Home > Bibliography > View Citation

View Citation


Walsh, Frank M. "Forging a Diplomatic Shield for American Satellites: The Case For Reevaluating The 2006 National Space Policy in Light of a Chinese Anti-Satellite System." Journal of Air Law and Commerce. Vol. 72 (Fall 2007): 759. [ 28 quotes ]

Evidence Related to this Citation

Protecting Satellites should take Precedence over Preserving Freedom of Action in Space
 
Protecting American satellites should take precedence over preserving freedom of action in space, which the current National Space Policy reveres. Unfettered action in space is only a means to the end of national security. A networked military, relying on real time satellite information, is a superior means of pursuing national security because the United States' "dependence on satellites for communications and the use of satellites for intelligence gathering far outweigh any potential benefits of placing power-projection systems in space." A deployable Chinese ASAT system threatens the United States' decided space advantage and thereby threatens its dominance in conventional military capability. On a more fundamental level, the Chinese ASAT test could stand as the ominous beginning of a space arms race where the United States and China vie for military supremacy in space. This eventuality is also a destabilizing scenario that would undermine the United States' terrestrial military dominance. By allowing all space assets to become viable targets, the United States would be forced to engage in the costly and technologically-daunting task of developing counter-ASAT weapons. Consequently, this Article argues that an ASAT treaty would best safeguard the United States' national security interests by diplomatically securing its satellites.
Walsh, Frank M. "Forging a Diplomatic Shield for American Satellites: The Case For Reevaluating The 2006 National Space Policy in Light of a Chinese Anti-Satellite System." Journal of Air Law and Commerce. Vol. 72 (Fall 2007): 759. [ 28 quotes ] [ page 762-763 ]
China's ASAT Test was a Demonstration of its Asymmetrical Capability against America's Military
 
First, China's decision to test an ASAT stemmed from its desire to exert greater influence within East Asia generally and over Taiwan specifically. American military dominance vis-a-vis the Chinese military represents a challenge to both of these goals. While Beijing was unwilling to accept the status quo of American military hegemony after the American military's effectiveness was showcased in Operation Desert Storm, China knew that it could not militarily challenge the United States force-on-force. Instead, Beijing sought out weaknesses in the American military so China could fight an asymmetrical war. In 1998, China's Central Committee gave its highest priority to the development of an ASAT and pursued several ASAT programs, including the use of lasers to blind satellites, jamming and electromagnetic pulses to disable electronics, and a "parasitic satellite" kinetic-energy vehicle. In the end, China succeeded in using a ballistic missile to hit a low-flying satellite. The test of an ASAT system was thus partly a demonstration that China had gained a new asymmetrical capability against America's military.
Walsh, Frank M. "Forging a Diplomatic Shield for American Satellites: The Case For Reevaluating The 2006 National Space Policy in Light of a Chinese Anti-Satellite System." Journal of Air Law and Commerce. Vol. 72 (Fall 2007): 759. [ 28 quotes ] [ page 766-767 ]
Chinese ASAT Test was a Reaction to U.S. Attempt to Exert Space Hegemony
 
Second, the ASAT test was a response to the perceived threat that the United States might someday attempt to deny China access to space. While space dominance, and by implication the denial of space access to others, was implied in American military publications in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the 2006 National Space Policy explicitly made space access denial a goal. The Policy demands that the Secretary of Defense "develop capabilities, plans, and options to ... , if directed, deny ... freedom of action [in space] to adversaries." China has invested heavily into satellite technologies over the past decade, launching thirty-nine satellites and spending between $ 1.4 and $ 2.2 billion on its space program. With this greater Chinese investment in space, the American threat of space denial carries even more weight. The ASAT test, then, was partly a result of Beijing's desire to tell Washington that China would not accept American space hegemony. As Michael Krepon, President Emeritus of the Henry L. Stimson Center, stated: "the Chinese are telling the Pentagon that the United States does not own space. China's message was that 'two could play the space weapons game, and we can play it dirtier than you.'"
Walsh, Frank M. "Forging a Diplomatic Shield for American Satellites: The Case For Reevaluating The 2006 National Space Policy in Light of a Chinese Anti-Satellite System." Journal of Air Law and Commerce. Vol. 72 (Fall 2007): 759. [ 28 quotes ] [ page 767-768 ]
Chinese ASAT Test was Meant to Dissuade US Deployment of Missile Defense
 
