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Tellis, Ashley J. "China's Military Space Stategy: An Exchange -- "Response"." Survival. Vol. 50, No. 1 (February-March 2008): 157-198. [ 4 quotes ]

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Should not put too much Faith in "Moral Revulsion" or "Mutual Deterrence" as Norms against Space Weapons
 
Where I therefore disagree with Krepon is with his belief that ‘widespread public revulsion with carrying human discord into the heavens’ and the fact that ‘satellites continue to be as vulnerable as they are essential’ would suffice to prevent unwanted competition in space. As Krepon well knows, human revulsion at the prospect of comprehensive annihilation did not prevent the superpowers from building gigantic nuclear arsenals capable of producing just that outcome. And while the proposition that ‘satellites are vulnerable just as they are essential’ explains the absence of conflict in the heavens for very specific reasons during the Cold War -- a point I elucidated in the article and with which Krepon concurred -- it is the asymmetric US dependence on satellites today that makes the possibility of a counterspace attack by Beijing more plausible. Even Eric Hagt concedes this point.
Tellis, Ashley J. "China's Military Space Stategy: An Exchange -- "Response"." Survival. Vol. 50, No. 1 (February-March 2008): 157-198. [ 4 quotes ] [ page 188 ]
China's Pursuit of Space Arms Control seems to be Limited to its Utility in Constraining U.S. Strategic Capabilities
 
In this context, let me also reaffirm that I do not believe, as Krepon phrased it, that ‘Chinese space diplomacy serves entirely as a ruse to protect the PLA’s ASAT programmes’. China’s space diplomacy, like that of any other great power, has multiple objectives. One certainly is to protect Beijing’s space warfare capabilities. Another more important goal consists of constraining America’s emerging military advantages in strategic arenas such as missile defence. The support offered by China to Russian treaty drafts circulated in connection with the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) negotiations in the Conference of Disarmament underscores this point. While I therefore wish the Stimson Center every success in its efforts to garner support for a code of conduct relating to space, it is worth noting that China has repeatedly rejected all US overtures to discuss space ‘rules of the road’ because the goal of constraining US missile-defence capabilities through the PAROS process has been far more important to Beijing than either protecting the peaceful uses of space for all or abjuring the employment of its own kinetic-energy counterspace systems.
Tellis, Ashley J. "China's Military Space Stategy: An Exchange -- "Response"." Survival. Vol. 50, No. 1 (February-March 2008): 157-198. [ 4 quotes ] [ page 189 ]
Many Historical Examples of Deterrence Failure Refute Hope that U.S. Military Might will Deter Attack on its Space Assets
 
In this context, Hagt nevertheless speculates that ‘China would have little incentive to attack American space assets because the risk of escalation to generalised conflict -- a conflict China would have no chance of winning -- is far too great’. I hope he turns out to be correct, but the history of deterrence failures should give us pause. After all, recent political history is littered with instances of weaker powers initiating war against stronger states despite the presence of nuclear weapons. And as Gary Schmitt and Tim Sullivan point out, even the most clear-eyed assessment of one’s strategic weaknesses may not prevent either the initiation of war or the use of certain military instruments when ‘ambition, justice, and legitimacy [function] as possible motivating factors in a conflict’. Indeed, as Bruce Russett pointed out in his classic essay on deterrence failure in regards to Japan in 1941 (a case that bears a fascinating resemblance to the current balance of power between China and the United States) the near-certain prospect of Japanese defeat, as well as the clear recognition of that fact by leaders in Tokyo, did not suffice to prevent an attack on the US Pacific fleet, given that the options of both a negotiated settlement and a Japanese withdrawal of their claims were ultimately out of the question.
Tellis, Ashley J. "China's Military Space Stategy: An Exchange -- "Response"." Survival. Vol. 50, No. 1 (February-March 2008): 157-198. [ 4 quotes ] [ page 195 ]
Simple Listing of China's Many Counterspace Programs Confirms their Intent to Counter U.S. Strength Better than a Review of Literature
 
In such circumstances, what is the analyst to do? I suggest that the way out of this predicament is to follow Karl Popper's general model of analysis for the social sciences: using 'situational logic' to develop internally coherent conjectures and thereafter testing the evidence for conformity with the deduction. My article meets Popper's test on both counts. Even a fierce critic such as Krepon admits without reservation that the argument that Beijing's counterspace efforts are driven by strategic necessity is internally coherent and, hence, meets the first test of verisimilitude. The evidence provided thereafter with respect to the wide range of Chinese counterspace investments establishes, in my judgement, abundant external corroboration for the prior deduction of strategic necessity. I found it intriguing that neither Krepon, nor Hagt, nor Shen, nor Bao have anything to say about the formidable range of Chinese counterspace programmes I described. When they do comment, they focus almost exclusively on the kinetic-energy ASAT, despite my insistence that direct-attack systems remain only one component of a much larger stable of warfighting assets and, hence, must not be treated as some accidental anomaly. In short, the fact that China is heavily pursuing such a wide variety of counterspace instruments explains better than any 'comprehensive reading of the Chinese literature' what Beijing's intentions with respect to coping with US military superiority might be.
Tellis, Ashley J. "China's Military Space Stategy: An Exchange -- "Response"." Survival. Vol. 50, No. 1 (February-March 2008): 157-198. [ 4 quotes ]