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Blazejewski, Kenneth S. "Space Weaponization and US-China Relations." Strategic Studies Quarterly. Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring 2008): 33-55. [ 12 quotes ]

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Any Treaty Limitations on Missile Defense should Recognize Possibility that Technology, especially of Rogue States, could Outpace Agreement
 
Finally, any agreement that limits the United States' ballistic missile defense options must account for the possibility that the missile technology of the true target states of its BMD, such as Iran and North Korea, might one day improve to the point of outstripping the negotiated limits on BMD. To avoid a future US abandonment of the agreement, as in the case of the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, any agreement on space weapons should incorporate some flexibility by recognizing the potential need for future negotiations and requiring ongoing dialogue on missile threats. If it becomes necessary for the United States to deploy a more robust BMD system, it might seek to defuse Chinese concerns by pursuing BMD as a more open and transparent initiative with dis- crete and limited opportunities for Chinese participation. Such an initiative may lay the groundwork for deeper forms of collaboration in the future.
Blazejewski, Kenneth S. "Space Weaponization and US-China Relations." Strategic Studies Quarterly. Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring 2008): 33-55. [ 12 quotes ] [ page 51 ]
U.S. can Defend Space Assets Against Chinese ASATs without Igniting Space Arms Race
 
The challenge for the United States is to defend its own satellites against a wide variety of potential threats without encouraging China to significantly step up its ASAT program. Various techniques and policies are capable of achieving this objective. First, the United States could engage in the hardening and shielding of its satellites. Making satellites more resistant to laser attack, nuclear radiation, or hacking would contribute greatly to the defense of its satellite system. Similarly, the United States could equip satellites with the means to protect themselves from high-intensity laser beams or other harmful agents. Additionally, cheap decoy satellites could be deployed. The United States could also work to decrease dependence on individual satellites: creating redundancy by placing additional satellites in space can effectively limit the damage that any single attack can inflict. Admittedly, many of these techniques are not without their drawbacks. For example, it might be difficult to hide satellites inside radar-reflecting balloons without impairing their own sensors and communications. Yet, increasing the research and resources directed towards this area might provide added passive satellite defenses.
Blazejewski, Kenneth S. "Space Weaponization and US-China Relations." Strategic Studies Quarterly. Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring 2008): 33-55. [ 12 quotes ] [ page 49 ]
Finding Consensus on Definition of a Space Weapons is not Impossible if Political Will Exists
 
A second potential criticism of the recommendation to forgo space weapons is the common assertion that such a commitment requires a workable definition of space weapons. Admittedly, defining space weapons without encompassing other space assets, such as satellites capable of inflicting physical damage on other satellites, presents a challenge. However, the impossibility of agreeing on a definition is likely inversely proportional to the political will to reach such a definition. Once the United States and China have determined to reach a space weapons ban, they should be able to design reasonable criteria to distinguish between space weapons and ordinary space assets. One possible approach would be to abandon the idea of a general definition altogether and agree on a definitive positive or negative list of space objects that would or would not fall within a space weapons ban. A positive list would describe the space systems that are specifically included within a prohibition. Alternatively, a negative list would include those that are specifically not affected by the prohibition. Each approach presents its own challenges. A positive list would require that the United States have sufficient information to describe the sorts of weapons China seeks to launch. A negative list would have the opposite effect: it would require the United States to reveal potentially sensitive details of its space assets to qualify for launch. Yet if the effect of each of these two approaches is to increase transparency about the sorts of assets that China and the United States have in space, it may only bolster stability between the two states.
Blazejewski, Kenneth S. "Space Weaponization and US-China Relations." Strategic Studies Quarterly. Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring 2008): 33-55. [ 12 quotes ] [ page 47 ]
Should not Place too much Emphasis on Risk of Cheating in Space Arms Control Regime
 