Finally, the Chinese ASAT test was also an attempt to show the United States that Beijing could target any space-based components of an American national ballistic missile defense (BMD) system. Cooperation between the United States, Japan, and India on missile defense threatens China because an integrated regional missile defense system could neutralize China's nuclear deterrent. But BMD does more than threaten China's strategic concerns - China has incorporated short-range and intermediate-range ballistic missiles into its operational plans for a conventional conflict to accomplish many of the goals that the United States accomplishes with fighters, bombers, and cruise missiles. As a relatively cheap and effective means of attacking over-the-horizon targets, ballistic missiles are China's "preferred method of power projection in the twenty-first century." When viewed from this perspective, an American BMD system is not just neutralizing China's strategic assets, but also its conventional strike assets.
Walsh, Frank M. "Forging a Diplomatic Shield for American Satellites: The Case For Reevaluating The 2006 National Space Policy in Light of a Chinese Anti-Satellite System." Journal of Air Law and Commerce. Vol. 72 (Fall 2007): 759. [ 28 quotes ] [ page 768-769 ]
Chinese Development of ASATs has Outpaced Intelligence Estimates
 
Regardless of the actual reason for the pursuit of an ASAT, China's research into the system outpaced almost all estimates. In early 2003, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency testified that ASAT systems would not be available for ten years. In 2004, political scientist Michael E. O'Hanlon underestimated the Chinese ASAT program when he posited that "China might also have means to attack U.S. space assets, particularly lower-flying reconnaissance satellites, by 2010 or 2015." The rapid rate of Chinese research, underestimated by the American intelligence community, should serve as a warning to American policy-makers: China has set its sights on asymmetrical systems that can target vulnerabilities in the American military.
Walsh, Frank M. "Forging a Diplomatic Shield for American Satellites: The Case For Reevaluating The 2006 National Space Policy in Light of a Chinese Anti-Satellite System." Journal of Air Law and Commerce. Vol. 72 (Fall 2007): 759. [ 28 quotes ] [ page 769-770 ]
Space Assets are the Foundation of Modern American Military Might
 
Satellites serve as the foundation upon which the modern networked American military stands. Communication between different elements of the military is relayed by satellites, enabling the United States to "essentially fuse[] its land-based conventional power projection capabilities with its space-based communications, navigation and reconnaissance capabilities." The beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom is illustrative of the central role satellites play in modern military operations. Satellite communications permitted fewer friendly-fire deaths, rapid precision air strikes, "unprecedented command and control" of forces, and a tour de force from Special Operations Forces who controlled large areas with limited resources. Additionally, 68 percent of munitions used in the twenty-nine-day battle were precision-guided weapons using satellite targeting - a stark change in ordinance from the unguided "dumb" bombs that had dominated the Air Force's arsenal for close to fifty years. Low-level targeting satellites allowed for an unprecedented 80 percent accuracy in air strikes.
Walsh, Frank M. "Forging a Diplomatic Shield for American Satellites: The Case For Reevaluating The 2006 National Space Policy in Light of a Chinese Anti-Satellite System." Journal of Air Law and Commerce. Vol. 72 (Fall 2007): 759. [ 28 quotes ] [ page 771 ]
ASATs could Cripple American Military Power
 
The Chinese ASAT threatens to destroy the critical links between American operational units. Coordination is so ingrained in modern American tactics that a sudden loss of communication could leave the American military fighting a battle for which it has not been trained. Because the United States no longer maintains comprehensive backup land lines, a Chinese ASAT could potentially sever the link between American conventional forces and leave the American military disoriented, uncoordinated, and fighting a war without real-time intelligence. Not only are satellites the crucial link in sustaining America's RMA, but they are also extremely vulnerable to attack. As described in Part III, infra, no technology exists to make satellites durable enough to withstand an attack like the kinetic energy kill vehicle that destroyed the FY-1C. The satellites that have allowed for unprecedented American military effectiveness are also America's Achilles' heel: they are vulnerable and, if attacked, threaten to bring down a seemingly unstoppable warrior.
Walsh, Frank M. "Forging a Diplomatic Shield for American Satellites: The Case For Reevaluating The 2006 National Space Policy in Light of a Chinese Anti-Satellite System." Journal of Air Law and Commerce. Vol. 72 (Fall 2007): 759. [ 28 quotes ] [ page 771-772 ]
U.S. National Space Policy should Focus on Best Means to Defend American Satellites rather than Current Flawed Focus on Preserving Operational Freedom
 
The inherent flaw in the 2006 Space Policy is that it values a means to an end more than the end. The need for operational freedom in space as a means to safeguard national security has become so institutionalized that other paths to national security are rejected if they restrict operational freedom. The institutionalization of a policy occurs when an organization fails to keep its ultimate goal in mind, but rather only thinks of the near-term, and in so doing, loses the forest for the trees. The United States is correct when it says it will "take those actions necessary to protect its space capabilities; respond to interference; and deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to U.S. national interests." But there are many paths to protecting space capabilities, and denying adversaries the use of hostile space capabilities, including the diplomatic measures that the 2006 Space Policy categorically rejects. The danger in conflating a nation's goal and a possible means to that goal is that the means may become an institutionalized goal in itself, whereby policy makers may begin to adopt strategies that advance freedom of space action, but may not necessarily improve national security.

