s during the USSRUSA negotiations on space weapons, in relation to a ban on orbital ABM systems. It was acknowledged at that time that such verification methods would be overly intrusive and practically impossible to implement for technical reasons (the necessity of opening containers with the payload, and its identification before being installed on a space vehicle). It is possible that in the context of radical disarmament measures and abandonment of military confrontation, such measures of pre-launch inspection could in time become possible for the verification of space disarmament. But at this stage they seem unrealistic, in particular regarding the RFPRC Draft Treaty of 2008. As regards land, air, and sea-based space weapons that are most likely to appear in the foreseeable future (but not addressed by the RFPRC Draft), even here the picture is mixed. The banning or limitation of such systems as were deployed by the Soviet Union in the '7080s (and experimental missiles tested by China against satellites in 2007) would not be difficult if their technical characteristics and locations could be agreed upon, using methods applied by the Treaty on Intermediate and Shorter Range Missiles and START-1.
Arbatov, Alexey. Space Weapons: Science Fiction, Real Threats and Arms Control Opportunities. : International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, May 2009. [ 8 quotes ] [ page 16-17 ]