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Graham, Thomas and William Marshall. Space Security 2007. Waterlo, Ontario: Project Ploughshares, August 2007. [ 20 quotes ]

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Space Tethers not Viable Space Debris Removal Option
 
To date no effective technical means to remove space debris exists. Nonetheless, interest in the development of electromagnetic tethers that could be deployed after a satellite becomes non- operational continued in 2006. Space tethers are essentially cables made of conductive material that are attached to a satellite and through which electric current passes. The motion of the cable in the Earth's magnetic field provides propellant-free propulsion for orbital objects. When a satellite reaches the end of its operational lifetime a tether could be released to de-orbit the satellite, eventually causing it to burn up in the atmosphere if in LEO or to raise the orbit, if in GEO. In October 2006 the IADC issued a final report assessing the potential benefits and risks of using such a mechanism to combat space debris and made several recommendations based on a five-year study. It concluded that while "electrodynamic tethers have strong potential to become effective mitigation measures…various problems are still to be solved before this technique can be practically adopted." There are also concerns that the technology could be used against uncooperative satellites for space negation purposes.
Graham, Thomas and William Marshall. Space Security 2007. Waterlo, Ontario: Project Ploughshares, August 2007. [ 20 quotes ] [ page 34 ]
Israel Increasing Spy Satellite Capabilities
 
Israel's programs reflect an interest in exploiting space systems in support of terrestrial military operations, including operational and tactical missions. Israel operates the dedicated military Ofeq-5 system, which provides both panchromatic and color imagery at resolutions of less than one meter for reconnaissance and surveillance purposes. It frequently passes over Arab territory in the region. Its capabilities are augmented by the dual-use Eros-A imagery system with a resolution of roughly 1.8 meters. The Israeli Ministry of Defense is managing five additional satellite programs intended to provide more advanced optical and radar imaging and secure communications for the military. In 2005 Israel successfully tested the latest Shavit Space Launch Vehicle, intended to give Israel independent launch capabilities.
Graham, Thomas and William Marshall. Space Security 2007. Waterlo, Ontario: Project Ploughshares, August 2007. [ 20 quotes ] [ page 99 ]
Israel tried to Jam Satellites During 2006 War with Lebanon
 
The potential for commercial satellites to be third-party targets during conflict was seen in the 2006 Israel-Lebanon war, when Israel tried, but failed, to jam the Al-Manar satellite channel transmitted by the Arab Satellite Communications Organization (ARABSAT). Israel refrained from directly jamming the satellite, which serves 200 million viewers through different services, but rather expressed an interest in developing an ability to selectively jam specific transmissions. Although Israeli officials acknowledged that jamming communications satellites is against international law, the strategy remains appealing during wartime. The US was the first state to claim a potential willingness to interfere with third-party commercial satellites in US Air Force Doctrine Document 2-2.1.
Graham, Thomas and William Marshall. Space Security 2007. Waterlo, Ontario: Project Ploughshares, August 2007. [ 20 quotes ] [ page 132 ]
India Still Planning to Create Unified Space Command
 
In India, the establishment of a joint space weapons command was turned down by the Defence Ministry in 2006, but the country's military plans for space will be charted over the next year in a concept paper by the Defense Ministry's Integrated Defense Staff. India still intends to establish what it calls an Aerospace Command, although the planned mandate remains vague. That some experts in India are anticipating a more significant military role for space is suggested in the November 2006 publication Space: The Frontiers of Modern Defence published by India's Center for Air Power Studies. The introduction makes the following observations: "As we move forward in the 21st century it is inevitable that space will become another medium of warfare besides assuming the important role of protecting the country's commercial assets in this medium."
Graham, Thomas and William Marshall. Space Security 2007. Waterlo, Ontario: Project Ploughshares, August 2007. [ 20 quotes ] [ page 56 ]
Israel Creating Military Space Force and Debating Counterspace Doctrine
 
In February 2006, the Israeli government ended years of heated debate by announcing that the Israeli Air Force, rather than the Military Intelligence Unit, will be given sole responsibility for all military activities in space as well as responsibility for designing and operating the nation's future satellites. The Air Force will now be known as the Israel Air and Space Force (IASF) and its mission will be to operate in the air and space arena for purposes of defense and deterrence. Israeli officials publicly contemplated jamming commercial, third-party satellite signals during the war with Lebanon, although they acknowledged that it was against international law (see Space Systems Negation Trend 7.1). The US was the first state to claim a potential willingness to interfere with third-party satellites in US Air Force Doctrine Document 2-2.1.
Graham, Thomas and William Marshall. Space Security 2007. Waterlo, Ontario: Project Ploughshares, August 2007. [ 20 quotes ] [ page 56 ]
Unintentional Radio Frequency Interference Incidents have Declined
 