In assessing how to craft a policy response to a potential Chinese ASAT system, the United States should first decide on its goal. Given the importance of satellites to the networked, systems-oriented American military, Washington's paramount goal should be to protect America's satellite assets. Despite America's unchallenged superiority in air and space, America's satellites remain vulnerable to a variety of weapons. The best way to achieve the goal of space security is to draft a National Space Policy that permits the most effective defense of American satellites, whether it is by military, technological, diplomatic, or a combination of means. American national security is safeguarded just as well if the United States stops a Chinese ASAT system at the negotiating table rather than on the battlefield.
Walsh, Frank M. "Forging a Diplomatic Shield for American Satellites: The Case For Reevaluating The 2006 National Space Policy in Light of a Chinese Anti-Satellite System." Journal of Air Law and Commerce. Vol. 72 (Fall 2007): 759. [ 28 quotes ] [ page 773-774 ]
Existing BMD Technology Ineffective against Chinese Direct-Ascent Missile ASAT
 
A BMD could not likely be used to neutralize a ballistic missile ASAT system in the near-term. As Richard Lehner of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) describes, the inherent problem "Is really the timing ... . If a missile is launched to destroy a satellite there is an incredibly short response time with which to try to intercept that missile." The current national missile defense systems target missiles with trajectories stretching tens-of-thousands of kilometers long, and reaching from Asia to North America. An anti-ASAT interceptor must hit targets with trajectories that are only several hundred kilometers long. The most promising BMD technologies being pursued by the MDA intercept the ballistic missile at either the boost phase, during the ballistic missile's initial ascent, or the terminal phase, immediately before the missile hits its target. Terminal phase defenses would not work against ASAT weapons because an ASAT has no terminal phase - it ends its flight in space. Boost phase technologies like the Airborne Laser, which fires a concentrated beam of light at ballistic missiles at altitudes below three hundred miles, are limited by the need to have defensive assets in position to respond to a launch within seconds. As Mr. Lehner describes, boost phase defenses could potentially work if they are "in exactly the right place at exactly the right time." Given these narrow constraints, it is highly unlikely that current BMD technologies could neutralize a Chinese ASAT.
Walsh, Frank M. "Forging a Diplomatic Shield for American Satellites: The Case For Reevaluating The 2006 National Space Policy in Light of a Chinese Anti-Satellite System." Journal of Air Law and Commerce. Vol. 72 (Fall 2007): 759. [ 28 quotes ] [ page 776 ]
Satellites could be Equipped with Evasion Technologies to Detect and Avoid Some Incoming ASATs
 
The United States could research and develop technologies that would "harden" satellites to the point where they could evade or survive attacks. This approach requires a variety of different mechanisms to be incorporated into new satellite designs. First, satellites could be equipped with sensors to detect incoming ballistic weapons and rockets so they can maneuver out of the way of a kinetic kill vehicle. While this option would likely require too much fuel to be practical for bigger satellites, increased maneuverability could work against a rudimentary ballistic missile system like the current Chinese design. Better ASAT guidance and tracking systems, however, could neutralize satellite maneuvering efforts by allowing an ASAT weapon to change course as it approaches the targeted satellite.
Walsh, Frank M. "Forging a Diplomatic Shield for American Satellites: The Case For Reevaluating The 2006 National Space Policy in Light of a Chinese Anti-Satellite System." Journal of Air Law and Commerce. Vol. 72 (Fall 2007): 759. [ 28 quotes ] [ page 777 ]
Rapid Replacement of Satellites is Best Way to Defend Satellites against Kinetic-Energy ASATs
 
Alternatively, a backup system of replacement of satellites could help the United States reestablish its network in the case of a first strike. The capability to relaunch satellites is a unique goal because it is more of a logistical problem of rapidly launching satellites and less of a technological problem of hardening satellites against potentially awesome destructive power. Because it is virtually "impossible to harden satellites against direct assaults by kinetic energy ASATs" like the one China tested, a replacement program may be the only way to guarantee continued satellite operations. This system would also provide additional benefits since it would allow the United States to deploy replacements when the original satellites fail because of normal maintenance failure.
Walsh, Frank M. "Forging a Diplomatic Shield for American Satellites: The Case For Reevaluating The 2006 National Space Policy in Light of a Chinese Anti-Satellite System." Journal of Air Law and Commerce. Vol. 72 (Fall 2007): 759. [ 28 quotes ] [ page 777 ]
Deploying Countermeasures to ASATs Only Continues Arms Race Logic -- Should First Try Diplomacy
 