Ultimately, cheating is a risk that countries run whenever they agree to be bound by a shared international agreement. However, certain factors significantly reduce this risk. First, while the secret development of space weapons technology might be possible, any effort to deploy or test space weapons will be clearly visible to the international community. Without the capacity to test, any space weapons program will be stifled at an early stage of development. Second, there is little reason to think that in the foreseeable future the technological capacity of the United States would fall far behind that of any state planning to launch space weapons. A commitment not to deploy weapons does not mean that all research and development must cease immediately. Once it becomes clear that a state is preparing to launch space weapons, the United States could respond by executing its own space weapons contingency plan. Third, as stated above, space weapons are relatively easy targets for ASAT attack, a feature that can work in the interests of the United States if others deploy first. Fourth, a universal ban on space weapons would engender a normative framework that would justify a swift reaction by the United States, such as the deployment of its own space weapons or ASAT attack if another country violated the ban first. Finally, if the United States is able to negotiate for greater transparency in Chinese military planning, as suggested above, it would reduce the possibility of a surprise Chinese launch. ( More ... )
Blazejewski, Kenneth S. "Space Weaponization and US-China Relations." Strategic Studies Quarterly. Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring 2008): 33-55. [ 12 quotes ] [ page 46-7 ]
China could Retaliate Against U.S. Space Weapons by Forgoing Participation in other Security Initiatives that are in the U.S. National Interest
 
A second reason for US commitment not to place weapons in space is the negotiating leverage such a concession would provide. Of course, such leverage cannot be taken for granted. Rather, agreement not to weaponize outer space could be loosely conditional on making progress in other areas of US security. There are at least three areas where the United States could expect to gain concessions from China in return for a commitment not to weaponize space. First, China's participation at the CD strongly suggests that it might be willing to begin negotiations on an FMCT, a top security priority of successive US governments, if the United States agrees to negotiate on space weapons. Since China's commitment to the FMCT can facilitate the FMCT commitments of India and Pakistan, its participation is critical. Second, the United States can demand greater support from China on the Proliferation Security Initiative. The PSI, which seeks to prevent illicit sea and air transport of fissile material, has been identified by the Bush administration as a key program in reducing the possibility of acquisition of nuclear weapons by a terrorist organization. To date, China's muted opposition to the PSI stands as one of the greatest impediments to a fuller development of the initiative. Chinese cooperation could be vital to this program's success. Third, the United States should demand greater transparency in Chinese military planning, especially with regard to ASAT and space-focused programs. Such transparency, long sought by US defense officials, would reduce the likelihood of potential conflicts over speculative intelligence and give the United States greater insight into how military decisions are made (and whether China indeed suffers from a stovepiped bureaucracy). I argue that progress in each of these three areas would represent a greater security gain than proceeding with the weaponization of space. If the United States is able to negotiate a quid pro quo in one or all of these areas in return for a commitment not to weaponize outer space, the agreement would represent a clear US net security gain.
Blazejewski, Kenneth S. "Space Weaponization and US-China Relations." Strategic Studies Quarterly. Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring 2008): 33-55. [ 12 quotes ] [ page 45-6 ]
Costs of U.S. Space Weaponization Outweigh Benefits, Including the Risks from Accidental Launch from Vertical Nuclear Proliferation
 
I recommend that the United States accept a commitment to forgo placement of weapons in outer space. The costs of space weaponization simply outweigh the benefits. Above, I argue that China would respond to US space weaponization with some level of military buildup. In the least, this response would include the deployment of a more robust ASAT system capable of attacking and potentially eliminating space weapons. After all, space weapons, like military satellites, make for vulnerable military targets. The use of space-based weapons in a conflict must be discounted by the likelihood that they would be eliminated by Chinese ASAT attack. More importantly, increased ASAT deployment would have the counterproductive effect of exposing US satellites to greater threat. Aside from ASAT issues, Chinese response to US space weaponization would include an increase in China's ICBM fleet and nuclear arsenal. Vertical proliferation cannot be in the interests of the United States, if only for the increased peacetime risks of accidental launch or the terrorist risk associated with increased availability of weapons technology and components. Finally, the United States should not discount the possibility, often cited by opponents of space weaponization, that the deployment of US space weapons would instigate a space arms race.
Blazejewski, Kenneth S. "Space Weaponization and US-China Relations." Strategic Studies Quarterly. Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring 2008): 33-55. [ 12 quotes ] [ page 45 ]
U.S. Refusal to Engage in Discussions on Weaponization of Outer Space in International Forums has two Significant Costs
 
