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Lambakis, Steven. "Leveraging Space to Improve Missile Defense." High Frontier Journal. Vol. 3, No. 2 (March 2007): 25-29. [ 6 quotes ]

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Missile defense neccessary to defend against unknown future threats
 
In the future, we may face adversaries unknown to us today, fight in unexpected regions, or have to defend against new types of ballistic missiles and countermeasures. The significance of this uncertainty for missile defense planners is enormous. This means that we cannot be totally focused on "who" poses the threat today because the "who" can change with a political decision or by a surprise shift in capabilities from one region to another. Similarly, a focus on the "how" does not mean we can ignore today's enemies or their present-day capabilities. On the contrary, today's ballistic missile threats continue to drive our Nation's near-term missile defense fielding and long-term development efforts. Today's threats provide "ground truth," a measure of what is possible today and, therefore, a low-end representation of what we must be prepared to defeat tomorrow. The "high end" represents ballistic missile threats that today are either unrealized or unknown but yet are possible to develop.
Lambakis, Steven. "Leveraging Space to Improve Missile Defense." High Frontier Journal. Vol. 3, No. 2 (March 2007): 25-29. [ 6 quotes ] [ page 25 ]
North Korea is working on long-range ballistic missiles
 
The international web of trading relationships in ballistic missiles and related technologies is extensive. Short-range ballistic missile systems are plentiful and available for sale on the international black market. Equally worrisome is the heightened interest in longer-range systems. For example, North Korea is developing an improved performance intermediate-range ballistic missile that can travel about 3,200 km. North Korea also has an intense development program to produce an ICBM. The Taepo Dong-2 ICBM may have a two-stage variant (and travel around 10,000 km) and a three-stage variant (15,000 km). The 4 July 2006 test of the Taepo Dong-2 failed moments after lift-off, demonstrating that the North Koreans have more work to do. There is every indication, however, they will continue to strive for a viable long-range strike capability in addition to producing and selling shorter-range systems that may be used to threaten its neighbors, such as Japan.
Lambakis, Steven. "Leveraging Space to Improve Missile Defense." High Frontier Journal. Vol. 3, No. 2 (March 2007): 25-29. [ 6 quotes ] [ page 25 ]
Iran is working on intercontinental ballistic missiles
 
Iran also has a significant ballistic missile development program. Besides its numerous short-range systems, Iran is developing a medium-range ballistic missile (Shahab-3) based on North Korean No Dong technology. In its quest for longer reach, Iran is developing an extended range Shahab-3 (which can travel 1,300 km and threaten Israel) and a new medium-range system (which may travel 2,000 km and reach into portions of Europe). In November 2006, Iran showcased on television several ballistic missile launches, to include the Shahab-3, demonstrating for the world the importance Tehran places on its ballistic missile development program. Iran is believed to be working on intercontinental range ballistic missiles, which may be in its arsenal by 2015, that is if it does not import longer-range systems from proliferators like North Korea earlier than that.
Lambakis, Steven. "Leveraging Space to Improve Missile Defense." High Frontier Journal. Vol. 3, No. 2 (March 2007): 25-29. [ 6 quotes ] [ page 25-6 ]
Space-based missile defense interceptors have wider range to engage ballistic missiles
 
Optimal orbits for engaging missiles from space would depend on the satellites' inclinations, which bound the orbital engagement zone between latitudes north and south of the equator at similar distances. With weapons on-orbit, missile defenders would have a capability to engage intercontinental- to mediumrange ballistic missiles launched from any region within that zone. Intercepts in the boost and midcourse of that missile’s flight could be possible. Essential work to demonstrate the feasibility of critical space-based interceptor functions has already been done (as part of the Brilliant Pebbles development program in the 1980s and early 1990s). The Missile Defense Agency (MDA), should it receive the support of the administration and Congress, could continue development efforts to perfect command and control of space-based assets and long-term storage of propellant, among other things.
Lambakis, Steven. "Leveraging Space to Improve Missile Defense." High Frontier Journal. Vol. 3, No. 2 (March 2007): 25-29. [ 6 quotes ] [ page 26 ]
Existing missile defense systems are technically space weapons
 
Ironically, when one considers the emotional and at times hyperbolic debate over deploying weapons in space, much of the missile defense battle involving ground-based or sea-based interceptors already takes place in space. The exoatmospheric kill vehicle (EKV) mated to booster stacks are designed to collide with the target in low Earth orbit. The EKV is a “space weapon”—it just spends most of its time on the ground. The attacker, therefore, has an ability to preposition before the defender can get to the point where he must engage. The currently deployed terrestrial-based interceptors, in other words, are not in the most optimal position to do battle with high-speed offensive missiles and payloads in the midcourse phase of the missile’s flight. By surrendering this fundamental positional advantage, we are fighting a space war with our bellies in the mud. Why not pre-position assets in space, where we know the battle is going to take place?
Lambakis, Steven. "Leveraging Space to Improve Missile Defense." High Frontier Journal. Vol. 3, No. 2 (March 2007): 25-29. [ 6 quotes ] [ page 28 ]
Space-based missile defense would improve flexibility and responsiveness of missile defense
 
The on-call, persistent defensive capabilities made available by space-based assets would improve missile defense response times, expand areas of engagement, provide better information on offensive missile events, and generally improve the worldwide integration of the system. The improved flexibility space offers would allow the US to better defend against emerging threats. This would allow it to improve crisis response times and enable US military forces to be more agile and protected on the battlefield. The US would be in a better position to defend its interests and more readily able to meet the defense commitments of its allies and friends. The confidence of the leadership would also improve, and the leadership, in turn, would have greater freedom of action to defend US interests and populations from a wider range of missile threats.
Lambakis, Steven. "Leveraging Space to Improve Missile Defense." High Frontier Journal. Vol. 3, No. 2 (March 2007): 25-29. [ 6 quotes ] [ page 28 ]