Nevertheless, all of these hardening approaches are only marginal defenses against a determined ASAT attack. A more complex ASAT, with better guidance and greater maneuverability, could defeat these systems and once again expose American satellites. But a non-diplomatic approach to the ASAT threat fails on a more fundamental level: it ushers in a space arms race. If the United States deploys counter-ASAT weapons, then China will develop better ASATs, and the United States will in turn pursue better countermeasures. According to H. Baker Spring of the Heritage Foundation, a conservative policy institute, a potential space arms race would most likely run to "billions or tens of billions of dollars a year, pretty much year in and year out." The result of this expensive endeavor, even if the United States is successful, would ultimately be the status quo of American satellite safety. A better policy would be to pursue the goal of American satellite safety via a less expensive and less risky path.
Walsh, Frank M. "Forging a Diplomatic Shield for American Satellites: The Case For Reevaluating The 2006 National Space Policy in Light of a Chinese Anti-Satellite System." Journal of Air Law and Commerce. Vol. 72 (Fall 2007): 759. [ 28 quotes ] [ page 777 ]
Both the U.S. and China have a Vested Interest in Maintaining the Status Quo in Outer Space
 
For the United States, maintaining the status quo condition of having no ASATs deployed is the optimal space policy. As described supra, the United States has a vested interest in protecting its satellites, and non-diplomatic solutions cannot protect America's space assets. An ASAT treaty, on the other hand, could prevent unrestricted space warfare and the indiscriminate targeting of American satellites. The benefits to the United States are not only military but economic as well, because the United States has invested hundreds of millions of dollars into its civilian and commercial satellites. These benefits, when obtained via an ASAT treaty, would secure America's conventional dominance at a fraction of the cost of a space arms race. Thus, a policy of no ASAT deployment is America's optimal policy because it is the cheapest way to achieve the most beneficial space policy.

China's optimal space policy is also the status quo because the current situation: (1) contains no deployed ASATs, and (2) space access is not challenged. The lack of an operational American ASAT benefits China because Beijing has invested heavily in satellites over the past fifteen years. In November 2000, China issued a White Paper on space policy saying: "the Chinese government attaches great importance to the significant role of space activities in implementing the strategy of revitalizing the country ... . The development of space activities is encouraged and supported by the government as an integral part of the state's comprehensive development strategy." The Chinese government followed up on this pledge with an ambitious plan that launched thirty-nine satellites in the past eleven years to give China the world's fourth largest satellite space program. With such an extensive investment in space, China stands to lose billions of dollars if it ever engaged in satellite warfare with the United States.
Walsh, Frank M. "Forging a Diplomatic Shield for American Satellites: The Case For Reevaluating The 2006 National Space Policy in Light of a Chinese Anti-Satellite System." Journal of Air Law and Commerce. Vol. 72 (Fall 2007): 759. [ 28 quotes ] [ page 780 ]
Dual-Use Nature of most Satellites Causes both U.S. and China to Mistrust Each Other's Intentions in Space
 
The lack of communication on arms control between the United States and China is a product of a fundamental lack of trust between the two countries on space policy. The distrust has two major causes: (1) the inherently dual-use nature of satellites and (2) a series of controversies in the past two decades. First, many satellites are neither definitively military nor civilian, but can serve both purposes simultaneously - approximately ninety-five percent of space technology has both civil and military applications. This "dual-use" nature of satellites complicates negotiations on space policy because it is very difficult to determine whether a satellite launch is part of a military or civilian endeavor. In a cognate of the perennial glass half-full or half-empty question, American and Chinese policy makers are often called upon to classify a satellite that could be either military or civilian and divine the intent behind the satellite's deployment. Since the nature of a given satellite is difficult to determine without intrusive inspections, both sides have assumed that the other's use of satellites has some sinister military use.
Walsh, Frank M. "Forging a Diplomatic Shield for American Satellites: The Case For Reevaluating The 2006 National Space Policy in Light of a Chinese Anti-Satellite System." Journal of Air Law and Commerce. Vol. 72 (Fall 2007): 759. [ 28 quotes ] [ page 781-782 ]
Cox Commission Report has Created a Legacy of Mistrust between U.S. and China on Space Policy
 
The second reason for the lack of Sino-American communication on space policy stems from a series of controversies beginning in the 1990s. In April 1998, the New York Times published a story alleging that two companies, Loral Space and Communications and Hughes Electronics, had given China confidential technical information on how to improve Chinese nuclear missiles. After a Justice Department investigation, Loral and Hughes agreed to settle the case after accepting fines of $ 6 million and $ 20 million, respectively. Following the Department of Justice investigation, the House of Representatives established the Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China (Cox Commission), which recommended a number of additional regulations to prevent another intentional transfer of technical space knowledge to foreign powers. The Cox Commission's report engendered much mistrust of China, and since the report's publication, the Department of State has not granted any export licenses for China-bound satellite launch vehicles. As a result of these two factors and general reservations about China for its opaque government and questionable human rights record, the United States has been reluctant to trust China. For its own part, China does not trust the United States to maintain a peaceful posture in space.
Walsh, Frank M. "Forging a Diplomatic Shield for American Satellites: The Case For Reevaluating The 2006 National Space Policy in Light of a Chinese Anti-Satellite System." Journal of Air Law and Commerce. Vol. 72 (Fall 2007): 759. [ 28 quotes ] [ page 782-3 ]
Distrust between U.S. and China has Deadlocked Space Arms Control discussions in the U.N. Conference on Disarmament
 
