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Everett, Terry. "Arguing for a Comprehensive Space Protection Strategy." Strategic Studies Quarterly. Vol. 1, No. 1 (Fall 2007): 20-35. [ 6 quotes ]

Evidence Related to this Citation

Space Debris from Chinese ASAT Test will Complicate Space Activities for Next 20 Years
 
Unfortunately, our adversaries do not need to be educated about our reliance on satellites. On 11 January 2007 the Chinese launched a mediumrange ballistic missile into space. It targeted an aging Chinese weather satellite orbiting 500 miles above the planet. The kill vehicle rammed into the target satellite, sending out into orbit thousands of pieces of debris of varying sizes with speeds up to 1,400 miles per hour, according to Air Force Space Command. Particles a few centimeters in length are large enough to cause major damage, which is what makes this debris so significant and why, given its potential to stay in orbit for years to come, it poses a long-term hazard to our satellites. The United States, with its space surveillance network, will bear the long-term responsibility for warning others of potential collisions, including foreign and commercial operators, and ironically, the Chinese. The likely result is that the space shuttle, the International Space Station, and many satellites in low Earth orbit will need to expend precious fuel to maneuver around debris. At some point, our satellite operators will determine the loss of “mission life” due to this extra maneuvering. This could be a sizeable impact when we are talking about multibillion-dollar satellites designed for lifetimes of five to 10 years. In recent testimony before the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, Gen James Cartwright, commander, US Strategic Command, commented that “we are going to have to make significant adjustments as collision, or, as we call it, conjunction opportunities occur over the next 20-plus years. . . . That is going to have an effect on business, on commerce. And it is going to have an effect on our national assets that are in low Earth orbit.”
Everett, Terry. "Arguing for a Comprehensive Space Protection Strategy." Strategic Studies Quarterly. Vol. 1, No. 1 (Fall 2007): 20-35. [ 6 quotes ] [ page 22 ]
Attacks on Space Assets Increasing because Conditions that Led to Restraint During Cold War no Longer Exist
 
Today, the repercussions of an attack that existed in the Cold War seem to have diminished. In fact, ASAT incidents and tests are occurring, and we have seen few consequences for the culprits. In the past few years, we have seen a handful of GPS and increasing numbers of satellite communications (SATCOM) jamming incidents. In the early stages of OIF, US forces encountered a GPS jamming situation. In this case, precision munitions were used to hit these jamming sources, which allowed our forces to quickly resume operations. We have seen several SATCOM jamming incidents, including Iranian jamming of a US satellite from Cuba in July 2003; ongoing jamming by Iran against Panamsat, AsiaSat, ArabSat, and EutelSat from June 1997 to July 2005; and Libyan jamming of two international SATCOM systems in December 2005. Last fall it was reported that a Chinese ground-based laser illuminated a National Reconnaissance Office intelligence-gathering satellite.9 What is most troubling is that these attacks are coming during a period of widespread use of GPS, satellite communications, and space-based imagery. ( More ... )
Everett, Terry. "Arguing for a Comprehensive Space Protection Strategy." Strategic Studies Quarterly. Vol. 1, No. 1 (Fall 2007): 20-35. [ 6 quotes ] [ page 23 ]
Congress Currently Trying to Balance Space Needs with Military Modernization
 
We must strike a balance between continuing with legacy systems and moving ahead with modernized systems. I support a measured approach that overlaps new acquisition programs with continuing legacy programs and one that avoids any drastic changes that could severely impact the delivery of war-fighter capability or affect the stability of the industrial base. This thinking is reflected in the House-passed defense bill, which curtails some new-start acquisition programs such as the Alternative Infrared Satellite System and the High Integrity GPS concept. We provide resources for an additional legacy AEHF satellite to mitigate any risk of a gap to our protected strategic communications and fully fund continuing technology and system development of TSAT. We are responsive to the war fighter’s demand for orders of magnitude increases in communications and Internet-like connectivity across platforms and users. ( More ... )
Everett, Terry. "Arguing for a Comprehensive Space Protection Strategy." Strategic Studies Quarterly. Vol. 1, No. 1 (Fall 2007): 20-35. [ 6 quotes ] [ page 29 ]
Ambiguity over Definition of a Space Weapon makes Arms Control Impractical
 
Some believe a space weapon is purely a weapons system based in space that collides with another space object or intercepts a missile traveling through space. However, I would argue, the damage caused by a ground-based highenergy laser is just as severe for a target satellite as the damage caused by a physical on-orbit collision. The key difference is the latter may create an unacceptable debris field, posing further risks to other orbiting satellites.

It is the ambiguity in definition that makes arms-control measures which ban space weapons difficult to implement and nearly impossible to enforce. This is compounded by the fact that satellites have tremendous dual-use value, making it very difficult to distinguish a nonweapon space system from a weapon space system. Any satellite could be maneuvered in such a way as to collide with a target satellite. Any ballistic missile, with sufficient orbital ephemeris data and software changes, could be used to target a satellite.
Everett, Terry. "Arguing for a Comprehensive Space Protection Strategy." Strategic Studies Quarterly. Vol. 1, No. 1 (Fall 2007): 20-35. [ 6 quotes ] [ page 32-3 ]
Space is Already Weaponized, Depending on how you Define Space Weapons
 
The policy debate centers primarily on how we use space and whether it should be a matter of US policy to develop and deploy “weapons in space” as a means of protection. The difficulty with this proposition starts with our understanding of space weapons. A definition is elusive. If a space weapon is any weapons system capable of rendering a satellite temporarily or permanently useless, then it could target the satellite in orbit, its data link to the ground, or its ground-control station. Moreover, a space weapon could be land-, sea-, air-, or space-based and use kinetic energy (e.g., direct-ascent missile), directed energy (e.g., laser), other electromagnetic energy (e.g., jammer), or even nuclear energy to disable a satellite. If one believes this definition, then space is already “weaponized.” The Cold War–era Soviet co-orbital ASAT and US F-15-launched ASAT would qualify, as would present-day GPS and SATCOM jamming and, surely, the Chinese ASAT test.
Everett, Terry. "Arguing for a Comprehensive Space Protection Strategy." Strategic Studies Quarterly. Vol. 1, No. 1 (Fall 2007): 20-35. [ 6 quotes ] [ page 32 ]
Space Radar could have Revolutionary Impacts on Military and Society
 
I am particularly pleased we maintained funding for the Space Radar program. Space Radar, with its sophisticated synthetic aperture radar and moving target indicator sensors, will provide all-weather, day-night, 24-7 coverage of static and moving targets, greatly enhancing our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities and protection of our armed forces. As William B. Scott and Linda H. Strine point out in a recent Aviation Week and Space Technology article, “Visionaries believe Space Radar will not only revolutionize the way military forces locate, track and target an enemy, but have as profound an impact on commerce and citizens’ daily lives as GPS does” if applications such as ship tracking for business and homeland security and all-weather, around-the-clock imaging for marketing are realized.
Everett, Terry. "Arguing for a Comprehensive Space Protection Strategy." Strategic Studies Quarterly. Vol. 1, No. 1 (Fall 2007): 20-35. [ 6 quotes ] [ page 29-30 ]