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Gruselle, Bruno. "The final frontier: missile defence in space?." Disarmament Forum. No. 1 (2007): 53-57. [ 4 quotes ]

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Must Consider the Security Needs that are Motivating the U.S. Push for Space-Based Missile Defense for Progress on Space Arms Control
 
Considering the current global security situation and trends, any debate on the deployment of weapons in space should be focused on finding a balance between all states' security needs rather than on trying to find a way to ban the larger spectre of military application platforms in space. Future US administrations may be willing to engage in a debate-even negotiation-on the weaponization of space if US security concerns could really be addressed by it. To make this possible, a tentative first step would be to recognize that not all space-based weapons constitute a threat to international security. Some may even enhance it-such as a future global capability to intercept in-flight missiles fired from a rogue state. Failure to make any concession on the reality of the proliferation concern and the potential of space systems to address this concern will probably lead to the continuation of the present US policy and ultimately to the absence of any progress in the prevention of an arms race in space.
Gruselle, Bruno. "The final frontier: missile defence in space?." Disarmament Forum. No. 1 (2007): 53-57. [ 4 quotes ] [ page 56 ]

Space-to-Earth Strike Weapons are not Practical Currently
 
Space-based assets could clearly play a role in both responses. Space-based sensors could give the necessary alert and tracking data to the interception network that land-based sensors would not be able to obtain. More important, space-based interceptors could be the most appropriate means to target long-range missiles fired from deep within a country's territory or to rapidly destroy the launch capabilities of a rogue state set on defeating limited land-based interception system inventories. The latter clearly lies at the core of the debate on the nonweaponization of space as it means the deployment of a space-to- Earth strike capability. However, it is doubtful that weapon platforms will be deployed in space in the near future. Orbiting weapons capable of striking land-based systems are neither economically nor technically interesting for the moment, and other means to conduct anti-launcher operations already exist, such as piloted or unmanned airborne systems. Indeed, the proponents of missile defence are not asking for space-to-Earth strike systems. Rather, they are advocating the development of space-based interception capabilities, which would have only a very marginal-and probably no-offensive potential against Earth targets.
Gruselle, Bruno. "The final frontier: missile defence in space?." Disarmament Forum. No. 1 (2007): 53-57. [ 4 quotes ] [ page 56 ]

North Korea is Continuing to Advance its Ballistic Missile Arsenal
 
In the realm of missiles, the development of more efficient, longer-range weapons is gaining pace, as illustrated by the launch on 4 July 2006 of a Taepodong-2 from the DPRK. Pyongyang possesses a large ballistic missile arsenal, comprising mainly Scud-type missiles in addition to longer range systems. According to some assessments, the DPRK today possesses between 300 and 400 Scud-B and Scud-C missiles as well as 60 mobile launchers deployed north of the Demilitarized Zone and capable of reaching most of the Republic of Korea and in particular Seoul. With its Nodong missile arsenal, the DPRK can strike most of Japan in a matter of minutes, including US assets deployed there. Today, worst-case assessments give the DPRK a total capability of about 200 Nodong missiles and 10-15 mobile launchers. More disturbing is the willingness of Pyongyang to sell such weapons to literally any state willing to pay for them. Its cooperation with Syria and its assistance to Iran's Shahab programme must today be considered as one of the most worrying trends in missile proliferation.
Gruselle, Bruno. "The final frontier: missile defence in space?." Disarmament Forum. No. 1 (2007): 53-57. [ 4 quotes ] [ page 55 ]

Iran's Ballistic Missile Program is Threatening even Without its WMD Ambitions
 
Indeed, Iran's missile programme has reached an unprecedented level of sophistication and size for a proliferant country. Tehran is reported to possess a tactical arsenal comprising several hundred Shahab-1 and Shahab-2 missiles14-equivalent to Scud-B and Scud-C. The quest for longer-range systems reportedly started at the beginning of the 1990s with support from the DPRK. The first flight test of the 1,300km-range Shahab-3 in 1998 started a long series of tests and the official deployment of the missile in 2003.16 With such a missile Tehran gains the ability to threaten Israel as well as part of Europe. Iran has also conducted the development of modern anti-ship cruise missiles, culminating with the announcement from Tehran of the deployment of a Raad anti-ship cruise missile in 2004. Furthermore, Iran allegedly illegally acquired six AS-15 missiles from Ukraine in 2001. The transfer was revealed by Hryhoriy Omelchenko, member of the Ukrainian parliament, in February 2005, and since then has been the subject of a legal investigation in Ukraine. According to this investigation, intermediaries of the operation-including a Russian national employed by the Oboronexport weapons export company- apparently used false end-user certificates to circumvent Ukrainian export control regulations. This missile, with a theoretical range of 2,500km, was apparently part of a batch of Soviet missiles for which the nuclear warheads had been returned to Moscow as part of a bilateral agreement in the middle of the 1990s. It would seem realistic to believe that Tehran has attempted to copy the received missiles since the sale, particularly the propulsion and navigation systems. On the other hand, considering information available about the state of the missiles as received by Iran and the relative inexperience of military units in the use of ground attack missiles, it seems improbable that they were immediately deployed.
Gruselle, Bruno. "The final frontier: missile defence in space?." Disarmament Forum. No. 1 (2007): 53-57. [ 4 quotes ] [ page 55 ]