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Zhang, Hui and Pavel Podvig. Russian and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space. Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2008. [ 16 quotes ]

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Multiple Countermeasure Options for Defeating Boost-Phase Missile Defense
 
Boost-phase defenses. The pursuit of a more effective missile defense, as envisioned by the Bush administration, would require space-based intercept components—such as the SBI and SBL—to catch missiles in their boost phase. As the recent report from the American Physical Society (APS) on boost- phase defense discussed, a number of countermeasures for SBI could be developed.103 One of the most potent countermeasures would be a fast-burn boost. Because it reduces the boost time by using solid-fuel, the fast-burn booster would make the job of a boost-phase interceptor defense extremely challenging or infeasible. The APS study concluded, "Switching from liquid- propellant to typical solid-propellant ICBMs would cut the boost phase by a minute or more. Boost phases as short as 130 seconds are certainly possible; such missiles would be practically impossible to intercept." As reported, China is developing solid-fuel ICBMs, and may be able to develop faster-burn rockets in the future. Other possible countermeasures include: lofting or de- pressing the trajectory of the ICBM relative to the maximum-range trajectory to evade attacks from space weapons; spoofing the defender's tracking sen- sors by deploying small, rocket-propelled decoys from the missile that mast or mimic the radar and electro-optical characteristics of the booster; and changing the brightness and configuration of the exhaust plume of the ICBM to make it more difficult for infrared sensors to locate the real missile body. For SBL, countermeasures could include: rotating the missile to distribute the laser energy from SBL over a wide area and protecting the vulnerable parts of the ICBM with reflective or ablative coatings.
Zhang, Hui and Pavel Podvig. Russian and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space. Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2008. [ 16 quotes ] [ page 54 ]
Midcourse Missile Defenses can be Easily Defeated with Countermeasures
 
Midcourse missile defenses. A number of countermeasures could feasibly defeat midcourse missile defense. Chinese scientists have followed and dis- cussed, for example, those countermeasures shown in the Union of Con- cerned Scientists/MIT report Countermeasures: A Technical Evaluation of the Op- erational Effectiveness of the Planned US National Missile Defense System.98 One efficient and simple countermeasure would be the deployment of decoys with each ICBM. Decoys can "confuse" the interceptor's sensors system, making it unable to discriminate between the real warhead and the decoys. The decoys might replicate the warhead or appear slightly different from one another and from the warhead. China might also disguise the warhead—a technique known as "antisimulation"—by enclosing it in a radar-reflecting balloon, cov- ering it with a shroud, hiding it in a cloud of chaff, or by using electronic or infrared jamming measures. These penetration aids, antisimulation and decoy technologies, are within China's capability.99 China has reportedly made some missile flight tests with penetration aids, such as the first flight test of China's new DF-31 ICBM, which included decoys, on August 2, 1999.100 China could also employ countermeasures to reduce the radar and in- frared signatures of the warhead, making detection more difficult. For exam- ple, China could reduce the radar cross-section of the nuclear warhead by shaping the reentry vehicle (or a shroud around it) as a sharply pointed cone and/or by coating it with radar-absorbing material. China could reduce the infrared signature of the warhead by covering it with a low-emissivity coating or by using a shroud cooled to low temperature by liquid nitrogen.
Zhang, Hui and Pavel Podvig. Russian and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space. Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2008. [ 16 quotes ] [ page 54 ]
China's Committment to FMCT Dependent on Satisfactory Settlement of Space Weapons / Missile Defense Issue
 
Participation in Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. A conservative estimate of China's existing stockpile suggests about two tons of weapons-grade highly enriched uranium and one ton of separated plutonium.136 The existing stockpile would be sufficient for modernizing China's nuclear forces under the assumption that the U.S. does not deploy a missile defense system. However, if U.S. missile defense deployments become operational, China would very likely be driven to expand its ICBM arsenal significantly, as described above, both in quantity and quality. In that case, China would deplete its existing fissile material stockpile and might find it necessary to produce more fissile material. China might then wish to keep open the option to restart production of fissile materials and therefore be unwilling to join a global fissile material cutoff treaty.
Zhang, Hui and Pavel Podvig. Russian and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space. Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2008. [ 16 quotes ] [ page 62-3 ]
China could Decline to Ratify CTBT in Retaliation for US Space Weapons Push
 
