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Lutes, Charles D. and Phillip C. Saunders. China's ASAT Test: Motivations and Implications. Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, June 2007. [ 10 quotes ]

Evidence Related to this Citation

China also Developing Electronic Jamming and Blinding Anti-Satellite Space Weapons
 
The direct-ascent ASAT appears to be part of a larger Chinese ASAT program that includes ground-based lasers and jamming of satellite signals. Chinese analysts, scientists, and strategists have written extensively about ASAT weapons and potential means of countering U.S. military uses of space. A recent Department of Defense report suggests that China appears to be developing a "ground-based laser designed to damage or blind imaging satellites." According to a news article, the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office confirmed that a Chinese laser illuminated a U.S. satellite. In addition, jamming could disrupt U.S. military communications and Global Positioning System (GPS) navigation and targeting signals. The exact performance characteristics of Chinese systems are unknown, but deployment of a range of ASAT capabilities could provide flexible options to temporarily or permanently deny U.S. space capabilities. The Chinese direct-ascent ASAT program appears to be in the research and development phase, and the intent or timing of operational deployment remains unknown.
Lutes, Charles D. and Phillip C. Saunders. China's ASAT Test: Motivations and Implications. Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, June 2007. [ 10 quotes ] [ page 1 ]
China could Threaten Satellites U.S. is Depending on for Defending Taiwan
 
If deployed, Chinese antisatellite weapons could threaten a range of U.S. military capabilities that rely on space assets and might have significant consequences for a Taiwan contingency. The United States has a range of options for countering Chinese ASAT capabilities and limiting their impact, but there is no simple or cost-free solution. Because the direct-ascent ASAT system that China tested could threaten satellites in LEO, U.S. military capabilities for reconnaissance, remote sensing, surveillance, electronic surveillance, and meteorology could be at risk. Satellites in medium Earth orbit and geostationary orbit are not vulnerable to a direct-ascent ASAT system boosted by a twostage DF–21 launcher. Although China has demonstrated the ability to launch satellites into geostationary orbits using larger rockets, the techniques required to reach higher orbits would significantly alter the dynamics for an effective hit-to-kill kinetic kill vehicle, making the current ASAT design unusable for such purposes.
Lutes, Charles D. and Phillip C. Saunders. China's ASAT Test: Motivations and Implications. Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, June 2007. [ 10 quotes ] [ page 2 ]
ASAT Weapons are Part of China's Strategy to Deter U.S. Involvement in Taiwan Conflict
 
Perhaps the most significant operational implication concerns the U.S. ability to respond to a Taiwan contingency. Given American military advantages, China's best chance of success in a conflict over Taiwan would be to delay the arrival of U.S. forces until after it forced Taiwan to capitulate, presenting Washington with a fait accompli. Most agreed that Chinese ability to destroy U.S. satellites in LEO would significantly increase the costs and risks of U.S. intervention on behalf of Taiwan. One China expert pointed out that ASAT weapons are only one in a range of military capabilities that China is developing to complicate and delay U.S. military responses. Even if any individual program had only a marginal impact, the cumulative impact could still be significant. A comprehensive net assessment of new Chinese technologies and potential U.S. counters is necessary to consider how to mitigate strategic risk.
Lutes, Charles D. and Phillip C. Saunders. China's ASAT Test: Motivations and Implications. Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, June 2007. [ 10 quotes ] [ page 3 ]
China Likely to Carry out ASAT Attacks in Combination with Information Warfare Campaign
 
An operational Chinese ASAT capability would provide flexible options for delaying and disrupting an American response to a Taiwan contingency. The direct-ascent ASAT could be used to attack U.S. reconnaissance satellites in LEO; at the same time, China could attempt to destroy Taiwan's Formosat series satellites operating in LEO. Chinese forces might attempt to temporarily blind U.S. reconnaissance and remote sensing capabilities through lasing, while jamming U.S. communication links and GPS signals could disrupt navigation and (more importantly) precision targeting. These efforts might be coupled with cyber attacks to disrupt and delay the response of U.S. forces. This strategy could be conducted in whole or in part—and without a complete integration of systems.
Lutes, Charles D. and Phillip C. Saunders. China's ASAT Test: Motivations and Implications. Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, June 2007. [ 10 quotes ] [ page 3 ]
U.S. does not have a Clear Declaratory Policy to Deter Attacks on U.S. Satellites
 
There was general agreement that lack of a clear declaratory policy makes it harder to deter attacks on U.S. satellites. Although some have suggested that destroying a U.S. satellite would be an act of war, official U.S. policy views "purposeful interference with its space systems as an infringement on its rights." However, determining if a lasing or jamming incident constitutes an attack that requires a response raises challenges for effective deterrence. Most participants felt the United States needed a clearer declaratory policy and that effective deterrence would also require the will to respond to attacks on U.S. satellites or computer systems. The U.S. response need not be tit-for-tat; the group discussed the possibility of asymmetric responses to jamming or lasing of U.S. satellites. These options raise complicated legal and operational issues that deserve further study.
Lutes, Charles D. and Phillip C. Saunders. China's ASAT Test: Motivations and Implications. Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, June 2007. [ 10 quotes ] [ page 5 ]
Should use Proliferation Security Initiative as a Model for a Space Security Confidence Building Measure
 