According to the Satellite Users Interference Reduction Group, there were only 305 satellite radio frequency interference incidents reported in 2006, a significant decline from the 1,282 reported incidents in 2005. Of these events 17 percent were caused by equipment malfunction and 19 percent by human error; less than one percent of the interference occurrences were caused by terrestrial services. Only 14 percent occurred during cross- polarization - when satellite dishes are being aligned to receive signals from the satellite - and adjacent satellites were responsible for only four percent of the incidents, suggesting the ongoing ability of the international community to manage use of the radio frequency spectrum. Almost 40 percent of all cases were classified as unknown; however, most of these are attributed to operator errors that were quickly corrected.
Graham, Thomas and William Marshall. Space Security 2007. Waterlo, Ontario: Project Ploughshares, August 2007. [ 20 quotes ] [ page 37 ]
Libya's Jamming of Satellite in 2006 is Biggest Jamming Incident Yet
 
In 2006 commercial satellite systems were intentionally disrupted in several different instances. Cited as "one of the most persistent jamming events ever recorded in the commercial satellite sector," the jamming by Libyan nationals of Thuraya Satellite Telecommunications mobile satellite communications lasted more than six months. The jamming ended when the government of the United Arab Emirates approached the Libyan government through diplomatic channels. The jamming was reportedly aimed at smugglers of cigarettes and other contraband into Libya, who were using Thuraya satellite phones; it had a much more far-reaching effect, causing the company to suffer revenue losses. In a further demonstration of the vulnerability of some commercial satellites, a group of Jakarta-based hackers collected data being transmitted by an older, unidentified commercial satellite. They did not use the data, but the incident demonstrates the ease with which some satellite systems can still be hacked.
Graham, Thomas and William Marshall. Space Security 2007. Waterlo, Ontario: Project Ploughshares, August 2007. [ 20 quotes ] [ page 132 ]
India has well-established Indigenous Launch and Remote Sensing Capability
 
India does not operate any dedicated military satellites, but it has one of the oldest and largest space programs in the world that has developed a range of indigenous dual-use capabilities. Space launch has been the driving force behind the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO). It successfully launched its Satellite Launch Vehicle (SLV) to LEO in 1980, followed by the Augmented Satellite Launch Vehicle (ASLV), the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) in 1994, and the Geostationary Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV) in 2004. During this time ISRO developed a series of civilian Indian Remote Sensing satellites and currently maintains a constellation of six satellites, several of which would be suitable for reconnaissance with resolutions up to one meter. India also maintains the joint government/military Technology Experimental Satellite, which provides images with a resolution of between one and 2.5 meters. In 2007 India plans to launch the Military Surveillance and Reconnaissance System, which will provide India with dedicated military satellite intelligence.
Graham, Thomas and William Marshall. Space Security 2007. Waterlo, Ontario: Project Ploughshares, August 2007. [ 20 quotes ] [ page 98 ]
Russia Building up Space Defense out of Concern over U.S. Space Weapons
 
In all of its military doctrine documents since 1992, Russia has expressed concern that attacks on its early warning and space surveillance systems would represent a direct threat to its security. Therefore, a basic Russian national security objective is the protection of Russian space systems, including ground stations on its territory. These concerns derive from Russia's assessment that modern warfare is becoming increasingly dependent on space-based force enhancement capabilities. In 2001, Anatoliy Perminov, then Commander-in-Chief of the space corps, stated that the international trend of armed force modernization demonstrates "the continuously rising role of national space means in ensuring the high combat readiness of troops and naval forces." In practical terms, Russian military space policy appears to have two main priorities. The first is transferring to a new generation of space equipment capabilities, including cheaper and more efficient information technology systems. The second priority is upgrading the Russian nuclear missile attack warning system. Together, these recent developments are seen as having a critical role in guaranteeing Russia's secure access to space. Russia has expressed concern about the potential weaponization of space and the extension of the arms race to outer space, especially in light of the development of US missile defense systems. Thus, Russia has actively argued for a treaty prohibiting the deployment of weapons in space. In the interim, Russia has pledged not to be the first to deploy any weapons in outer space and has encouraged other space-faring nations to do the same. However, various Russian officials have also threatened retaliatory measures against any country that attempts to deploy weapons in space.
Graham, Thomas and William Marshall. Space Security 2007. Waterlo, Ontario: Project Ploughshares, August 2007. [ 20 quotes ] [ page 49 ]
China Reportedly Tested Ground-Based Laser Weapons Against U.S. Satellites
 
