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Shaw, John E. "On Cossacks, Subs, and SAMs: Defeating Challenges to U.S. Space Superiority." High Frontier Journal. (Winter 2005): 23. [ 6 quotes ]

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Should not Underestimate Enemy Intentions by Projecting our Own
 
As a nation with space superiority prepares to meet and defeat an emerging space denial counterstrategy, it is critical to recognize the full scope of disparities and asymmetries at work, and plan accordingly. As Azriel Lorber elucidates in Misguided Weapons, throughout history one of the most consistent and deadly mistakes made on the battlefield has been the tendency to project one's own practices, constraints, and value system on the adversary. This was Napoleon's fatal flaw in his Russian campaign ­ the assumption the Russian army would play by the battlefield rules of "war by annihilation." The "projection" syndrome also plagued the air campaign in Vietnam. US national leadership "subconsciously assigned the enemy western values and translated a guerilla war into a conventional conflict they could better understand." Where might the dangers of self-projection manifest themselves in the space arena? The continued adherence by some to space sanctuary theory is a strategic-level example. Projecting one's own acquisition and fiscal restraints or levels of acceptable risk onto an adversary. A potential adversary may be less risk averse in the demonstration of a new technology than the US, or less deterred by world opinion, or less concerned with loss of life. Whatever the differences may be, defeating a counterstrategy of space denial will require recognizing the dissimilarities in potential adversaries.
Shaw, John E. "On Cossacks, Subs, and SAMs: Defeating Challenges to U.S. Space Superiority." High Frontier Journal. (Winter 2005): 23. [ 6 quotes ] [ page 26 ]
U.S. needs to develop a Strategy to deal with Assymetric threat to its Space Dominance
 
The proper way to respond to an adversary's determined space denial counterstrategy is with a space superiority counterstrategy of one's own, not constrained by the "known rules," and involving the full spectrum of warfighting capabilities. It is not possible to precisely describe that strategy. Much will depend on the nature of the threat and the context of operational-level activities. But its characteristics should be familiar, sharing much in common with historical superiority counterstrategies. Is the US properly postured today to develop and execute such a space superiority strategy in the face of a determined adversary? Space power analyst Stephen Lambakis argues that the "United States is secure in space by default, not because there is a deliberate policy framework and well-resourced, organized, and strategically guided military force to guard national space interests". In a sense, the current US approach to space superiority resembles the strategic setting at the start of the air war in Southeast Asia. There is a basic understanding that controlling and exploiting the medium in question is important. An integrated approach to defeating space denial efforts on par with the convoy system does not exist. Neither is there a universally recognized doctrinal and practical mandate for preservation of space superiority in the face of a denial threat.
Shaw, John E. "On Cossacks, Subs, and SAMs: Defeating Challenges to U.S. Space Superiority." High Frontier Journal. (Winter 2005): 23. [ 6 quotes ] [ page 27 ]
Most Likely Threats to U.S. Space Assets will be Cheap, Low-Tech, and Assymetric
 
How, then, might future space denial efforts conform to this characteristic of asymmetric and relatively cheap technologies? It seems they will not fit the current US space infrastructure mold: large, expensive spacecraft and launchers requiring long lead times from production to deployment. A 1998 study identified the most likely threats to be (1) direct ascent anti-satellite weapons (i.e. those launched from ground-mobile or even airborne platforms on small boosters), (2) low-power electromagnetic jammers or directed energy weapons enhanced by the proliferating technology of adaptive optics, and (3) information-based attacks, such as computer viruses constructed by "hackers" and inserted into vulnerable points in space command and control infrastructure. All of these methods fit the mold of "cheap and asymmetric threats," and, more frighteningly, are at or near commercial of-the-shelf status ­ even a direct ascent capability tested ten years ago on the Russian MiG-31 Foxhound is capable of being exported.
Shaw, John E. "On Cossacks, Subs, and SAMs: Defeating Challenges to U.S. Space Superiority." High Frontier Journal. (Winter 2005): 23. [ 6 quotes ] [ page 25 ]
Vietnam Experience shows ability of Adversaries to defeat U.S. Airpower Dominance through Assymetric Methods
 