Establish international partnerships to support peaceful uses of space. The Proliferation Security Initiative offers an example of partnerships among like-minded nations to counter malevolent international behavior. A Space Security Initiative could be developed to discipline actors who seek to limit international uses of space. The goal would be to enlist governmental and nongovernmental space users in efforts to prevent and penalize actions that might threaten the operation of satellites, including issues such as ASAT weapons, space debris, nuclear accidents in space, jamming of satellite communications, or intrusions into satellite broadcasts. The partnership could offer benefits such as shared surveillance of space debris and also serve as a vehicle for sanctions against countries or entities that violate a space code of conduct (whether they are signatories or not). All space-faring nations, including China, could become members of the partnership by agreeing to the code and enforcing its norms.
Lutes, Charles D. and Phillip C. Saunders. China's ASAT Test: Motivations and Implications. Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, June 2007. [ 10 quotes ] [ page 4 ]
U.S. Needs to Increase Costs of ASAT Tests to China to Dissuade Them
 
Another approach is to try to dissuade China from developing ASAT capabilities and to deter China from using them in a conflict. Successful dissuasion would require the United States and other countries to impose costs on China if it continues efforts to develop and deploy ASAT weapons. A space expert noted that the lack of U.S. response to earlier tests might have led China to underestimate the costs of pursuing ASAT weapons. A China expert noted that U.S. complaints about earlier tests might have helped overcome the compartmentalized Chinese system and forced Chinese leaders to consider the full costs and benefits of the ASAT program. A strong response from the international community would reinforce dissuasion efforts, but most felt that China was currently paying relatively low costs for its ASAT test and ASAT program. Dissuading China from deploying ASAT capabilities would require greater efforts to raise the costs of ASAT deployment and to assure China that it can meet its security needs without deployment. The possibility of conflict over Taiwan greatly complicates this effort.
Lutes, Charles D. and Phillip C. Saunders. China's ASAT Test: Motivations and Implications. Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, June 2007. [ 10 quotes ] [ page 5 ]
China may be Trying to Force U.S. to Expend Resources in Space Countermeasures Arms Race
 
One space expert suggested that China may be using a competitive strategies approach against the United States. Space may become an "offensive dominant" arena. By demonstrating a relatively inexpensive response to U.S. space dominance, China may calculate that the United States will pursue costly options that divert resources from other areas. China could avoid an expensive arms race by minimizing reliance on space assets and developing a relatively inexpensive set of asymmetric capabilities. Conversely, other China experts suggested that China's dependence on space for military purposes is likely to increase dramatically over the next 5 to 10 years. Foregoing space capabilities would greatly limit China's ability to fight an "informationalized war." The shift toward more symmetrical U.S. and Chinese dependence on space may create opportunities for arms control or restraint in the development of space weapons.
Lutes, Charles D. and Phillip C. Saunders. China's ASAT Test: Motivations and Implications. Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, June 2007. [ 10 quotes ] [ page 3 ]
A Code of Conduct could help Constrain China's ASAT Tests
 
Adopt an international code of conduct on space behavior. Establishing a code of conduct or rules of the road would reinforce international norms about the right of countries to use space for peaceful purposes. This could limit China's ability to conduct future ASAT tests and to develop more effective systems. Both arms control and code of conduct approaches would impose limits on U.S. freedom of action in space. In addition, a ban against actions that produce space debris would not address strategic issues associated with ASAT weapons or prevent the development of capabilities that could deny or disrupt satellite services. However, the space debris issue could be helpful in mobilizing commercial interests to actively oppose ASAT weapons or actions that interfere with the operations of satellites.
Lutes, Charles D. and Phillip C. Saunders. China's ASAT Test: Motivations and Implications. Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, June 2007. [ 10 quotes ] [ page 4 ]
China does not Share Arms Control / Confidence Building Norms
 
Deterring the use of ASAT weapons also poses difficult challenges. China experts noted that China does not share the U.S.-Soviet experience with arms control, deterrence, mutual satellite reconnaissance, or dealing with incidents at sea. The U.S. military has internalized these norms into its doctrine and operations, but China does not necessarily accept or share them. While U.S. thinking about deterrence has traditionally focused on deterring conventional and nuclear aggression, deterrence might work differently in the space and cyber domains. The different context may complicate attribution and require rethinking thresholds for response.
Lutes, Charles D. and Phillip C. Saunders. China's ASAT Test: Motivations and Implications. Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, June 2007. [ 10 quotes ] [ page 5 ]