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Shixiu, Bao. "Deterrence Revisited: Outer Space." China Security. (Winter 2007): 2-11. [ 4 quotes ]

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China Directly Threatened by Revised U.S. National Space Policy
 
The NSP presents a number of challenges to China's security environment. First, it grants the United States with exclusive rights to space: the right to use any and all necessary means to ensure American security while at the same time denying adversaries access to space for "hostile purposes." This sets up an inequitable environment of "haves" and "have-nots" in space, raising suspicion amongst nations. For instance, the NSP declares that U.S. space systems should be guaranteed safe passage over all countries without exception (such as "interference" by other countries, even when done for the purpose of safeguarding their sovereignty and their space integrity). With its significant space assets and military space capabilities, this situation gives the United States an obvious and unfair strategic advantage in space. Second, it refutes international restrictions and undercuts potential international agreements that seek to constrain America's use of space. This effectively undermines any potential initiatives put forth by the international community to control space weaponization– initiatives that China supports. This U.S. position leads the global community to suspect U.S. unilateralist intentions in space. Lastly, while the policy may not state it explicitly, a critical examination of its contents suggest its intention to "dissuade and deter" other countries, including China, from possessing space capabilities that can challenge the United States in any way– a parameter that would effectively disallow China to possess even a minimum means of national defense in space. The resultant security environment in space is one with one set of rules for the United States and another set of rules for other nations. In such a context, only U.S. security concerns are taken into account with a result of the reinforcement of a zero-sum dynamic to which space is already prone and threatens to pressure others into a military space race.
Shixiu, Bao. "Deterrence Revisited: Outer Space." China Security. (Winter 2007): 2-11. [ 4 quotes ] [ page 2-3 ]
Space Debris Risks may make the Use of Space Weapons Taboo as it would cause the "Mutually Assured Destruction" of all Space Assets
 
It is a well-known phenomenon that the use of nuclear weapons is considered taboo. Along with the doctrine of mutual assured destruction, the use of nuclear weapons in war is almost unimaginable. The utilitization of nuclear weapons is therefore almost entirely limited to a role of deterrence. What about the taboo of space weapons? More and more specialists are looking at the impact of space debris that results from the use of space weapons. Large amounts of space debris caused by space weapons will invariably threaten space assets of all space-faring countries, not just intended target countries. Any attack by one country against another using space weapons will result in many losers. With so much of commercial, scientific and military activity increasingly reliant on space, there exists a considerable and growing taboo against using space weapons in a situation of conflict. Thus, under the conditions of American strategic dominance in space, reliable deterrents in space will decrease the possibility of the United States attacking Chinese space assets.
Shixiu, Bao. "Deterrence Revisited: Outer Space." China Security. (Winter 2007): 2-11. [ 4 quotes ] [ page 6-7 ]
Space Weapons will not Fundamentally Alter the Nature of War
 
At a fundamental level, space weapons – like nuclear weapons – will not alter the essential nature of war. Throughout history, there has been much ink spilled over new weapons that have the unique power and ability to change the underlying quality of war. For example, military theorists once exaggerated the tank's role in deciding the war's outcome during World War I.11 The atom bomb itself is probably the most salient example, as many analysts and politicians described the weapon as the unique ultimate weapon. But this was a fundamental misunderstanding of war and its implements. Nuclear weapons crossed a threshold in terms of their immense capacity for destruction. But deterrence, mutual assured destruction and the nuclear taboo evolved to consign the use of nuclear weapons to a near impossibility, negating its utility as a tool of war-fighting. Weapons to change the nature of war have not emerged in the past and will not emerge in the future. As such, space weapons will not be the ultimate weapon nor will they be able to decide the outcome of war, even if they are used as a first strike.
Shixiu, Bao. "Deterrence Revisited: Outer Space." China Security. (Winter 2007): 2-11. [ 4 quotes ] [ page 7 ]
China Lacks the Means or Motivation to Engage U.S. in a Space Arms Race, its Motives are Primarily Defensive
 
Despite the need for an effective deterrent to meet security challenges that China may confront in space, it will not initiate a space weapons race with the United States or any other country. First, China does not have the ambition to enter a space weapons race. During the Cold War period, faced with a threat of nuclear war, China did not join in the nuclear weapons race between the United States and the Soviet Union. Today, China's space program is pointed in the direction of peaceful development. The new political and diplomatic doctrines – a harmonious society and world – also curb China's entrance to a space weapons race. Second, China does not have the ability to enter a space weapons race. Although China has ambitious plans in space, the technical gap, especially in the military area vis-à-vis the United States, is difficult if not impossible to fill. China will not and cannot expend significant budgetary resources pursuing space weapons, but will instead focus on civilian and commercial space assets. So, if China owns space weapons, their number and quality will be limited in their capacity to act as an effective defense mechanism and will not be a threat to other countries.
Shixiu, Bao. "Deterrence Revisited: Outer Space." China Security. (Winter 2007): 2-11. [ 4 quotes ] [ page 10 ]