As a result of this mistrust, there has been no real communication on disarmament or arms control in the last decade. The United Nations Conference on Disarmament (CD) has been deadlocked for close to a decade, partially because the United States has opposed any negotiations on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) and China has opposed any negotiation on a fissile material cut-off treaty in the absence of negotiations on PAROS. In 1998, the CD appointed special ad hoc committees to try and break this deadlock in talks, but to date these committees have made no progress. There is currently no real likelihood that either China or the United States will change its entrenched bargaining position without a major new policy initiative. Neither side trusts the other, and, as a result, neither side is willing to engage in strategic communications over how to resolve the Chinese ASAT threat.
Walsh, Frank M. "Forging a Diplomatic Shield for American Satellites: The Case For Reevaluating The 2006 National Space Policy in Light of a Chinese Anti-Satellite System." Journal of Air Law and Commerce. Vol. 72 (Fall 2007): 759. [ 28 quotes ] [ page 782 ]
Security Dilemma Paradigm is a Useful Framework for Understanding U.S.-Chinese Military Space Policy
 
This security dilemma paradigm is, like all models, an oversimplication of Sino-American space relations. For ex-ample, the United States and China do not engage in a single policy confrontation but rather make hundreds of policy decisions each day. That is, the United States and China play the "game" every day. This repeated play can affect the decision-making process in the game by making cooperative play either more or less likely. Also, there are countless externalities involved in the policy-making process that could never be adequately integrated into a model. Neverthe-less, the security dilemma is a useful paradigm because it isolates the fundamental policy options for Sino-American space policy. Additionally, the values attributed to each payoff can be altered and the security dilemma still functions as long as the structure of the game remains unchanged. Uncontested space control is valued highest, cooperative action is valued second, a space arms race is valued third, and being at the mercy of an ASAT-wielding power is last. Thus, the security dilemma is a simplified yet effective approach for policy-makers attempting to craft America's response to the Chinese ASAT.

This set-up is called a dilemma because, even though the United States and China would be better off refraining from starting an arms race, pictured in the top-left square, both countries will likely choose to begin the arms race when acting out of self-interest. The decision-making process, for the United States, proceeds as follows: (1) if China were to deploy an ASAT, then it would be in America's best interest to also deploy an ASAT (moving its utility from negative 10 to negative 5); (2) if China were to refrain from deploying an ASAT, then it would again be in America's best interest to deploy an ASAT (moving utility from five to ten). The decision-making process for China is identical: in every situation, both countries choose to deploy ASAT systems.
Walsh, Frank M. "Forging a Diplomatic Shield for American Satellites: The Case For Reevaluating The 2006 National Space Policy in Light of a Chinese Anti-Satellite System." Journal of Air Law and Commerce. Vol. 72 (Fall 2007): 759. [ 28 quotes ] [ page 785-6 ]
A Space Arms Control Treaty is Best Way for U.S. and China to break out of Security Dillema
 
China has actively advocated for a comprehensive treaty regime that limits the weaponization of space, and Chinese officials have routinely suggested space weapons bans at the United Nations Conference on Disarmament. Beijing would likely be willing to engage the United States if Washington was to seriously address the issue of banning ASAT weapons. The onus is thus on the United States to take China up on its offer to negotiate. The 2006 National Security Strategy correctly argues that the United States "seeks to encourage China to make the right strategic choices for its people[.]" With respect to American space policy, this means that Washington should encourage Beijing to refrain from deploying ASAT weapons and to avoid a costly space arms race. The best way to do this is through a treaty that allows both China and the United States to cooperatively break out of the space weapons security dilemma.
Walsh, Frank M. "Forging a Diplomatic Shield for American Satellites: The Case For Reevaluating The 2006 National Space Policy in Light of a Chinese Anti-Satellite System." Journal of Air Law and Commerce. Vol. 72 (Fall 2007): 759. [ 28 quotes ] [ page 786 ]
Workable Verification Regime is Biggest Policy Hurdle for Space Arms Control
 