The US refusal to engage in discussions on the weaponization of outer space imposes two significant costs. First, it increases Chinese uncertainty and suspicion, leading China to assume its worst-case scenario about US space weaponization. Second, it prevents the international community from developing new rules and norms in areas such as advancing situational awareness, coordinating launches, and deterring the further development and proliferation of ASAT weapons that could benefit US space assets. There is broad consensus that the United States can no longer afford to remain silent in the international debate on the weaponization of outer space. The Rumsfeld Commission, the US-China Commission, and many space arms-control advocates all recommend greater US participation in setting rules for the use of outer space beyond the existing legal framework.
Blazejewski, Kenneth S. "Space Weaponization and US-China Relations." Strategic Studies Quarterly. Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring 2008): 33-55. [ 12 quotes ] [ page 43 ]
China's Investment in Anti-Satellite Weapons may make Space Arms Race Inevitable Regardless of U.S. Decisions
 
Second, China has developed the means to attack some US satellites, and there is no guarantee that China does not ultimately seek to develop a robust space weapons program. China's ASAT test demonstrates that the Chinese have been working assiduously at developing their space weapons program. Although China made a decision in the early 1990s to focus its space resources on civilian programs, an annual official budget of $2.5 billion for space programs and a growing number of dual-use technology programs suggest that China's military space capacity is growing. For instance, China has long conducted research on the development of beam weapons that can be incorporated into ASAT weapons systems. China is known to have tested high-power microwave weapons for jamming satellite communication. If China is indeed pursuing a full-blown space weapons program, a space arms race may be inevitable despite a US decision not to launch the first space weapons program.
Blazejewski, Kenneth S. "Space Weaponization and US-China Relations." Strategic Studies Quarterly. Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring 2008): 33-55. [ 12 quotes ] [ page 41 ]
China has Multiple Assymmetric Responses to U.S. Weaponization of Space
 
First, if the United States proceeds with space weaponization China will respond by bolstering its own military capabilities. China's response will seek to preserve the asymmetric threat it poses to US space assets and maintain its nuclear deterrent. Under each of the interpretations considered, China is not willing to allow the United States to build up its space weapons program unchallenged. In the least, China would develop additional ASAT weapons to which the United States would seek to develop effective countermeasures. Alternatively or in addition, China could invest in more ICBMs and nuclear warheads, acquiring the capacity to overwhelm a BMD shield. An option less likely in the near future, China could counter US space weaponization by deploying its own space weapons. Other potential Chinese responses include adopting a "launch on warning" policy or abandoning its no-first-use pledge. Each of these strategies would seek to counter the effectiveness of US space weapons. The United States, of course, could always respond to China's response, but such tit-for-tat policy making risks devolving into an arms race. Chinese officials claim that an arms race would "likely emerge" unless a negotiated solution can be reached on PAROS.41 It is noteworthy, however, that under at least two interpretations, this is not China's preferred outcome. Under the first and second interpretations, China will only proceed with further developing ASAT technology and acquiring additional weapons if it cannot be assured that the United States does not plan to weaponize outer space.
Blazejewski, Kenneth S. "Space Weaponization and US-China Relations." Strategic Studies Quarterly. Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring 2008): 33-55. [ 12 quotes ] [ page 40-1 ]
U.S. Actions and Policy Documents show Aggressive Plans for Weaponization of Outer Space
 
