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Friedman, Norman. "War in Space?." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. Vol. 133, No. 3 (March 2007). [ 5 quotes ]

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The Soviets abandoned anti-satellite weapon tests during the Cold War because they had already conducted enough to prove the system successful
 
The Chinese test was shocking because space was thought to be quite safe. That was an illusion. In the 1980s the Soviets conducted a few antisatellite tests and then stopped. U.S. experts thought that proved the Soviets had concluded that attacks on satellites were not in their interests, essentially because they thought the Soviets had accepted U.S. reasoning about the stabilizing effect of satellite reconnaissance. After the Cold War ended, however, the Russians published detailed accounts of their space activities. It turned out that the tests had ended because they had proved the system successful. The Soviet antisatellite system was deployed, and it stayed deployed throughout the Cold War, clearly without the United States being aware of it.

To the Soviets, antisatellite measures made perfect sense. U.S. reconnaissance satellites were and are extremely expensive, and they are made in very small numbers. If one is destroyed, instant replacement is not an option. ( More ... )
Friedman, Norman. "War in Space?." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. Vol. 133, No. 3 (March 2007). [ 5 quotes ]
U.S. abandoned anti-satellite weapon tests during the Cold War because they didn't think they would be practical against the Soviets superior launch-on-demand capabilities
 
Conversely, the United States abandoned antisatellite weapons because it believed the Soviets had numerous replacement satellites available for instant launch (that turned out not to be true). It seemed to follow that the only way to blind the Soviets in space was to destroy the launch site at Plesetsk, which clearly would not be an option in an early non-nuclear phase of a war. This was very much a naval issue, because the main sensor supporting the most effective Soviet antiship missile, SS-N-19 (P-500 Granit), was an electronic reconnaissance satellite, a system called Legenda. The Soviets also had an active radar satellite program that they abandoned after embarrassing crashes of the reactor-laden device. ( More ... )
Friedman, Norman. "War in Space?." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. Vol. 133, No. 3 (March 2007). [ 5 quotes ]
Can Defeat Anti-Satellite Weapons by Increasing Launch on Demand Capability
 
These considerations suggest ways of dealing with the Chinese system. One is to multiply the number of U.S. satellites by accepting far lower sophistication in each. It may. for example, be possible to achieve the results we currently get by combining lower-quality data from numerous satellites in precisely known orbits, just as we can achieve high radar resolution by combining multiple radars. Such an array of satellites would be difficult to destroy, and it would also degrade gracefully if some of the satellites were destroyed. The United Slates is already considerably interested in low-cost satellites, usually in the context of providing tactical commanders with their own assets. Note that the debris generated by the Chinese test may endanger existing and future satellites, making it less plausible that truly long-life devices can operate in low earth orbit. Although one test cannot generate enough debris to ruin low-level satellites, multiple tests might do so. In that case, switching to expendable low-cost satellites may be mandatory. ( More ... )
Friedman, Norman. "War in Space?." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. Vol. 133, No. 3 (March 2007). [ 5 quotes ]
Can Defeat Anti-Satellite Weapons through Stealth or Decoy Measures
 
Another possibility is to complicate the Chinese targeting problem by making satellites stealthy. If the satellites cannot be tracked in the first place, they cannot be intercepted. For the last few years reports have surfaced of stealthy or "black" satellites apparently launched by the United States. They would seem to fit this bill. If satellites cannot be stealthy, they can be made more maneuverable, particularly if short lifetimes (set by on-board fuel loads) are accepted.

Yet another possibility is decoying. Just as ballistic-missile developers produce decoys to saturate defensive systems, satellite developers can presumably produce dummy inflatable satellites. At high enough altitude it may be impossible to distinguish them from real ones, at least until the Chinese become significantly more sophisticated. Given U.S. expertise in producing decoys for missile re-entry vehicles, it seems very likely that satellite decoys can be made (or perhaps already are being made).
Friedman, Norman. "War in Space?." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. Vol. 133, No. 3 (March 2007). [ 5 quotes ]
China Now Equally Dependent on its Satellite Infrastructure for an Attack on Taiwan
 
There are real consequences if we change styles (transform) in a half-baked way. When they decided that shooting down satellites was a good way to demonstrate their power, and thus to deter us from protecting Taiwan, the Chinese military leadership probably did not realize how far it had gone in the same direction we are following. China is no longer the desperately poor country that had to use human wave attacks in Korea. It is buying expensive technology, and it. like us, cannot have both numbers and the best information technology. If the Chinese do attack Taiwan or anywhere else, they will need good situational awareness, which will mean air and satellite reconnaissance on a real-time basis. Losing their satellites will not do them enormous good, and it would be naive for them to imagine (hat they can fight a modern information war without such resources. It may be up to us to make this truth obvious, but it would also be up to us to neutralize the Chinese antisatellite system.
Friedman, Norman. "War in Space?." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. Vol. 133, No. 3 (March 2007). [ 5 quotes ]