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Forden, Geoffrey. "After China's Test: Time For a Limited Ban on Anti-Satellite Weapons." Arms Control Today. Vol. 37, No. 3 (April 2007). [ 7 quotes ]

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China already has the Technology to Threaten all U.S. Space Assets, even those in Higher Orbits
 
Contrary to some analysts' assertions, China would then likely have an ASAT system capable of threatening all U.S. space assets, not just those in low-Earth orbit. China has already mastered the techniques of placing satellites in medium and higher orbits: first placing the satellite and its booster's third stage into low-Earth orbit, then using the third stage to boost the satellite into a highly elliptical transfer orbit, and finally using the satellite's onboard engine to place it in a higher-altitude circular orbit. An ASAT attack against a navigational satellite or higher communications satellites would almost certainly involve the first two steps. At higher altitudes, moreover, the final attack is easier because at these altitudes satellites need to move less quickly to stay in orbit because of the Earth's weakening gravitational field. Likewise, an ASAT weapon does not need to approach its target satellite with as great a closing speed (information graphic available in the print edition). Thus, an attack on a geostationary satellite would be considerably less stressing for an ASAT weapon's tracking, guidance, and control systems than the scenario already successfully tested by China's ASAT system.
Forden, Geoffrey. "After China's Test: Time For a Limited Ban on Anti-Satellite Weapons." Arms Control Today. Vol. 37, No. 3 (April 2007). [ 7 quotes ]
China will want to Conduct more Tests of its Direct-Ascent ASAT to be Confident that it is Viable
 
Even though this was a test of a very sophisticated weapon, it was still only a single successful test. China , with its history of deliberate weapons development, is unlikely to feel confident in this system until it has undergone a significant number of additional tests against similar targets. China would then almost certainly want to test many of the ASAT weapon's subsystems in geostationary transfer orbits so Beijing could have confidence in attacks against higher-orbit satellites. China might choose to do so using close flybys that would not create the debris or international uproar its last test did.
Forden, Geoffrey. "After China's Test: Time For a Limited Ban on Anti-Satellite Weapons." Arms Control Today. Vol. 37, No. 3 (April 2007). [ 7 quotes ]
Much more Difficult to Defend the Higher-Value Satellites in Higher Altitudes
 
It might be possible to protect low-Earth-orbit satellites either by passive countermeasures (maneuvering out of the way of the interceptor) or active defenses (destroying the incoming interceptor before the collision). Active defenses are possible at such low altitudes because most of a suborbital interceptor's debris would fall to earth within minutes. Unfortunately, neither measure is effective at higher altitudes and could be counterproductive. If it missed the first time, an ASAT weapon placed in an elliptical transfer orbit could simply wait for its next pass. For a geostationary satellite, the interceptor would have another shot about 24 hours later. Furthermore, to escape, the target satellite would undoubtedly have had to accelerate at several times that of gravity, likely causing booms or large, high-gain antennas to shear off. If on the other hand, the defender was foolish enough to try to destroy the interceptor, it would simply create a shotgun blast of debris traveling in essentially the same trajectory as the interceptor; eventually this widening swarm would destroy the target. The advantage is definitely on the side of the attacker.
Forden, Geoffrey. "After China's Test: Time For a Limited Ban on Anti-Satellite Weapons." Arms Control Today. Vol. 37, No. 3 (April 2007). [ 7 quotes ]
Would have to Disable half of U.S. GPS Constellation to Degrade U.S. Percision Guided Munition Capability
 
On the other hand, an attacker would have to destroy a considerable number of satellites in order to have an immediate effect on military operations. There are on average about 10 GPS satellites visible at any given time and point on the Earth's surface even though a high positional accuracy requires only six. An attacker would have to destroy at least six satellites to affect precision-guided munitions even momentarily because other GPS satellites would soon appear as their orbits took them into view. A country would need to disable nearly one-half of the United States' 24 NAVSTAR/GPS satellites currently in orbit to eliminate the ability to employ precision-guided munitions for more than a few hours each day. Likewise, the United States has a number of alternatives for communications satellites in the short term. Other space assets, such as weather and mapping satellites, although important in the long term, are not as time critical.
Forden, Geoffrey. "After China's Test: Time For a Limited Ban on Anti-Satellite Weapons." Arms Control Today. Vol. 37, No. 3 (April 2007). [ 7 quotes ]
China and Russia are Pursuing Space Arms Control to Limit U.S. Missile Defense Efforts
 
Missile defenses also pose an obstacle to making diplomatic progress on ASAT weapons systems. The United States believes these defenses are critical to protecting itself from attacks by rogue states, but China fears they could also be used to deter it in any conflict with the United States, such as over Taiwan. In recent years, China, at first alone but later with Russia, has made several proposals to the United Nation's Conference on Disarmament on possible elements for a future treaty banning the weaponization of space. At times, the proposals have taken in all U.S. missile defenses, not merely U.S. consideration of deploying space-based interceptors. Beijing 's and Moscow 's June 2001 proposal, for example, required signatories not to "test, deploy or use in outer space any weapons, weapon systems, or their components." As part of the proposed treaty, a list of definitions was offered that included defining outer space as starting at an altitude of 100 kilometers and a weapon as any device or facility that could "strike, destroy or disrupt directly the normal functions of a target." These definitions are hardly controversial, but they would ban the United States from even testing its current defense shield, which is supposed to strike and destroy an incoming warhead at altitudes far higher than 100 kilometers.
Forden, Geoffrey. "After China's Test: Time For a Limited Ban on Anti-Satellite Weapons." Arms Control Today. Vol. 37, No. 3 (April 2007). [ 7 quotes ]
Existing U.S. Missile Defense Systems would be more effective against Satellites than Missiles
 
Any attempt to ban ASAT weapons development will have to figure out how to square such an agreement with the existence of U.S. ballistic missile defenses. Although the effectiveness of these defenses against missiles has been questioned, there is no doubt that they could hit a satellite in low-Earth orbit. Their tracking, guidance, and control systems have been developed and successfully tested against incoming warheads in engagements that have closing speeds in excess of 11 kilometers per second. Such closing speeds are much higher than those it would encounter against even the lowest satellite and certainly higher than those the Chinese overcame in their January test.
Forden, Geoffrey. "After China's Test: Time For a Limited Ban on Anti-Satellite Weapons." Arms Control Today. Vol. 37, No. 3 (April 2007). [ 7 quotes ]
Key Provisions of Proposed Code of Conduct are to Limit Space Debris and Share Space Surveillance Data
 
Many feel that these definitional problems are impossible to overcome if international agreement is to be reached. In answer to this, the Henry L. Stimson Center , in collaboration with a number of other nongovernmental organizations, has proposed a Code of Conduct for Space-Faring Nations. This code is still evolving, but its key feature is a pledge to avoid creating persistent space debris by following the guidelines of the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC). Such a pledge would go a long way in protecting the world's economic interests in outer space by creating an international taboo against creating dangerous space junk. ...

Another important aspect of the proposed code is the call for nations of the world to share space surveillance data. Through a series of radars, ground-based optical telescopes, and even a camera onboard a satellite, the United States observes and tracks almost all the objects in space with diameters greater than 10 centimeters. The parameters necessary to calculate the orbits for most of these are provided on a website open to the public. Other countries also maintain such observations but do not share them. It would be an important confidence-building measure for all countries to share this information. ( More ... )
Forden, Geoffrey. "After China's Test: Time For a Limited Ban on Anti-Satellite Weapons." Arms Control Today. Vol. 37, No. 3 (April 2007). [ 7 quotes ]