In 2006 China reportedly used a ground-based laser to illuminate an American reconnaissance satellite flying over Chinese territory. The previously unreported incidents were acknowledged by the director of the National Reconnaissance Office, Donald Kerr, in October 2006. Details were not provided regarding the satellites involved or the number of incidents. It is difficult to verify from publicly available sources the nature of the laser beam (power level, continuous versus pulsed, etc.), the physical effects on the spacecraft, or the intent behind the illumination. Laser illumination at very low powers is used for satellite laser ranging as part of routine space surveillance. There is no international agreement prohibiting one state from using laser ranging on another state's satellites. The laser did appear to have an effect on the satellites and the incidents were detected after operators noticed occasional and sudden declines in satellite performance when passing over China. Gen. James Cartwright, Commander of US Strategic Command, denied that there is clear evidence of Chinese intentions to interfere with US space assets. Nonetheless, the ability to illuminate satellites in orbit with a laser beam demonstrates Chinese advances in laser, satellite tracking, and optics technology. High power lasers could conceivably blind the sensitive optics in imagery satellites, although a case could be made that the laser system is only intended to prevent Chinese ground assets from being imaged. No official Chinese statements have been released.
Graham, Thomas and William Marshall. Space Security 2007. Waterlo, Ontario: Project Ploughshares, August 2007. [ 20 quotes ] [ page 134 ]
Prohibitive Costs and Technical Barriers make Space-Based Strike Weapons Unlikely
 
In summary, there have been no space-based strike systems tested or deployed to date, although Cold War-era programs did support considerable development and testing of key technologies. Prohibitive costs and reduced perceived needs led Russia and, to a lesser degree, the US to drastically cut funding for space-based strike programs, particularly the energy-to- target types. More recently, the US has pursued the development of SBI in the context of its ballistic missile defense program, although challenges to its completion remain. ( More ... )
Graham, Thomas and William Marshall. Space Security 2007. Waterlo, Ontario: Project Ploughshares, August 2007. [ 20 quotes ] [ page 141 ]
Debris is Already Becoming Self-Sustaining
 
Two key factors affecting the amount of space debris are the number of objects in orbit and the number of debris-creating launches each year. Growth in the debris population increases the probability of inter-debris collisions that have the potential to create even more debris. A recent study by NASA has shown that, in LEO, debris-debris collisions will become the dominant source of debris production within the next 50 years. As debris collides and multiplies, it will eventually create a "cascade of collisions" that will spread debris to levels threatening sustainable space access. As of 2003 it was estimated that 43 percent of tracked debris resulted mostly from explosions and collisions.7Additional space debris in LEO could be created by ground- and space-based midcourse missile defense systems currently under development or other weapons testing in space.

Between 1961 and 1996, an average of approximately 240 new pieces of debris were catalogued each year, due in large part to fragmentation and the presence of new satellites. Between 8 October 1997 and 30 June 2004, only 603 new pieces of debris were catalogued, representing a noteworthy decrease from the previous rate of debris generation, particularly given the increased resolution of the system. This decline can be related in large part to international debris mitigation efforts, which increased significantly in the 1990s, combined with a lower number of launches per year. An increase in the annual rate of debris production has been observed again since 2004.
Graham, Thomas and William Marshall. Space Security 2007. Waterlo, Ontario: Project Ploughshares, August 2007. [ 20 quotes ] [ page 23 ]
U.S. and China Conducting Research on Ionosphere Modification as a Satellite Jamming Technique
 
USAF is funding a project that seeks to use plasma to reconfigure a part of the ionosphere. The modified ionosphere would have different radio frequency properties, selectively blocking out radio transmission in an area while the surrounding areas are unaffected. The Microwave Ionosphere Reconfiguration Ground-based Emitter (MIRAGE) project would employ microwave transmitters on the ground and a small rocket to dispense chaff into the air at an altitude of 60-100 km. About one liter of plasma is generated by the microwave-chaff interaction, changing the number of electrons in that portion of the ionosphere. The first phase of MIRAGE was recently completed by Research Support Instruments. Atmosphere modification could be used as a method to conduct ground-based negation. Because it would not directly interfere with satellite communication, this type of disruption would be difficult to detect by conventional means or to distinguish from a normal atmospheric event. Currently this type of temporary, ground-based space negation is a technology of interest. At least one Chinese academic paper has been written about the potential of plasma negation efforts; however, there is no evidence at this time that the Chinese government is pursuing such technologies.
Graham, Thomas and William Marshall. Space Security 2007. Waterlo, Ontario: Project Ploughshares, August 2007. [ 20 quotes ] [ page 132 ]
Europe Building up Space Surveillance Capabilities
 