During the Vietnam War, the North Vietnamese had a major goal: deny America air superiority over Vietnam, and, in so doing, extract material, and, more importantly, political costs (such as downed aircrew turned POWs). The centerpiece of North Vietnam's strategy was a new and ambitious air defense system centered on the Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM). It was a new kind of weapon, based on advanced rocketry and guidance technology, developed in the late 1950s, and used in anger for the first time to down US U2 aircraft over the Soviet Union and Cuba in the early 1960s. Despite these foreshadowings, the SAM threat was not properly anticipated or prepared for in Vietnam: "between 1955 and 1965, the Air Force made no concentrated effort to develop a SAM countermeasure." Between January 1962 and January 1973, over 2300 US fixed wing aircraft fell victim to enemy anti-air efforts. The US soon began to find ways to counter the SAM threat at the tactical level. Anti-radiation missiles such as the Shrike and radar-jamming equipment like the ALQ-71 Electronic Countermeasures pod became available. Ironically, though, it was not until the end of the air war that the US finally overcame the air denial efforts of the North Vietnamese and achieved unopposed air superiority. Just two days before Operation LINEBACKER II ended, the North Vietnamese air defenses shut down, as they had exhausted their national supply of SAMs. Thus, this achievement of air superiority was "won" by a long and costly battle of attrition, not by triumph of superior strategy.
Shaw, John E. "On Cossacks, Subs, and SAMs: Defeating Challenges to U.S. Space Superiority." High Frontier Journal. (Winter 2005): 23. [ 6 quotes ] [ page 24 ]
U.S. Needs to Focus on Mastering Space Domain to Defeat Counterstrategies
 
What needs to be done to put the US on the proper trajectory to anticipate and defeat future space denial counterstrategies? A reasonable starting point is to examine that body of thought that seeks to guide operational-level warfighting: Joint Doctrine. Unfortunately, it seems current US joint warfighting doctrine is not optimized to support the development and execution of an effective space superiority strategy. The central problem is that current Joint Doctrine tends to focus on space and the advantages it yields as a logistical support concern to be managed, rather than a medium to be mastered. To be fair, there is some attention in Joint Doctrine documents of the importance of gaining and maintaining space superiority, but these are clearly isolated and minority instances. For example, in the only Joint Publication (JP) devoted to space, JP 3-14, the word "support" appears in the primary text over 200 times, while "superiority" appears only 6 times. Failing to place paramount importance on maintaining superiority within a medium in the face of a denial threat―as demonstrated in the historical campaigns discussed above--carries with it a price. To address this concern, Joint Doctrine must reflect the paramount imperative to gain and maintain space superiority in any Joint campaign, as necessary a condition to victory as gaining air or maritime superiority. In fact, in future conflicts it may very well not be possible to gain superiority within other mediums without first achieving it in space. Ensuring such superiority is the sine qua non for realizing the increasingly critical contributions space capabilities make in modern warfare.
Shaw, John E. "On Cossacks, Subs, and SAMs: Defeating Challenges to U.S. Space Superiority." High Frontier Journal. (Winter 2005): 23. [ 6 quotes ] [ page 27 ]
Adversaries can Defeat Dominant Player in a Medium through Stealth, Surprise, and by Varying Tempo
 
One obvious but important observation about those powers that seek to maintain superiority over a medium is that their means to do so are overt, obvious, and continuous: Napoleon's armies, the Allies? WWII fleets and convoys, and the US air presence in Vietnam all fit this description. Accordingly, the means employed to deny superiority uniformly take on alternative characteristics: stealth, surprise, and varying tempo of operations. Russian armies proved ever elusive to Napoleon, evading battle, striking with Cossack raids on flanks and the rear, and doing so quickly. Even more decisively, German U-boats attacked targets without warning, and at high tempo, often escaping the scene of attack before their torpedoes even struck. North Vietnamese SAM and anti-aircraft batteries relied often on ambush methods to achieve success, as a founder of the Naval Fighter Weapons School noted: "They had timed us so many times on our bombing runs that they knew how long we were going to be there, and when we were going out." SAM sites, including radars and launchers, were highly mobile, and could relocate in under four hours.
Shaw, John E. "On Cossacks, Subs, and SAMs: Defeating Challenges to U.S. Space Superiority." High Frontier Journal. (Winter 2005): 23. [ 6 quotes ] [ page 24 ]