Recent US actions and other internal statements, however, paint a much more aggressive picture of US plans for the weaponization of outer space. In 2001, a high-level commission headed by Donald Rumsfeld and charged with examining the future of US space security concluded that to avoid a "Space Pearl Harbor" the "U.S. government should vigorously pursue the capabilities called for in the National Space Policy to ensure that the President will have the option to deploy weapons in space to deter threats to, and, if necessary, defend against attacks on U.S. interests." In addition, the commission stated that since space warfare is a "virtual certainty," the "U.S. must develop the means both to deter and to defend against hostile acts in and from space." The commission called for improvements in "defense in space" and "power projection in, from and through space." Before the commission concluded its work, Donald Rumsfeld assumed the post of secretary of defense. In 2006, President Bush issued a new US National Space Policy that emphasized the US determination to remain free of restraint in outer space. "The United States will oppose the development of new legal regimes or other restrictions that seek to prohibit or limit U.S. access to or use of space. Proposed arms control agreements or restrictions must not impair the rights of the United States to conduct research, development, testing, and operations or other activities in space for U.S. national interests." In 2004, the Air Force published a paper called Counterspace Operations that begins with the assertion that "counterspace operations are critical to success in modern warfare." The document goes on to explore the sorts of actions that would be included in a US offensive counterspace operation, including possible preemptive attacks on satellites, veillance and reconnaissance systems.
Blazejewski, Kenneth S. "Space Weaponization and US-China Relations." Strategic Studies Quarterly. Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring 2008): 33-55. [ 12 quotes ] [ page 36 ]
U.S. Policy Statements have Effect on Foreign Governments even if they do not reflect Consensus of U.S. Government
 
These statements and actions do not, of course, establish that the United States is planning to launch weapons into outer space. Foreign policy making is an unsightly process with many competing interests at stake. The fact that one federal department, such as the Air Force, argues for the weaponization of space, does not mean that such weaponization will occur. But this is beside the point. Regardless of the ultimate effect of these statements on US policy in space, their impact on foreign audiences can be stronger. Foreign countries seeking to decipher US behavior can only be further persuaded that the United States plans to weaponize outer space. Chinese officials, for instance, have taken note of each of the statements described above and confidently concluded that the United States seeks to control space.
Blazejewski, Kenneth S. "Space Weaponization and US-China Relations." Strategic Studies Quarterly. Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring 2008): 33-55. [ 12 quotes ] [ page 37 ]
China is most Concerned about Effect of U.S. Missile Defense on its Deterrent
 
On this account, China's primary concern with US space weaponization is its contribution to a US multilayered missile defense shield. Indeed, China's campaign for PAROS negotiation at the CD seems to intensify after each new development in United States BMD plans. Although China could respond to a BMD shield with effective countermeasures, future technological developments may permit the BMD system to vitiate China's nuclear deterrent. In the case of a conflict over Taiwan, for example, a US space-based BMD system could prove very valuable to the United States. According to this view, if the United States decides to advance with such a BMD program, China will respond so as to maintain its nuclear deterrence. It will modernize its ICBM fleet (a program it has already initiated), develop further countermeasures to circumvent the BMD shield, and develop the means to launch multiple ASAT attacks. Ultimately, an arms race could ensue. This, however, would not be China's chosen outcome. Its development of space weapons is merely a counterstrategy to what it views as likely US space weaponization. China would much prefer that the United States negotiate a PAROS agreement not to build the BMD shield. If this were the case, China's January ASAT test would appear to be an attempt to get the United States to the negotiating table. By launching the ASAT, China sought to put the United States on notice that any attempt to weaponize outer space would lead to this mutually undesirable path.
Blazejewski, Kenneth S. "Space Weaponization and US-China Relations." Strategic Studies Quarterly. Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring 2008): 33-55. [ 12 quotes ] [ page 38 ]