European states continued to develop independent space surveillance capabilities in 2006. Although there is still not an integrated European network, option studies are ongoing and a formal proposal is expected in 2008. Moreover, the ESA has defined space surveillance as one of three main security priorities. France's GRAVES space surveillance radar was fully operational as of 22 December 2005. The system is capable of monitoring space objects, including orbital debris and satellites in LEO up to 1,000 kilometers in altitude, and can follow more than a quarter of all satellites, particularly those that France considers "the most threatening" and those for which the US does not publish orbital information. France has cited the necessity of developing this system to decrease reliance on US surveillance information, and to ensure the availability of data in the event of a data distribution blackout. France is now able to maintain a satellite database of approximately 2,000 space objects. The UK's British National Space Centre (BNSC) awarded two contracts to Space Insight in 2006 to develop a new space surveillance system to map large areas of the sky quickly. This method is different from the conventional time-consuming method of detecting individual space objects113and could provide greater European space surveillance capability.
Graham, Thomas and William Marshall. Space Security 2007. Waterlo, Ontario: Project Ploughshares, August 2007. [ 20 quotes ] [ page 36 ]
U.S. Eforts to Enhance Space Surveillance Network Underfunded and Behind Schedule
 
The broader category of space situational awareness, within which space surveillance is a primary capability, remains one of the "most urgent space security shortcomings" of the US, according to leading experts. In response, the US has programs to bolster such capabilities, but they are generally under-funded and behind schedule. The US Deep View program plans to develop a high-resolution radar-imaging capability to characterize smaller objects in Earth orbit by 2010. The US Space Surveillance Telescope program intends to "demonstrate an advanced ground-based optical system to enable detection and tracking of faint objects in space, while providing rapid, wide-area search capability" by 2009. Also under development is the Space Based Space Surveillance System (SBSS), set for launch in 2007, and the Orbital Deep Space Imager. Both surveillance systems are expected to have inherent capabilities for identifying and tracking orbital debris in GEO, and are also relevant for the broader US space control mission.
Graham, Thomas and William Marshall. Space Security 2007. Waterlo, Ontario: Project Ploughshares, August 2007. [ 20 quotes ] [ page 27 ]
Satellite Jaming Incidents Becoming more Feasible and Common
 
The most vulnerable components of space systems are the ground stations and communications links, which are susceptible to attack from widely accessible weapons and technologies. An attack on the ground segments of space systems with conventional military force is the most likely space negation scenario. System sabotage; physical attack on the ground facility by armed invaders, vehicles, or missiles; and interference with power sources would require modest military means.

Electronic and information warfare techniques, including hacking into computer networks and electronic jamming of satellite communications links, are negation capabilities that are becoming increasingly available to both state and non-state actors. A number of incidents of electronically jammed media broadcasts have been reported in recent years, including interruptions to US broadcasts to Iran, Kurdish news broadcasts, and Chinese television (allegedly by the Falun Gong). Iraq's acquisition of GPS-jamming equipment for use against US GPS-guided munitions during Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 suggests that jamming capabilities are proliferating - the equipment was reportedly acquired commercially from a Russian company, Aviaconversiya Ltd.
Graham, Thomas and William Marshall. Space Security 2007. Waterlo, Ontario: Project Ploughshares, August 2007. [ 20 quotes ] [ page 125 ]
Russia is only other State with Dedicated Space Surveillance System
 
Russia is the only other state with a dedicated Space Surveillance System (SSS), which functions using Russia's early warning radars in space and more than 20 optical and electro- optical facilities at 14 locations on Earth. The main optical observation system, Okno, located at an altitude of 2,200 meters in the mountains near the Tajik eastern city of Nurek, aims principally at objects of 2,000 to 40,000 kilometers in altitude. The system cannot track satellites at very low inclinations and the operation of Russian surveillance sensors is reportedly erratic. The network as a whole carries out some 50,000 observations daily, contributing to a catalogue of approximately 5,000 objects, mostly in LEO. While information from the system is not classified, Russia does not have a formal structure to widely disseminate information about observations.
Graham, Thomas and William Marshall. Space Security 2007. Waterlo, Ontario: Project Ploughshares, August 2007. [ 20 quotes ] [ page 27 ]
U.S. Efforts to Upgrade Space Surveillance Network have hit Funding Roadblocks
 
