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Roberts, Tommy A. "Space Situation Awareness: How Much Should the US Share?." High Frontier Journal. (Winter 2005): 9-12. [ 8 quotes ]

Evidence Related to this Citation

Declassification of Space Surveillance Data Complicated by its Potential for Offensive Counter Space (OCS)
 
One large security issue for SSA is trying to break it from its natural linkages to OCS. In todayʼs current construct, anything remotely related to OCS is going to be highly classified. If data might be used for targeting, no matter how unlikely that case might be, it is traditionally slapped with a high classification label. Since the declassification of OCS capabilities is unlikely, an effort must be made to break some of the linkage to SSA. In addition, a thorough security review of current systems and data to identify potential areas for declassification must be done if efforts to share SSA data are to be successful. Most importantly, this review should not be done solely by members of the space community. Without a genuine effort at declassification the US falls into the trap of providing limited SSA, and global customers will ultimately determine the unwillingness to share requires them to develop their own capability.
Roberts, Tommy A. "Space Situation Awareness: How Much Should the US Share?." High Frontier Journal. (Winter 2005): 9-12. [ 8 quotes ] [ page 11-12 ]
Military Space Culture not used to Sharing Data
 
These policy statements indicate either an attempt to develop a cooperative culture within the space community, or simply suggest an attempt to “seem” cooperative. Either way, the reality is that the military space community has not fully embraced a culture of sharing. In fact, quite the opposite is true. The development of stovepiped systems and the cover of security classification labels have created an environment where internal DoD cooperation is hard enough, without mentioning the difficulty in sharing capabilities with foreign and commercial “competitors.” In the end, that mindset must change if the US is to maintain its asymmetric advantage and benefit from the synergy created through cooperation.
Roberts, Tommy A. "Space Situation Awareness: How Much Should the US Share?." High Frontier Journal. (Winter 2005): 9-12. [ 8 quotes ] [ page 9 ]
U.S. should ask for Data Exchanges as Payment for Using Space Surveillance Network
 
Assuming the who and what questions can be adequately answered, should the US seek reimbursement for the SSA it provides? The answer is yes. However, the requested reimbursement should not be monetary, but should focus on gaining SSA data in return for the SSA given. In other words, the US needs to build symbiotic relationships with its customers so both can benefit. For example, instead of financial reimbursement, perhaps a foreign or commercial user would be willing to provide more precise tracking data on their spacecraft in exchange for collision avoidance support. In other words, the US would help them avoid collisions with other space objects in exchange for continual data on the location of the commercial users assets. This tracking data would provide the US with the day-to-day situational awareness they need on those assets without having to task a US resource to track the object(s). Given the fact that the US space tracking capability is heavily tasked, such an arrangement would free valuable resources to track other objects. The gained situation awareness not only benefits the US, but also makes space a safer environment for everyone by improving the US tracking database. The bottom line is to not scare away any potential customers over the issue of reimbursement. It is better to foster a relationship with the hope of future reimbursement then push them away and cause them to go elsewhere.
Roberts, Tommy A. "Space Situation Awareness: How Much Should the US Share?." High Frontier Journal. (Winter 2005): 9-12. [ 8 quotes ] [ page 11 ]
EU Started Alternative to U.S. Global Positioning to Guarantee Availability
 
The bottom line is that despite US efforts to share, global actors still decided they must develop an alternative to GPS. A number of statements from the European Space Agency (ESA) shed light on why they chose this path. First, the Europeans promote their counterpart system, Galileo, as a “guaranteed global positioning service under civilian control.”6 Two parts of this statement stand out: guaranteed service and civilian control. These are words clearly picked to differentiate the Galileo system from GPS. The ESA is counting on a market that wants guaranteed service not tied to American military control. The Europeans further elaborate on guaranteed service by claiming to provide, “availability of the service under all but the most extreme circumstances.”7 Although the exact meaning of “extreme circumstances” is debatable, it seems to imply a higher threshold for service denial then the current US policy. If nothing else, it seems more likely for one country to make a decision to deny service than it is for a multinational organization that requires some sort of mutual agreement.
Roberts, Tommy A. "Space Situation Awareness: How Much Should the US Share?." High Frontier Journal. (Winter 2005): 9-12. [ 8 quotes ] [ page 10 ]
U.S. should Share Space Surveillance Data to Build Dependence on U.S. SSN
 
