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Berkowitz, Marc J. "Protecting America's Freedom of Action in Space." High Frontier Journal. Vol. 3, No. 2 (March 2007): 13-18. [ 11 quotes ]

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Threat to U.S. Space Assets can no Longer be Viewed as Speculative
 
The preservation of this right will be the space policy issue for the US in the coming years. The medium of outer space is becoming a significantly more complicated operating environment. There is a clear trend toward challenges to the freedom of space. This trend is evidenced by the increasing prevalence of foreign efforts to interfere with satellite operations. For example, Iraq jammed US satellite positioning, navigation, and timing signals in 2002, Libya and Iran interfered with international communications satellite transmissions in 2005, and China apparently lased a US imaging reconnaissance satellite in 2006. After China’s successful test of a direct ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon in January 2007, there should be no failure of imagination in foreseeing threats to US interests in space.
Berkowitz, Marc J. "Protecting America's Freedom of Action in Space." High Frontier Journal. Vol. 3, No. 2 (March 2007): 13-18. [ 11 quotes ] [ page 13 ]
Arms Control would Contribute nothing to Reducing Threat to U.S. Space Assets and Security
 
Placing controls on dedicated ASAT weapons would not eliminate the threat posed to US space systems. Such arms control measures are flawed by problems of definition, commonality between civilian and military technologies, information disclosure, verification, and enforcement. Controls on dedicated ASAT weapons would not eliminate the threat posed by non-dedicated systems (e.g., modified ballistic missiles or space launch vehicles, exo-atmospheric ballistic missile defense interceptors, electronic warfare systems, maneuvering spacecraft, etc.) to US space systems. Even a treaty banning ASAT testing, deployment, and use would not ensure the survivability of the space systems' launch, communications, processing, and ground segments. Such arms control measures simply could not substitute for unilateral survivability measures. Moreover, such arms control would not constrain the threat posed by an adversary's use of space systems for purposes hostile to US national interests. Indeed, controlling ASAT weapons while permitting space-based force enhancement assets to run free would ensure a sanctuary for an enemy's "gun sights" in space. Space systems which support hostile operations against the US homeland and military forces should be placed at risk.
Berkowitz, Marc J. "Protecting America's Freedom of Action in Space." High Frontier Journal. Vol. 3, No. 2 (March 2007): 13-18. [ 11 quotes ] [ page 16 ]
Military Commanders and Policymakers need a range of options, including Space Weapons, to Respond to Attacks on U.S. Space Assets
 
Given that doing nothing in the face of enemy aggression in space is not an attractive option, and diplomatic demarches and economic sanctions may not achieve the desired results, national security planners must be prepared in advance with a range of options for the impending contingency of responding to hostile interference with US interests in space. The tailoring of responses involving military activities must take into account the possibility that the adversary may not own or operate spacecraft or find a tat-for-tat response sufficiently compelling to change its behavior. Deterring additional strikes and disarming the enemy's ability to inflict further damage on critical US space assets should take priority. Countering the enemy's space control weapons, C2, and targeting, as noted above, will be important approaches to achieving such a counterforce mission objective. ( More ... )
Berkowitz, Marc J. "Protecting America's Freedom of Action in Space." High Frontier Journal. Vol. 3, No. 2 (March 2007): 13-18. [ 11 quotes ] [ page 17 ]
U.S. should be Prepared to Risk Escalation when Attacking Enemy Space Assets
 
The idea that America cannot afford to fight for its right of passage through space because it has the most to lose if the medium becomes a battlefield is specious. Policy-makers should be willing to take risks of escalation to respond appropriately to an enemy’s campaign to interfere with our space operations. If not made aware of the stakes and implications of inaction, it should be recognized that the American leadership and public might be insensitive to hostile interference with satellite operations that does not involve the direct loss of life. Consequently, informed decision-making will require the stewards of our space power to educate policy-makers, combatant commanders, and the American public about the political, military, and economic consequences of being denied the use of important space capabilities.
Berkowitz, Marc J. "Protecting America's Freedom of Action in Space." High Frontier Journal. Vol. 3, No. 2 (March 2007): 13-18. [ 11 quotes ] [ page 17 ]
U.S. should Pursue a mix of Active and Passive Defense Measures
 
The decision whether America can utilize its space assets to protect and advance its national interests must not be placed in the hands of our adversaries. The need to undertake serious preparations to preserve the right of US space systems to pass through and operate in space without interference is an imperative. America urgently needs to confront the impending challenge to the freedom of space. It would be extremely imprudent for the US to neglect to pursue a broad range of tactical, technical, and procedural approaches to enhancing the survivability and endurance of satellite systems. Given the strength of the offense in space, and America’s need to exploit the medium rather than simply deny an enemy its use, a mix of active and passive defense measures should be the approach to providing both the credible deterrent and warfighting capability necessary to protect our space assets. In general, such a mix will be more robust than relying upon either active or passive measures alone because of the synergy produced by a combination of offense and defense. The danger of pursuing such a course is less the risk of inciting an arms race than America creating an Achilles Heel because of the extent of its dependence upon space assets and an inadequate approach to their mission protection.
Berkowitz, Marc J. "Protecting America's Freedom of Action in Space." High Frontier Journal. Vol. 3, No. 2 (March 2007): 13-18. [ 11 quotes ] [ page 17-8 ]
U.S. Space Assets will Eventually come under Attack
 