Nuclear test ban ratification. China signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996 and has not yet ratified it, partly because the U. S. Senate rejected it in 1999. However, U.S. missile defense and space weaponization plans make it politically difficult for China to consider ratification. The cessation of nuclear weapons test explosions and all other nuclear explosions, as called for in the CTBT, would constrain qualitative improvement of China's existing nuclear weapons and the development of new advanced weapons. In the event of a continuing challenge from the United States, China would need further nuclear tests to avoid a major degradation or neutralization of their limited retaliatory capability. For example, China may need additional nuclear tests to reduce the size of new warheads as needed for deployment of MIRVed missiles or complicated decoys. The development of maneuvering warheads would also require tests. Already, some Chinese scientists and arms control experts believe that China made significant sacrifices in signing the CTBT, arguing that the CTBT places more direct constraints on China's nuclear weapons program than on the weapons programs of other states. However, to achieve the goal of complete prohibition and eventual destruction of nuclear weapons, China decided to sign the treaty despite its drawbacks. Many Chinese question why other nations, including China, should care about an international agreement such as the CTBT when the United States, in pursuing its own absolute security, damages the security of other nations and expresses no interest in international treaties
Zhang, Hui and Pavel Podvig. Russian and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space. Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2008. [ 16 quotes ] [ page 64-5 ]
China has Multiple Ways to Respond to US Space Weapons, all of which would Negatively Impact Global Security
 
In summary, the development and deployment of U.S. missile defense sys- tems, including weapons in space, would definitely encourage a number of responses from China including technological development, military counter- measures, and political realignment. The type of response would depend on the specific infrastructure of U.S. missile defense and space weaponization programs. At the moment and in the near future, China's major response would be to take an arms control approach, such as firmly advocating at the CD a legal instrument to prevent space weaponization. Facing very limited missile defense deployment, e.g., the initial GMD currently under deployment, China might focus on building more road-mobile ICBMs and developing a variety of penetration aids. If a stronger missile defense system with more inter- ceptors is deployed, China would need to produce more fissile material to fuel more warheads, thus influencing its FMCT participation. If China is confront- ed with the deployment of a layered (or space-based) missile defense system, it could consider additional measures such as using ASAT weapons.
Zhang, Hui and Pavel Podvig. Russian and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space. Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2008. [ 16 quotes ] [ page 65 ]
Focused Space Weapons Ban could be Acceptable to US because it would allow Ground-Based Missile Defense
 
A focused space weapons ban. If China wants to move past its complaints and toward an agreement, it will have to consider proposals that might conceivably be acceptable to the United States. A ban on space weapons that used a focused definition of these weapons, along with bilateral confidence- building measures, could be a first practical step to overcome the deadlock at the CD and to reduce the concerns of both the U.S. and China. The focused approach could include the following two core elements:

  • Banning the testing and deployment of any weapons in outer space, including space-based KEWs, space-based DEWs, and any other space-based weapons for attacking space-, ground-, sea-, or air-based targets. This would rule out space-weapon components of missile defense and ASAT systems.
  • Banning the testing and deployment of any "dedicated" ASAT weapons. This would include any weapon strike system—whether ground-based, sea-based, air-based, or space-based—against orbiting satellites.


Because all long- or intermediate-range ballistic missiles and high-altitude missile defense systems have inherent ASAT capabilities, it would not be practical to pursue a complete ban on ASATs. Although a ban on testing in "ASAT mode" would not eliminate all threats to satellites, it would reduce the cost and complexity of ensuring a reasonable level of satellite safety. Under such a regime, non-dedicated ASATs would not be able to reach high-value satellites in geosynchronous or high Earth orbit, including widely used weather satel- lites and civilian and military communications satellites, and some of the most stabilizing and defensive military satellites responsible for early warn- ings of missile launches and the detection of nuclear explosions.
Zhang, Hui and Pavel Podvig. Russian and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space. Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2008. [ 16 quotes ] [ page 73-4 ]
Space Weapons Arms Control would Reduce threat to U.S. Space Assets
 
A focused space weapons ban would reduce the proliferation of ASATs. It would reduce the risk of a "Space Pearl Harbor" for other military and civilian satellites. As many experts in the United States point out, the heavy de- pendence of the United States on its space assets means that it "has more to lose than to gain by opening the way to the testing and deployment of ASATs and space weapons." For example, the United States is now more depend- ent on satellites to perform important military functions than is any other state. By placing weapons in space, the United States might stimulate others to balance symmetrically and asymmetrically against U.S. space assets. It would be very difficult for the United States to maintain unchallenged hegemony in space weaponization, and many have argued that the United States' current military advantage in space assets would be lost or degraded by wea- ponization. Space weaponization would also threaten U.S. civilian and com- mercial assets. The economy and society of the United States are highly de- pendent on the applications of commercial satellites. Placing weapons in space would make these satellites much more vulnerable.
Zhang, Hui and Pavel Podvig. Russian and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space. Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2008. [ 16 quotes ] [ page 74 ]
China would View Space-Based Missile Defense as more Threatening than Ground-Based
 