The biggest policy hurdle for an ASAT treaty is the issue of verification: that is, whether verification provisions could give "timely warning, with appropriate confidence, of violations of formal provisions of a treaty limiting ASAT acts, capabilities and preparations." Critics of an ASAT treaty uniformly claim that such an instrument would be an unverifiable leap of faith that rogue nations could covertly ignore with impunity. Satellites are inherently "dual-use" because the same satellite can be used for both peaceful and military purposes without any detectable alteration. Dating back to the Reagan administration, critics have uniformly dismissed ASAT treaties as "effectively unverifiable" and therefore not worth pursuing. A renewed push for an ASAT treaty in response to the Chinese test must thus address how party-states could verify compliance with the treaty.
Walsh, Frank M. "Forging a Diplomatic Shield for American Satellites: The Case For Reevaluating The 2006 National Space Policy in Light of a Chinese Anti-Satellite System." Journal of Air Law and Commerce. Vol. 72 (Fall 2007): 759. [ 28 quotes ] [ page 787-788 ]
Existing International Space Law Lacks Formalized Verification Procedures as Basis for ASAT Arms Control
 
An ASAT verification regime would break new ground in space law because none of the existing space treaties contain the type of formalized verification procedures codified in other arms control treaties. For example, the Outer Space Treaty, which bans nuclear weapons in space and restricts the use of celestial bodies to "peaceful purposes," has no real verification procedure. Articles X and XII of the Outer Space Treaty allow a party-state that suspects a violation of the treaty to request a "consultation," but there is no duty on the accused state to take any action. Article 15 of the Moon Treaty contains a similar empty verification provision where state parties "may request consultations" if they believe there has been a treaty violation. This type of toothless verification offers little guidance to those who desire effective ASAT verification. Consequently, there is a virtual blank slate in devising how an ASAT treaty's verification procedures would effectively advance the cause of arms control.
Walsh, Frank M. "Forging a Diplomatic Shield for American Satellites: The Case For Reevaluating The 2006 National Space Policy in Light of a Chinese Anti-Satellite System." Journal of Air Law and Commerce. Vol. 72 (Fall 2007): 759. [ 28 quotes ] [ page 789 ]
Realistically Verifiable ASAT Treaty would Focus on Prohibiting the Testing, Deployment, and Use of ASATs
 
The first step in creating a verifiable treaty is setting up verifiable and effective treaty goals. For an ASAT treaty, this means identifying verifiable treaty provisions that effectively preclude the targeting of satellites. There is an inherent tension in this process: provisions that are more effective in precluding the deployment of ASATs tend to be more difficult to verify. For example, a total ban on any research, development, testing, deployment, or use of ASAT technologies would effectively stop an ASAT system. Such a comprehensive ban, however, would be virtually impossible to verify because the United States could not reasonably monitor all research and development in all Chinese laboratories, nor is it likely that Beijing would allow such comprehensive investigations by American investigators. The difficulty in constructing an arms control treaty is deciding at which point in the production chain of a new weapon the treaty should stop a nation's actions: at the initial research stages, when a country starts to develop prototypes; when a country begins testing the weapons system; when a country deploys a new weapons system; or when a country uses a weapon against an enemy. A treaty that stops action too early in this chain is unverifiable, while a treaty that stops action too late in the chain is not effective in precluding destabilizing weapons systems.

A realistic ASAT ban would prohibit the testing, deployment, and use of ASATs because this type of ban would effectively stop the development of ASATs in a way that party-states could verify. The three major draft ASAT treaties all agree that a treaty regime should stop the creation of an ASAT at the testing stage because it is at that "crucial point" where ASAT systems can be stopped in an effective and verifiable manner. Stopping ASATs at the testing stage is effective because, without field tests, an ASAT system cannot be relied upon as a weapons system. Theoretical simulations can only moderately model the real world, and in order to deploy an effective ASAT system, a country must test the weapon against satellites. If an ASAT treaty bans the testing of ASATs, then it interdicts the creation of an ASAT system long before that ASAT is deployed or used. This kind of advanced notice of a country's progress in the field of ASAT weaponry will allow non-violating countries to respond to the diplomatic transgression. Thus, this type of ASAT ban would effectively prevent an ASAT system.
Walsh, Frank M. "Forging a Diplomatic Shield for American Satellites: The Case For Reevaluating The 2006 National Space Policy in Light of a Chinese Anti-Satellite System." Journal of Air Law and Commerce. Vol. 72 (Fall 2007): 759. [ 28 quotes ] [ page 789-90 ]
National Technical Means could be Used to Verify an International Treaty against ASAT Testing, Deployment, and Use
 