Operation Iraqi Freedom should be a wake up call for the US national security community. In contrast to the 1991 Gulf War, enemy forces attempted to challenge our use of space to enhance the combat effectiveness of coalition military operations. Although Iraqi efforts to jam global positioning satellites’ (GPS’) signals employed by our weapons platforms and munitions for the delivery of precision strikes did not succeed, it would be imprudent to conclude future enemies will not attempt to neutralize our space capabilities. History shows that no other medium has ever remained a sanctuary from armed conflict once it was exploited for national security purposes. During crisis or conflict, adversaries may target America’s space assets as an asymmetric means of countering US military operational effectiveness, intelligence capabilities, economic vitality, or political will. They may attack our space systems as symbols of our military and economic prowess to reduce our international status as a global superpower. We should expect that America’s freedom of action in space will be forcibly challenged. One of the most important policy choices facing American decision-makers is whether or not the US will have the capabilities to defend effectively its national interests in space.
Berkowitz, Marc J. "Protecting America's Freedom of Action in Space." High Frontier Journal. Vol. 3, No. 2 (March 2007): 13-18. [ 11 quotes ] [ page 14 ]
U.S. should not Leave its Space Assets Undefended
 
Space control weapons may not function perfectly in a defensive satellite role. Such capabilities clearly would not be able to protect every element of critical US government and commercial space systems. Their importance for helping to secure unhindered passage for US and allied on-orbit assets, however, should not be overlooked. The US has invested billions of dollars in space and related assets. Defending the space lines of communications is critically important for the conduct of military operations, execution of national policy, and global commerce. Not to field capabilities to protect the freedom of space would be the equivalent of a major maritime nation deciding to forego deploying a navy.
Berkowitz, Marc J. "Protecting America's Freedom of Action in Space." High Frontier Journal. Vol. 3, No. 2 (March 2007): 13-18. [ 11 quotes ] [ page 16 ]
U.S. should be Prepared to Escalate in Response to Attacks on U.S. Space Assets
 
The idea that America cannot afford to fight for its right of passage through space because it has the most to lose if the medium becomes a battlefield is specious. Policy-makers should be willing to take risks of escalation to respond appropriately to an enemy’s campaign to interfere with our space operations. If not made aware of the stakes and implications of inaction, it should be recognized that the American leadership and public might be insensitive to hostile interference with satellite operations that does not involve the direct loss of life. Consequently, informed decision-making will require the stewards of our space power to educate policy-makers, combatant commanders, and the American public about the political, military, and economic consequences of being denied the use of important space capabilities.
Berkowitz, Marc J. "Protecting America's Freedom of Action in Space." High Frontier Journal. Vol. 3, No. 2 (March 2007): 13-18. [ 11 quotes ] [ page 17 ]
Defense of U.S. Space Assets Requires Military to Disable Enemy Assets
 
Given that the offense is probably the stronger form of warfare in space and absolute survivability is impossible, the potential contributions of active defense measures for space mission protection also must be considered. Future US space architectures may need to be capable of some form of self-defense or defense by escort space vehicles. Space control weapons systems should be examined for their utility in defensive satellite roles against certain classes of anti-satellite weapon (ASAT) threats such as co-orbital interceptors, space mines, or other systems with kill mechanisms that require proximity.

Indeed, the survivability of US space assets clearly would benefit from a broader counterforce mission for active space defense, that is, neutralization of an adversary’s space control force structure. The ease of targeting an enemy’s arsenal of ASAT systems, however, would depend among other things upon the scale and diversity of the weapons inventory. While similar targeting challenges would also apply to countering an enemy’s space weapons-related command and control (C2), the high-leverage results if such countermeasures are feasible are obvious. Perhaps the greatest payoff in terms of space system defense would be provided by suppression of an enemy’s space object surveillance and identification capabilities for space control targeting. US efforts to maintain effective space mission capabilities in the event of conflict could only be enhanced if such suppression denied the enemy knowledge of satellite launches, orbital paths, and maneuvers.
Berkowitz, Marc J. "Protecting America's Freedom of Action in Space." High Frontier Journal. Vol. 3, No. 2 (March 2007): 13-18. [ 11 quotes ] [ page 15 ]
U.S. Military Success Depends on Reliable Access to Space Assets
 
Indeed, the reliance of US combatant commanders and military forces upon the global capabilities provided by space systems has never been greater. The data collected, generated, and relayed by our defense and intelligence satellite systems, as well as civil and commercial satellites used to augment national security assets, are crucial for deterrence and warfighting. Space systems enable the knowledge necessary to maintain military preparedness, implement joint operational concepts, and support the planning and conduct of military operations across the conflict spectrum. US national security satellite systems are now critical to the decision superiority of our armed forces. They are part of the glue that holds together US defense strategy. Disruption or loss of critical space mission capabilities thus would substantially decrease our combat effectiveness and increase the risks and costs of military operations.
Berkowitz, Marc J. "Protecting America's Freedom of Action in Space." High Frontier Journal. Vol. 3, No. 2 (March 2007): 13-18. [ 11 quotes ] [ page 13 ]
Means to Attack U.S. Space Assets are Proliferating Rapidly
 
Many nations and sub-national groups can develop weapons systems to impede America’s right of passage through space. The means to attack the ground segments and supporting critical infrastructure of our satellite systems remains present, while the global diffusion of dual-use radio and laser technology that could be used to interfere with our assets on-orbit is worrisome. Moreover, the continuing proliferation of nuclear weapon and ballistic missile technology is increasing the probability of a nuclear detonation in space. America is more dependent upon its space capabilities than any other nation or sub-national group. Our dependence upon vulnerable satellite systems is provocative. Adversaries must be expected to understand the importance of space assets to the US. One of the lessons relearned from recent military operations obviously was the value of our space capabilities for warfighting. This lesson undoubtedly will be acted upon by our foes.
Berkowitz, Marc J. "Protecting America's Freedom of Action in Space." High Frontier Journal. Vol. 3, No. 2 (March 2007): 13-18. [ 11 quotes ] [ page 14 ]