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U.S. State Department. Study on Space Policy: Report of the International Security Advisory Board. Washington, D.C.: U.S. State Department, April 27, 2007. [ 9 quotes ]

Evidence Related to this Citation

U.S. should Share Space Situational Awareness with Allies to Pre-empt Competitors
 
Requirements to improve our own space situational awareness create an opportunity for the United States to engage with commercial and allied satellite operators to enhance our mutual understanding of the space environment, so long as it does not compromise national security. Without U.S. leadership in promoting this cooperation, allies may pursue independent means to develop space situational awareness, thereby weakening the overall allied network. In addition, commercial entities rely heavily on the Commercial, Allied, and Foreign Entities Program (CAFE) that is currently maintained by the United States Air Force and makes available via the Internet a catalog of space objects and space data sets. The CAFE Program is helpful to efforts to improve space situational awareness, to promote commercial space activities, and to foster cooperation with allies and other nations.
U.S. State Department. Study on Space Policy: Report of the International Security Advisory Board. Washington, D.C.: U.S. State Department, April 27, 2007. [ 9 quotes ] [ page 6 ]
Space Arms Control is not Worth Pursuing because it is Unenforceable and Unverifiable
 
The United States is constantly pressed by other governments, by NGOs, and by individuals to engage in arms control processes (sometimes disguised as "codes of conduct" or "rules of the road") aimed at agreements to ban certain activities in space. Unfortunately, many such proposals would include unhelpful restrictions on the United States. Almost all contain provisions that are unverifiable and unenforceable. While these provisions would hinder the United States, they would have no significant impact on nations determined to cheat and circumvent the proposed agreements. A putative ban on anti-satellite weapons, or ASATs, for example, has been shown to be unworkable after years of consideration. There is no way to verify whether a space system is designed for ASAT applications, has significant but latent ASAT capabilities, or only minimal ASAT capabilities because every space system that can maneuver or transmit has some ASAT potential. Direct ascent ASAT weapons—kinetic, explosive, or directed energy—cannot be prevented as long as there are ballistic missiles.
U.S. State Department. Study on Space Policy: Report of the International Security Advisory Board. Washington, D.C.: U.S. State Department, April 27, 2007. [ 9 quotes ] [ page 7-8 ]
Historically, Dominance of Sea by Hegemonic Power Helped to Maintain Global Order and Commerce
 
How space is utilized for peaceful purposes will depend on who ultimately controls space. This is analogous to control of the seas that has been deemed essential to sea faring states over the centuries. There is a widely accepted historical example of those states with a great interest in trade, notably The Netherlands and Great Britain, which also had highly developed naval capabilities for sea control designed to ensure peace-time commerce. Such countries played an indispensable role in both developing and enforcing the "rules of the road." The United States, in association whenever possible with allies, must be prepared to play a similar role in space in the decades ahead. Space control is therefore a vital element of U.S. programs and policies.
U.S. State Department. Study on Space Policy: Report of the International Security Advisory Board. Washington, D.C.: U.S. State Department, April 27, 2007. [ 9 quotes ] [ page 3 ]
Russia is still a Significant Spacepower Threat
 
China, largely due to the recent demonstration of a physically destructive ASAT, may be the most dramatic example of threat to US space assets, but it is not the only one. Several states have developed capabilities that could be used against U.S. space systems. China may have surpassed Russia in space programs, but Russia maintains significant space threat capabilities that were developed by the USSR, including direct ascent capabilities. While Russia is not known to have tested the Soviet Orbital ASAT system, that system was tested in orbit some twenty times by the Soviet Union and may be maintained or resurrected. Russia also possesses laser, radio frequency, jamming, and electro-magnetic pulse (EMP) systems that could be employed against U.S. space capabilities.
U.S. State Department. Study on Space Policy: Report of the International Security Advisory Board. Washington, D.C.: U.S. State Department, April 27, 2007. [ 9 quotes ] [ page 4 ]
U.S. should Emphasize National Security and Economic Concerns over Space Arms Control Objectives
 
A strong effort should be made to shift the space debate from the prevailing arms control paradigm to the national security and economic areas. The National Space Policy designates the Secretary of State as the lead for the U.S. government in public diplomacy efforts to build an international understanding of, and support for, U.S. national space policies and programs. It is important for the Department of State to develop a public diplomacy game plan to enhance international understanding of U.S. space policy. Too often, detractors erroneously and summarily dismiss U.S. policy today as advocacy for "weapons in space." U.S. space dependence and vulnerabilities are too critical for the U.S. government to remain silent, leaving the playing field open for those in the international community who would seek to misconstrue and undermine our interests. It is important that friends and allies understand the United States commitment to freedom of action and protection of the civil uses of space. The State Department should work closely with allies that share our interests in a dialogue to promote understanding and support of U.S. space policy and requirements.
U.S. State Department. Study on Space Policy: Report of the International Security Advisory Board. Washington, D.C.: U.S. State Department, April 27, 2007. [ 9 quotes ] [ page 10 ]
Space Debris Concerns should not Trump U.S. National Security Interests
 