Banning ASAT activity at the testing, deployment, and use stages is verifiable. Using satellites and other remote monitoring devices known as national technical means (NTM), it would be "relatively easy" to detect the testing, deployment, or actual use of ASAT technologies. NTM was the mainstay of arms control verification during much of the Cold War and was fundamental to the verification regimes in the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF), and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). The immediate detection of the January 11, 2007 Chinese ASAT test showcased how effectively American intelligence could detect ASAT tests; indeed, the United States also detected the two previous tests of the Chinese SC-19 ASAT weapon. The United States can also likely detect any deployments of ASAT weapons by using reconnaissance satellites. In fact, America's ability to track China's deployment of SC-19 mobile launchers before the January test is a testament to the prowess of American reconnaissance efforts. Finally, the United States can detect the actual use of ASATs by identifying the destruction of a known satellite. In sum, the United States currently has the NTM to reliably detect when other countries test, deploy, or use ASAT technologies.
Walsh, Frank M. "Forging a Diplomatic Shield for American Satellites: The Case For Reevaluating The 2006 National Space Policy in Light of a Chinese Anti-Satellite System." Journal of Air Law and Commerce. Vol. 72 (Fall 2007): 759. [ 28 quotes ] [ page 791-792 ]
On-Site Inspections and Consultations could Supplement but not Replace National Technical Means in ASAT Testing Arms Control Treaty
 
An ASAT treaty could rely on other verification mechanisms aside from NTM. First, on-site inspections could give investigating countries valuable information on facilities not observable by NTM. While countries may be reluctant to allow intrusive on-site inspections of classified space-research laboratories, inspection concerns may be alleviated if an ASAT treaty established a formalized inspection regime similar to the regime set up in the 1987 INF Treaty. The Soviet Union proposed this kind of an independent ASAT inspectorate in March 1987. Under the Soviet plan, the international inspectorate would station permanent observers at all space launch facilities. The utility of on-site inspections in the ASAT context is questionable, however, because ASATs can be launched from mobile launchers that can evade inspectors. But even if on-site inspections might be better suited to large-scale weapons systems that are stationary in nature, the inspections might nevertheless have a place in ASAT verification as a guard against new ASAT technologies like highly-concentrated lasers that require substantial energy. Alternatively, countries could supplement NTM with a less intrusive consultation regime. Similar to the mechanisms described in the Outer Space Treaty and the Moon Treaty, party-states to an ASAT treaty could agree to discuss any perceived violations of the treaty. Consultation adds little confidence to a verification procedure, however, because consultations are largely dependent on the good will of the party-states to the treaty. With this in mind, NTM remains the best means for verifying potential violations of an ASAT treaty.
Walsh, Frank M. "Forging a Diplomatic Shield for American Satellites: The Case For Reevaluating The 2006 National Space Policy in Light of a Chinese Anti-Satellite System." Journal of Air Law and Commerce. Vol. 72 (Fall 2007): 759. [ 28 quotes ] [ page 792-793 ]
Verification of an ASAT Testing Ban will only become more Difficult as Tests Improve ASAT capabilities
 
The ability to verify ASAT technology deteriorates with every successful ASAT test because ASAT technology is most observable at the testing stage. NTM can detect missile tests that hit or pass near satellites, so monitoring ASAT development at this point is relatively easy. However, once an ASAT "weapon is developed and deployed[,] its small size and non-distinctive deployment mode" would make verification of a ban impossible. The need for an ASAT treaty is time sensitive: the longer the United States and China wait to negotiate a treaty, the less reliable the treaty will be. The January 11, 2007 Chinese test, the Soviet tests in the 1970s, and the American ASAT tests in the 1980s have all shown a rudimentary ability to use ASATs. An ASAT treaty is needed now before any further ASAT tests move weapons development from the testing to deployment stage.
Walsh, Frank M. "Forging a Diplomatic Shield for American Satellites: The Case For Reevaluating The 2006 National Space Policy in Light of a Chinese Anti-Satellite System." Journal of Air Law and Commerce. Vol. 72 (Fall 2007): 759. [ 28 quotes ] [ page 793-794 ]
U.S. could Safeguard Space Arms Control Treaty against Technological Obsolesence by Including Periodic Review Periods, Modelled after Non-Proliferation Treaty
 
The decision to subject the Non-Proliferation treaty to a comprehensive review was a result of a compromise at the negotiating table and the realization that "the treaty was not perfect and that its provisions might not stand the test of time."

