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Larrimore, Scott. "International Space Launch Notification and Data Exchange." Space Policy. Vol. 23 (August 2007): 172-179. [ 7 quotes ]

Evidence Related to this Citation

Number of Spacefaring Nations Predicted to Double in Next Few Years
 
On 25 February 2007, a suborbital sounding rocket blasted off from a launch pad in Iran, bringing that country a step closer towards a domestic space launch capability and membership among spacefaring nations. Several news organizations had mistakenly reported the test as an actual space launch, in part because of the lack of international transparency in Iran's space plans and because of statements the previous month of an imminent Iranian space launch from a leading member of the Iranian parliament.

As the Iranian launch shows, proliferation of space technology continues its march around the world. Fifteen countries have joined the satellite-owning club with spacecraft of their own within the past decade, an increase of 50%. The steady increase of space capable nations is illustrated in Fig. 1. While most states contract launch services from established providers, others are seeking launch independence as well. A decade ago only half a dozen nations could launch their own spacecraft. Fig. 2 shows that this number will double in a few years, as nations such as South Korea, Iran and Pakistan field independent launch systems.
Larrimore, Scott. "International Space Launch Notification and Data Exchange." Space Policy. Vol. 23 (August 2007): 172-179. [ 7 quotes ] [ page 172 ]
Growing Number of Rocket Launches by Spacefaring States Increases Risks of Miscalculation
 
The increase in the number of spacefaring states and launch sites raises security issues for many states. Several countries seeking indigenous launch capabilities are doing so in the context of regional arms races. The problem is that space technologies, and rocket technology in particular, are inherently dual purpose. Technology used to develop a space launch vehicle could be directly applied to ballistic missiles. Technology used for meteorology or land development could be used for reconnaissance. While there is by necessity a good deal of transparency in commercial space launches, this launch segment's market share remains about half that of the combined national civil and military sectors. When one state launches a ballistic missile or spacecraft, another state may not know whether a potential adversary is launching a satellite, a destructive ballistic warhead, or some other weapon of war.
Larrimore, Scott. "International Space Launch Notification and Data Exchange." Space Policy. Vol. 23 (August 2007): 172-179. [ 7 quotes ] [ page 172 ]
Proliferation of Space Launch and Ballistic Missile Technologies Necessitates Greater Transparency to Avoid Miscalculation
 
As space launch and ballistic missile technologies proliferate, countries around the world need to be increasingly vigilant to potential attack. Correspondingly, the opportunities for misunderstandings and false alarms increase as well. The strategic consequences of a ballistic missile attack magnify the necessity to minimize these potential errors, to increase launch transparency, and to establish other confidence-building measures. Early warning false alarms by countries holding the world's foremost nuclear arsenals underscore this imperative. Leaders of the USA, the former Soviet Union, and later Russia, have had to consider their nuclear attack options at least four times in the past as a result of technical problems, administrative errors or system false alarms.
Larrimore, Scott. "International Space Launch Notification and Data Exchange." Space Policy. Vol. 23 (August 2007): 172-179. [ 7 quotes ] [ page 173 ]
Impasse Between Russia and U.S. over Joint Data Exchange Center may Finally be Over
 
Although agreed to in concept almost a decade ago, there has been very little movement standing up the JDEC. First, relations between the USA and Russia became strained over NATO's Operation Allied Force against Serbia in 1999. Both nations changed presidential administrations following elections in 2000 in their respective countries. Despite strong Russian support following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, bilateral relations subsequently cooled with growing US concerns over Moscow's crackdown on internal dissent and hostility towards its weaker neighbors. Relations further chilled with the USA's withdrawal from the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty in 2001. Progress on joint initiatives, such as the JDEC, slowed to a standstill.

Work on the JDEC stalled in February 2001, ostensibly over tax and liability issues. The nations disagreed over whether US contractors would have to pay Russian taxes and whether they could be held liable for injuries or damages occurring in the course of their job. The Bush administration believed acquiescing to Russian demands would set a precedent that could jeopardize larger and potentially more dangerous joint projects under the Cooperative Threat Reduction program.

The impasse might recently have been broken. On 15 September 2006, the USA and Russia finalized an agreement resolving a liability dispute on a project to dispose of excess Russian plutonium, potentially establishing a precedent for other joint projects. A liability resolution process is now in place, as well as protection of US companies from employees' individual transgressions or negligence. The Bush administration's strategy was to try to resolve the most difficult case first and then apply that solution to less worrisome projects such as the JDEC.
Larrimore, Scott. "International Space Launch Notification and Data Exchange." Space Policy. Vol. 23 (August 2007): 172-179. [ 7 quotes ] [ page 176 ]
JDEC has Limitations as a Confidence Building Measure or Step Towards Shared Space Surveillance
 
While a laudable concept, there are some inherent challenges with the JDEC. One party cannot be guaranteed that the information provided by the other has not been manipulated in some manner. If hostilities ever ensued, a belligerent would not provide launch information of its attack to its adversary. Furthermore, the information exchanged is processed rather than raw data, impeding the potential merger, corroboration and synthesis of the countries' data together.
Larrimore, Scott. "International Space Launch Notification and Data Exchange." Space Policy. Vol. 23 (August 2007): 172-179. [ 7 quotes ] [ page 176 ]
Resolving JDEC Issues could Smooth U.S. - Russian Relations over Missile Defense Issues
 
The USA and Russia should continue to work on resolving issues with JDEC. The JDEC issue has been lingering in limbo for nine years with little headway. Lack of progress demonstrates the low priority both nations have placed on this endeavor, despite rhetoric to the contrary. The USA and Russia should re-evaluate their desire to implement this program and, if validated, quickly establish plans to stand up the center. Impediments towards progress, particularly the liability issue, have been resolved. Nations around the world will follow these nuclear powers' lead. The path could be either toward cooperation and transparency or toward opposition and obfuscation.

An operable JDEC may help diffuse some of the tension between Washington and Moscow over the USA's plans to build a component of its missile defense system in central Europe. Recently President Bush offered to give a detailed explanation of the country's plans to Russia and opened the door to further missile defense cooperation. The head of the USA's Missile Defense Agency, Lieutenant General Henry Obering, said his organization is ''very open to cooperation with Russia to strengthen missile defenses, including possible technology and data transfer''. Placing priority on implementing a previously agreed-upon collaborative missile warning center would be a good step.
Larrimore, Scott. "International Space Launch Notification and Data Exchange." Space Policy. Vol. 23 (August 2007): 172-179. [ 7 quotes ] [ page 177 ]
U.S. and Russia should Combine the Proposed JDEC with the Current Operations of the Hague Code of Conduct
 
JDEC operations should be consolidated with HCoC There is significant overlap between the missions and intent of the bilateral JDEC and the multilateral HCoC. Both regimes call for nations to exchange pre-launch notification information. Indeed, when Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton agreed to create the JDEC, they hoped the center might evolve to include other interested states. By consolidating the JDEC with the HCoC, the presidents' vision is attained while simultaneously enhancing HCoC's stabilizing influence with the inclusion of voluntary early warning information. If the USA and Russia cannot come to terms over implementation plans establishing the JDEC in Russia, then the nations should consider placing the center in another, neutral country. Taxes and liabilities would become moot issues. Considering Austria's long history of neutrality, Vienna would be an ideal alternate location. Integration with HCoC operations should be technically simple.
Larrimore, Scott. "International Space Launch Notification and Data Exchange." Space Policy. Vol. 23 (August 2007): 172-179. [ 7 quotes ] [ page 177 ]