The US Space Surveillance Network is the primary provider of space surveillance data. It has limited capabilities to provide real-time data collection, however, and restrictions were placed on the distribution of the data in the 2004 Defense Authorization Act. The Space Situational Awareness Integration Office was created in 2002 within USAF Space Command, with responsibilities to oversee the integration of space surveillance in order to achieve space situational awareness. Space-based surveillance, demonstrated by the US in the late 1990s through the Space Visible Sensor experiment, is being pursued through the Space-Based Surveillance System (SBSS), described in the 2003 Transformation Flight Planas "a constellation of optical sensing satellites to track and identify space forces in deep space to enable defensive and offensive counterspace operations." A "Pathfinder" SBSS satellite is set for launch in 2007. The US is planning to develop a geostationary Orbital Deep Space Imager designed to "provide a predictive, near real-time operating picture of space to enable space control operations." However, funding issues have bedeviled efforts to improve US space surveillance. Further, traditional US willingness to provide space surveillance data to other governments and commercial firms has been challenged over the past several years - both for cost reasons and concerns about satellite security.
Graham, Thomas and William Marshall. Space Security 2007. Waterlo, Ontario: Project Ploughshares, August 2007. [ 20 quotes ] [ page 126 ]
National and International Efforts to Mitigate Space Debris
 
Growing awareness of space debris threats has led to the development of a number of international and national debris mitigation guidelines. The Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) began discussions of space debris issues in 1994 and published its Technical Report on Space Debris in 1999. In 2001, COPUOS asked the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) to develop a set of international debris mitigation guidelines, on which it based its own draft guidelines in 2005. The IADC includes representatives of the space agencies of China, Europe (ESA), France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Russia, Ukraine, the UK, and the US.

At the national level, NASA issued guidelines on limiting orbital debris in the August 1995 NASA Safety Standard 1740. In December 2000, the US Government issued formal orbital debris mitigation standards for space operators. These standards were developed by DOD and NASA. In 2004, the US Federal Communications Commission imposed requirements for satellite operators to move geostationary satellites at the end of their operating life into "graveyard orbits" some 200 to 300 kilometers above GEO and in 2005 new rules went into effect requiring satellite system operators to submit orbital debris mitigation plans.18The ESA initiated a space debris mitigation effort in 1998.

The ESA Space Debris Mitigation Handbookwas published in 1999 and revised in 2002.20 Also in 2002, ESA issued the European Space Debris Safety and Mitigation Standardxxi and issued new debris mitigation guidelines in 2003. Japan and Russia also appear to strongly support the mitigation of space debris production. China, although a member of the IADC, has not formally adopted debris mitigation guidelines and no national policies have been put into place as yet. At the 2003 COPUOS annual meeting, China committed to "undertake the study and development of Chinese design norms to mitigate space debris, in conformity with the principles reflected in the space debris mitigation guidelines developed by the Coordination Committee."
Graham, Thomas and William Marshall. Space Security 2007. Waterlo, Ontario: Project Ploughshares, August 2007. [ 20 quotes ] [ page 25 ]
South Korea and Taiwan Pursuing Independent Spy Satellites
 
In December 2003, South Korea announced its intentions to increasingly use space for military purposes. South Korea operates the civilian Kompsat-1 satellite with 6.6 meters imaging resolution, which is "sufficient for [military] mapping although not for military intelligence collection." It also bought 10 Hawker 800 series satellites from the US, and has operated them for signals intelligence since 1999. In July 2004 Thailand signed a deal with the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS) Astrium to provide its first Earth observation satellite, which is expected to be used for intelligence and defense purposes. Taiwan has also announced plans to launch a $300-million reconnaissance satellite, but it is not clear if work has commenced. The planned system, named Follow-On RSS (Remote Surveillance Satellite), will be capable of producing images with 50 centimeters resolution. In the meantime, a Taiwanese official stated that military and security authorities will have to increase their reliance on images taken from their existing Formosa-2, which has a resolution of 1.8 meters.
Graham, Thomas and William Marshall. Space Security 2007. Waterlo, Ontario: Project Ploughshares, August 2007. [ 20 quotes ] [ page 99 ]