From a Chinese perspective, a non-space-based BMD system would be less threatening to national security than a space-based missile defense system. As discussed above, countermeasures for mid-course missile defense systems would be less expensive and easier for China to develop. However, a space-based, boost-phase missile defense system would pose more threat than a non-space-based BMD system, because a boost-phase missile defense would have fewer targets, the target ICBM would be much larger and more fragile than the normal re-entry vehicle, and the target would be easily detectable due to the bright plumes of the burning booster. Moreover, a non-space-based, boost-phase missile defense system would not be able to cover ICBMs launched from China's interior. In fact, an ICBM at an altitude of 200 km is only detected within 1600 km by a sensor on the ground, and within 2000 km by a sensor at an altitude of 15 km. Because of the vastness of China's land holdings, the United States would have to destroy a Chinese missile in boost phase from space. As such, even a limited ban on space weapons would sig- nificantly reduce the threat to China posed by U.S. missile defense systems, assuming that Chinese military planners have confidence in countermeasures for midcourse missile defense systems.
Zhang, Hui and Pavel Podvig. Russian and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space. Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2008. [ 16 quotes ] [ page 75 ]
Russia more Likely to Pursue Assymetric Strategy Against US Space Weapons than try to Compete with US in Space Arms Race
 
Even if the United States decided to introduce weapons in space, Russia would be unlikely to follow. Its experience with anti-satellite programs is discouraging—the capabilities of the Soviet system were very limited and if used would have had virtually no impact on the ability of the United States to op- erate its own space-based systems. With the increase in U.S. capabilities in space, a system of the kind that the Soviet Union had in the 1970s would be even less useful today. Among other factors that would make development of space-related weapons systems less likely are the very high cost of such sys- tems and the lack of a proper organizational structure to support a development project in this area.

It is more likely that Russia would turn to a policy of "asymmetric response," planning measures to counter the systems developed by the United States should they present a threat to Russia's space assets. This policy would be relatively easy to implement, for, as already noted, Russia's limited reliance on space systems does not make its armed forces overly susceptible to an attack on space assets.
Zhang, Hui and Pavel Podvig. Russian and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space. Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2008. [ 16 quotes ] [ page 28-9 ]
Russia also Concerned about Strategic Effect of US use of Space Assets to Augment Conventional Forces
 
Although "space strike" weapons have a prominent place in the ongoing discussion in Russia about the military use of space, attention is also paid to the systems that support military operations on the ground. The most impor- tant of these are the systems that provide the reconnaissance, targeting, and navigation information that allow an attack to be conducted from a distance and to use flexible and accurate targeting. The Global Positioning System (GPS) navigation system and optical and electronic reconnaissance and com- munication satellites are among the currently deployed systems of this kind. It is correctly assumed that the number of these systems will grow with improvements in their technical characteristics and with their increased ability to operate as part of an extensive and well-coordinated network. A capabil- ity of this kind would introduce new uses of military force, and it is not yet understood how these would affect Russia's reliance on the strategic nuclear force that exists today. The resulting uncertainty is one of the reasons the Russian military is wary of the continued militarization of space, as it is unclear if Russia would be able to deal with the new situation.
Zhang, Hui and Pavel Podvig. Russian and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space. Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2008. [ 16 quotes ] [ page 3 ]
Recent Russian Military Reforms Created a Separate Russian Space Force
 
A series of reforms in recent years subordinated the air-defense component of the service to the Air Forces and transferred space-related branches— early-warning systems, space surveillance, and missile defense—to the Space Forces. This transformation remains a contentious point in Russia, and many analysts argue that defense in airspace and in outer space should be considered together and advocate an organizational reform that would facilitate integration between various defense systems. Defense officials express the point of view that although integration is indeed essential, it does not necessarily require further organizational changes.

The degree to which defending airspace and defending outer space are considered to be part of a single mission varies, but most experts agree that defenses are, at the very least, united by the strategic nature of any threat that they would have to counter. As a result, some strong parallels between air and space defense are drawn, and it is in this context that experts most often mention the need to counter space-based assets of the attacker. In discussions of this possibility, little distinction is made between "strike weapons" in space and support systems like navigation or communication. This is understand- able, as all these systems are assumed to be highly integrated.
Zhang, Hui and Pavel Podvig. Russian and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space. Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2008. [ 16 quotes ] [ page 4 ]
Unlikely Soviet-era ASAT System is Still Operational
 
The development of the Soviet ASAT system began in the early 1960s, and the first test flights of maneuverable spacecraft were performed in 1963–1964. The TsNII Kometa design bureau of the Ministry of Radio Industry managed the development of the system. The space launcher used in the system was a modified R-36 (SS-9) missile, developed by OKB-586 design bureau (now Yuzhnoye Design Bureau). In addition to the launcher and the interceptor spacecraft, the system included a network of space-surveillance radar and the command and control center.