The National Space Policy commits the United States to seek the minimization of space debris by government and nongovernment activities. The United States should continue to play a strong leadership role in the Inter-Agency Debris Coordination Committee, at the United Nations, and elsewhere, for the minimization of man-made space debris.

At the same time, it should be recognized that space debris produced by human activity is quite low compared to that produced by nature. To minimize does not mean stopping all activities that would or might produce some debris. It is a relative not an absolute matter. U.S. national security requirements could take precedence over the goal of minimization of space debris –for example, the testing and use of ballistic missile defense interceptors against objects in space that would threaten populations, armed forces, and infrastructure. ( More ... )
U.S. State Department. Study on Space Policy: Report of the International Security Advisory Board. Washington, D.C.: U.S. State Department, April 27, 2007. [ 9 quotes ] [ page 10 ]
Space Weapons are Impossible to Identify and Define, Complicating Arms Control
 
Space weapons are nearly impossible to identify and define sufficiently for the purposes of arms control agreements, as U.S. experience has demonstrated. Verification would be the same. Space weapons most obviously can be deployed on the surface of the earth for use in space, or to transit space; they may emerge from space systems designed (at least ostensibly) for scientific, civil, or commercial purposes. They may take a wide variety of forms and draw upon a large number of technologies, and new ones may emerge. Moreover, international agreements, or the very negotiation of them, that attempt to ban such unidentifiable "weapons" can have damaging consequences, intended or unintended, on U.S. rights in space and freedom of access to and use of space. The U.S. Government is generally well aware of this, which is a reason for its well grounded skepticism about such agreements and processes.
U.S. State Department. Study on Space Policy: Report of the International Security Advisory Board. Washington, D.C.: U.S. State Department, April 27, 2007. [ 9 quotes ] [ page 8 ]
U.S. Space Assets are Threatened by a Range of State and Non-State Actors
 
A number of states are developing a variety of capabilities that will intentionally or unintentionally place at risk the space systems operated and used by the United States, its allies, and coalition partners. Although these actors are states, they are likely to include actors other than states in the relatively near future as technologies for space operations become more widely accessible. The Chinese ASAT direct ascent test should be a wake up call for the United States. Such high-leverage, asymmetric threats could have a highly disproportionate impact on U.S. military capability and security. Many of our space-based assets serve both civilian and military users. Their destruction, or even the threat of their destruction, would have devastating economic and military implications. Threats, disruption, or damage to commercial satellite systems would wreak havoc on the U.S. and global economy.
U.S. State Department. Study on Space Policy: Report of the International Security Advisory Board. Washington, D.C.: U.S. State Department, April 27, 2007. [ 9 quotes ] [ page 4 ]
U.S. Lacks the Means (i.e. Space Weapons) to Back Up its Space Deterrence Policy
 
The ideal way, if possible, to protect our space assets is to dissuade others from developing and deploying ways to threaten them, but given the many ways available and the difficulty of identifying potential threats, this does not provide sufficient confidence. Besides, the United States has not been successful in dissuading at least a small number of countries from developing and acquiring means to attack its space systems. These capabilities exist, and are growing and spreading. Next, we need to be able to deter attacks on our systems, but what attacks and how? To rely on deterrence requires that we clearly define our interests and what we will regard as threats to them. It requires that all states and non-state actors be convinced that the United States will not tolerate attacks on or deliberate interference with our vital space systems, and that the United States has effective means to deal with such threats. This requires that the United States possess highly credible and potentially highly damaging responses, such that we can place confidence in reliance on deterrence. The ISAB is worried that deterrence against attacks confined to U.S. space assets, even though vital, lacks the high confidence necessary. At this time, the United States relies on dissuasion and deterrence, because it lacks the means to defend our space assets and to deny successful attacks on them. This is so despite the requirement in the 1996 and 2006 space policy directives that the United States be able to "deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to U.S. national interests."
U.S. State Department. Study on Space Policy: Report of the International Security Advisory Board. Washington, D.C.: U.S. State Department, April 27, 2007. [ 9 quotes ] [ page 6 ]