This article proposes that the US must develop a policy that promotes the sharing of its SSA capabilities with foreign and commercial entities in order to maintain its dominant position. This does not mean full and complete disclosure of everything we possess to whomever requests it, but rather a well-designed approach that fully considers the National Security interests of the United States. Such a policy should have three primary objectives: 1) derive additional SSA for the US by maximizing the relationships developed through SSA cooperation, 2) increase Joint and Coalition interoperability for future conflicts, and 3) drive dependence on US SSA to delay the development of foreign and commercial SSA.
Roberts, Tommy A. "Space Situation Awareness: How Much Should the US Share?." High Frontier Journal. (Winter 2005): 9-12. [ 8 quotes ] [ page 9 ]
U.S. must Decide between Sharing Space Surveillance Data or Dealing with Competing Systems
 
In the context of SSA, the US is at an important crossroads. As noted in a recent RAND study, “Nations are facing important choices in deciding whether to acquire independent aerospace capabilities, whether to depend on other nations for aerospace support, whether potential costs and vulnerabilities are incurred for those relationships, and whether they are willing politically to accept both the benefits and the risks of dependence.”17 The US also faces an important choice. Is it willing to share its SSA capabilities in order to drive foreign and commercial dependence, or will it continue to hide behind its Cold War-era security blanket and fail to adjust to the changing global environment? It is clear a policy of sharing is the answer…now the devil will be in the details.
Roberts, Tommy A. "Space Situation Awareness: How Much Should the US Share?." High Frontier Journal. (Winter 2005): 9-12. [ 8 quotes ] [ page 12 ]
Debatable whether Adversaries would want to or need to Rely on U.S. Space Surveillance Data to Attack Space Assets
 
Although an SSA policy should liberally encourage the sharing of data, there are a number of SSA categories that should not be shared. One category in this area would be SSA that could reasonably aid in offensive space capabilities. This includes, space intelligence that highlights a system vulnerability, or data that might be used for offensive targeting purposes. The difficulty here is drawing the line on what constitutes a reasonable threat. One of the common arguments in the surveillance community is the US should not share its SSN tracking data because the data could be used to target on-orbit assets. One of the assumptions in such an argument is that the offending party designing the offensive space capability would rely on US data to fulfill a critical requirement in their system. The validity of this assumption is certainly debatable, but, in the past, that argument has provided a readily available excuse to resist sharing. The bottom line is a culture of paranoia that refuses to share anything only hurts the US in the long run. If an SSA policy of sharing is to be successful, efforts must be made to find ways to share data rather then excuses not to.
Roberts, Tommy A. "Space Situation Awareness: How Much Should the US Share?." High Frontier Journal. (Winter 2005): 9-12. [ 8 quotes ] [ page 11 ]
U.S. must Fully Share Space Surveillance Data to Preclude Competitors
 
One final lesson from GPS is that it does not matter if the US thinks it is fully sharing its space systems and capabilities. It only matters what the rest of the world perceives. Limited resources are going to be an issue for any country, especially in the high-cost business of space. If the US can persuade others they will reliably and responsibly provide certain space services; like navigation and SSA, others will spend their limited space resources in areas more beneficial to the US (e.g. international space station support). While the opportunity to prevent competitors to GPS is probably gone, the US can still use these key lessons to improve their SSA policy.
Roberts, Tommy A. "Space Situation Awareness: How Much Should the US Share?." High Frontier Journal. (Winter 2005): 9-12. [ 8 quotes ] [ page 10 ]