Initial tests of the system were conducted in 1968. During subsequent tests, the system demonstrated its ability to destroy satellites in low orbits, with altitudes of up to 1000 km. The system was tested with different inter- cept geometries, onboard sensors, and proximity fuses (infrared and radar). The system was accepted for service and commissioned for active duty in 1979. The launchers were deployed at the Baykonur test site, where testing continued until 1982. In November 1983, the Soviet leadership announced a unilateral moratorium on further ASAT tests.

The status of the ASAT system deployed in Baykonur has never been officially disclosed, but it is certain that the system is no longer operational. Some reports indicate that the system underwent modernization that was completed in 1991. Parts of the space-surveillance network that were integral to the ASAT system were lost to Russia during the breakup of the Soviet Union. Russia formally decommissioned the system in 1993.
Zhang, Hui and Pavel Podvig. Russian and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space. Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2008. [ 16 quotes ] [ page 22 ]
Russia Lacks Critical, Up-to-date Space Infrastructure to become a Significant Military Space Power
 
First, Russia's ability to deploy a range of space-based military systems that would support the operations of the Russian armed forces—optical reconnaissance, navigation, and signal intelligence systems—is an essential component of competition in space. Russia does operate a number of systems of this kind, but, as discussed, none of them operates at full capacity. In addition, most of these systems were developed in the 1980s and have not been modernized for a substantial period of time, which hardly makes them suitable for support of modern military operations. In many cases, Russia has to deal with the low reliability of satellites developed in the Soviet Union. This was not a serious problem when the military had access to a virtually unlimited launch capacity. It is a problem for Russia now, however, as a large number of launches are required just to maintain constellations in a very limited configuration.
Zhang, Hui and Pavel Podvig. Russian and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space. Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2008. [ 16 quotes ] [ page 26-7 ]
Russia lacks the Necessary Ground Infrastructure to Fully Exploit Military Space Assets
 
There is another problem, potentially more serious, with the current Russian military space program. Realizing the full potential of space requires a significant investment in the creation of an infrastructure that would allow troops to use information and capabilities provided by the space-based components of the system. Although Russia has been improving its capability to launch satellites and to maintain and operate satellite constellations, the development of infrastructure on the ground remains the weakest link, limiting much of the effort to broaden the use of space systems. The Glonass satellite navigation system illustrates these points particularly well. It was developed in the 1970s and became operational in the mid-1980s. In recent years, Russia has invested considerable effort into having a full constellation of 24 Glonass satellites in orbit. In order to achieve this deployment, it had to upgrade the spacecraft to extend their lifetimes, as it could not otherwise provide enough launches to replace the satellites in orbit. However, even if the plan to populate all slots in the constellation succeeds, the ground infrastructure does not seem to be ready to take advantage of the system. For example, it was reported that the aircraft of Military Transport Aviation do not have Glonass receivers onboard and rely on the GPS system of the United States instead.
Zhang, Hui and Pavel Podvig. Russian and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space. Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2008. [ 16 quotes ] [ page 27 ]
Poor Ground Infrastructure and Command and Control Prevents Russia from Fully Exploiting Imagery and Signals Intelligence Satellites
 
Most of the same problems are common to photoreconnaissance and signal intelligence systems. Although Russia has the capability to collect imaging information and to monitor communications, these capabilities are not integrated into the command structure of the armed forces to the extent that would make these systems directly usable in military operations. The launch schedule of the satellites that provide these capabilities confirm this lack of integration—for example, there have been no serious efforts to constantly maintain the presence of imaging satellites in orbit. The same is true of signal intelligence satellites— Russia does not maintain fully operational constellations. Although this may be explained in part by a lack of sufficient funding, success with other systems, namely communication satellites, shows that funding was probably not the only, or even the main, factor. As the recent history of communication-satellite launches demonstrates, Russia has been investing considerable effort into its space-based communication network. This was due partly to the dual-use nature of the satellites, which are used for both military and civilian communications; however, military systems like the Strela system have been maintained at close to full capacity.
Zhang, Hui and Pavel Podvig. Russian and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space. Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2008. [ 16 quotes ] [ page 27 ]
No Military Advantage to be Gained from Attacking Russian Space Assets
 
The situation with early-warning satellites is also very characteristic of the current Russian space program. Although the space-based early-warning system is considered an important element of the strategic command and control system, Russia in effect discontinued its efforts to maintain a full constellation of satellites in orbit after 2001, seemingly satisfied with the limited capability provided by the few satellites it can support. Expansion of the system does not appear to the have the urgency that would justify efforts to deploy the constellation in its full capacity. All of these factors make Russia's space systems unlikely targets for space-based or anti-satellite weapons. Although an attack on some Russian military—or civilian—space assets could theoretically have adverse effects on Russia's capability to conduct military operations, in practice none of the currently deployed military space systems is advanced enough for an attack to make a significant difference militarily.
Zhang, Hui and Pavel Podvig. Russian and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space. Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2008. [ 16 quotes ] [ page 27-8 ]