Similarly, a potential ASAT treaty should incorporate a twenty-five year review so the signatories could reassess whether the treaty had fulfilled its goals. For the United States, this means that in twenty-five years, Washington could determine whether its interests were best being served by safeguarding its satellites and resisting the weaponization of space. If no other country had deployed space assets threatening America's terrestrial military hegemony, then continued reliance on the treaty would be appropriate. If, however, other nations had begun to field innovative and potentially destabilizing weapons, then the United States could find that withdrawal from an ASAT treaty would be in its best interests. With the inclusion of a twenty-five year horizon, an ASAT/Space Weapons ban effectively codifies the status quo in space power for review at a future date. For the United States, the current terrestrial and space superpower, preserving the status quo power balance equates to preserving American dominance.
Walsh, Frank M. "Forging a Diplomatic Shield for American Satellites: The Case For Reevaluating The 2006 National Space Policy in Light of a Chinese Anti-Satellite System." Journal of Air Law and Commerce. Vol. 72 (Fall 2007): 759. [ 28 quotes ] [ page 794-795 ]
U.S. Could Hedge Against Breakout by Including Withdrawal Provision into any Space Arms Control Treaty
 
A second way to preserve future operational freedom would be to incorporate a standard withdrawal provision into the treaty. Generally, withdrawal provisions allow party-states to withdraw in response to "extraordinary events related to the subject matter" after giving other members notice of their intent to withdraw. For example, the NPT allows for withdrawal with three months notice and the ABM treaty allows for withdrawal with six months notice. Functionally, an ASAT treaty with a withdrawal provision would preserve the status quo of no ASAT weapons while giving party-states the ability to respond to changes in circumstances that threaten the status quo. More importantly, the chances that China could covertly test and deploy an effective ASAT are slim because of America's intelligence capacity. The United States detected the SC-19's previous launches and knew about the January 11, 2007 test before the launch. America's verification capability would only improve under a treaty regime that allowed for greater access.
Walsh, Frank M. "Forging a Diplomatic Shield for American Satellites: The Case For Reevaluating The 2006 National Space Policy in Light of a Chinese Anti-Satellite System." Journal of Air Law and Commerce. Vol. 72 (Fall 2007): 759. [ 28 quotes ] [ page 795-796 ]
ASAT Issue could be a Key Test for Sino-American Relations
 
The policy problems associated with the Chinese ASAT test are symptomatic of more systemic problems in Sino-American relations. Samuel P. Huntington, a noted international relations scholar, has argued that the "increasingly antagonistic relations" between the United States, the current superpower, and China, the world's rising superpower, are part of the inherent friction in the shifting of global power. Other political scientists have argued that the state of Sino-American relations is part of inevitable real politik or the beginning of a new Cold War. Regardless of the cause of the rift between the United States and China, American policy-makers must now decide how to respond to the Chinese ASAT test amidst poor relations. There are two basic possibilities: (1) the United States could assume that relations will continue to deteriorate so America should pursue military technologies to confront an inevitable enemy, or (2) the United States could decide that a new Cold War is not a fait accompli and that it should attempt to find cooperative solutions where possible. An ASAT treaty that serves the strategic needs of both the United States and China could be the first step in following the latter option.
Walsh, Frank M. "Forging a Diplomatic Shield for American Satellites: The Case For Reevaluating The 2006 National Space Policy in Light of a Chinese Anti-Satellite System." Journal of Air Law and Commerce. Vol. 72 (Fall 2007): 759. [ 28 quotes ] [ page 797 ]
Successful Diplomatic Resolution of ASAT Issue could have Broader Consequences for Sino-American Relations
 
The ASAT security dilemma is a microcosm of Sino-American relations as a whole. Just as the United States and China would be better off pursuing a cooperative ASAT treaty instead of a costly arms race, the two countries would also be better off pursuing cooperative national security policies instead of an antagonistic zero-sum game. The major impediments to breaking out of this bigger security dilemma are the same impediments to cooperative action in the ASAT context: the United States and China must communicate and trust each other. Both are difficult. But maybe the first steps in a fundamental change in Sino-American relations could begin with a single space treaty - perhaps protecting the satellites that are vital to both countries could be the beginning of a recognition of Beijing's and Washington's similarities.

Reengaging China on the issue of ASAT weapons would represent a breakthrough in Sino-American relations. This kind of diplomatic coup is not unlike President Ronald Reagan's call for nuclear abolition at the 1985 Reykjavik Summit with Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, an unprecedented move that shocked the world and a number of Reagan's advisors. While negotiations on nuclear abolition broke down after Reagan refused to concede on BMD, Reagan's maverick diplomacy set the stage for future diplomatic engagement with the Soviet Union. As Reagan's Secretary of State, George P. Shultz, explained, "the world was not ready for Ronald Reagan's boldness. What happened at Reykjavik seemed almost too much for people to absorb, precisely because it was outside the bounds of conventional wisdom... . We were ... contemplating the notion of a world without nuclear weapons." The time for "boldness" and thinking "outside the bounds of conventional wisdom" in the field of arms control may have come once again, but this time in the context of ASAT abolition.
Walsh, Frank M. "Forging a Diplomatic Shield for American Satellites: The Case For Reevaluating The 2006 National Space Policy in Light of a Chinese Anti-Satellite System." Journal of Air Law and Commerce. Vol. 72 (Fall 2007): 759. [ 28 quotes ] [ page 797-798 ]