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Grego, Laura. "Statement of Dr. Laura Grego." Testimony before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs. Ed. . Washington, D.C.: , May 23, 2007. [ 6 quotes ]

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U.S. should Push for a "Rules of the Road" Agreement as a Confidence-Building Measure
 
The United States should implement these satellite safeguards, and should also take the lead on developing “rules of the road” for space operations, and increasing transparency on space security issues. Rules of the road could include rules that establish a keep-out zone around satellites, and a method for notifying the owner of a satellite should another satellite need to violate this zone. In a similar manner as the Law of the Sea, such rules can defuse unnecessary tensions, and are especially useful during times of crisis. Diplomacy may not be perfect or solve all of the outstanding security requirements or tensions, but neither are military options perfect.
Grego, Laura. "Statement of Dr. Laura Grego." Testimony before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs. Ed. . Washington, D.C.: , May 23, 2007. [ 6 quotes ]
Could use Space Surveillance Assets to Verify a Ban on Destructive Anti-Satellite Weapon Tests
 
Such a ban should be verifiable from the ground, perhaps with the already existing observational assets, perhaps with additional assets and coordination between observers. Countries that consider this idea may convene a panel of experts who could assess existing national technical means and their suitability for the purpose.

For example, U.S. early warning sensors could detect the launch of the booster carrying a ground-based hit-to-kill weapon; China’s destructive anti-satellite test as well as the tests leading up to it (that did not destroy a satellite) were observed in this way by the United States. Additionally, preferably with—but perhaps initially without—launch detection, all possible satellite targets for tests of a destructive ASAT test could be monitored and verified that they have not been destroyed in an ASAT test. The US Space Surveillance Network (SSN) regularly tracks thousands of objects of size greater than around 10 cm; its tracking of active satellites and inactive satellites and large pieces of debris is considered to be complete. ( More ... )
Grego, Laura. "Statement of Dr. Laura Grego." Testimony before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs. Ed. . Washington, D.C.: , May 23, 2007. [ 6 quotes ]
Current Legal Vacuum may have Motivated China to Conduct Anti-Satellite Weapons Test
 
With no legal restrictions on ASAT weapons, and with the evident strong interest in ASAT-capable technologies by the leading space power, other states may decide ASAT weapons are the answer to their perceived security needs. The Chinese rationale for developing and testing its ASAT weapon is unknown to us. However, its repeated calls along with the Russian Federation for diplomatic discussions about space security were rejected by the United States. Although it is impossible to say where such discussions could have led, that there were no discussions guaranteed that there was no law banning the Chinese destruction of an orbiting satellite. Additionally, although there were two tests of the ASAT system that were observed by the United States prior to the January test, there was reportedly no effort to dissuade China from testing it against a satellite.[6] It remains to be seen whether China sees this ASAT capability as important to its military posture. Performing another test of the system may indicate this is so; however, if China does not pursue additional tests, which would be required for the system to be considered operational, it may indicate that China is not committed to developing this capability and remains open to diplomacy.
Grego, Laura. "Statement of Dr. Laura Grego." Testimony before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs. Ed. . Washington, D.C.: , May 23, 2007. [ 6 quotes ]
U.S. not Limiting itself to Non-Destructive Anti-Satellite Weapons
 
The approach instead has been to focus on developing a set of technologies, many of which have anti-satellite (ASAT) capability. While the United States has available for use nonpermanent means of interfering with the operation of satellites, such as “jamming” systems, more lethal options have been considered. In the 1980s, the Air Force performed a series of tests of the “Air-Launched Miniature Vehicle,” a homing interceptor launched from an airplane, which could ascend directly to a satellite and destroy it with the force of impact; in a 1985 test, the system destroyed an orbiting satellite. About ten years later, the United States tested a system based on a high-powered laser that was coupled to a mirror that could track satellites. Research continues on technologies useful for laser ASAT systems. Additionally, systems such as the ground-based midcourse missile defense system and highly maneuverable microsatellites have intrinsic ASAT capability and create an implicit and unaddressed threat to satellites. And no clear directive has been issued taking destructive ASAT weapons off the table.
Grego, Laura. "Statement of Dr. Laura Grego." Testimony before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs. Ed. . Washington, D.C.: , May 23, 2007. [ 6 quotes ]
Space Weapons Encompass Missile Defense and Ground-Attack Options but most Relevant and Timely Debate is around Anti-Satellite Weapons
 
The term “space weapons” encompasses space-based missile defense interceptors, ground attack weapons based in space, and anti-satellite weapons—both ground-based and space-based. While both space-based missile defense and ground-attack weapons have serious security implications, any sort of implementation of them is some years off. Instead, I will focus on what I believe is the major issue facing the United States in the near-term: the development of anti-satellite weapons.
Grego, Laura. "Statement of Dr. Laura Grego." Testimony before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs. Ed. . Washington, D.C.: , May 23, 2007. [ 6 quotes ] [ page 2 ]
U.S. Dominant in Space at Pivotal Point for Future Management of Outer Space
 
The choices made now about which space programs to pursue and how to formulate rules and engage in agreements about conduct in space will set the tone for space operations and strategic relationships for years to come. The United States, in particular, as the most influential user of space, has a great opportunity to shape the future. These issues have been visited before, most notably during the Cold War. But context is important, and a number of changes in political, strategic, and technical context have occurred in the last twenty years—changes that may lead to new policies regarding space weapons. This revisit finds the world with the United States as the single dominant space power, without the peer competitor relationship of previous years. At the same time, satellites and services from them, the use of which is not at all exclusive to space-faring nations, are much more deeply ingrained in the international economy than in the past. And the number of states with the ability to build and launch satellites,[3] or the aspirations to do so, has grown steadily.
Grego, Laura. "Statement of Dr. Laura Grego." Testimony before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs. Ed. . Washington, D.C.: , May 23, 2007. [ 6 quotes ] [ page 3 ]