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Collard-Wexler, Simon, Thomas Graham et al. Space Security 2006. Waterloo, Ontario: Space Security Index, July 2006. [ 26 quotes ]

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Russian military space policy focused on defense -- they've pledged not to be the first to deploy space weapons
 
In practical terms, Russian military space policy appears to have two main priorities. The first is transferring to a new generation of space equipment capabilities, including cheaper and more efficient information technology systems. The second priority is the upgrade of the Russian nuclear missile attack warning system. Together, these recent developments are seen as having a critical role in guaranteeing Russia's secure access to space. Russia has expressed concern about the potential weaponization of space and the extension of the arms race to outer space, especially in light of the development of US missile defense systems. ( More ... )
Collard-Wexler, Simon, Thomas Graham et al. Space Security 2006. Waterloo, Ontario: Space Security Index, July 2006. [ 26 quotes ]
India, Israel, Japan, China, and the European Union all took steps to increase military use of space in 2005
 
The number of states emphasizing the security uses of space in national policies continued to increase in 2005. In January, the Japanese government introduced a plan to deploy a new generation of spy satellites. Japan also continued talks with the US throughout 2005 on furthering missile defense cooperation. The Israeli Air Force unveiled plans in June to launch additional surveillance satellites to boost intelligence capabilities and to manufacture micro-satellites that could provide information on combat zones (see Space Support for Military Operations). In addition, Yuval Steinitz, chairman of Israel's Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee, stated that defense and industry officials should consider future developments of "anti-satellite missiles" and "satellite-attacking lasers." India also continued to pay greater attention to the military uses of space. The Indian Air Force urged the government to set up a Strategic Aerospace Command to purportedly facilitate the development of capabilities to degrade space weapons in preparation for "future star wars." While some reports contend that the government has rejected the proposals, Indian Air Force Chief S. P. Tyagi insists that the recommendations are still under consideration, particularly in light of the Parliamentary Standing Committee's declarations that India needs the ability to counter any threat from space. Media reports throughout 2005 revealed significant speculation about China's space capabilities and military-related space intentions, although Chinese officials maintain that the country's space program is solely for peaceful purposes.
Collard-Wexler, Simon, Thomas Graham et al. Space Security 2006. Waterloo, Ontario: Space Security Index, July 2006. [ 26 quotes ] [ page 60 ]
Space debris caused several fragementation and collision events in 2005
 
Several satellite fragmentation and debris collision events took place in 2005. By October, five cases of satellite fragmentation had been recorded and two new accidental collisions identified. On 17 January, a US rocket body collided with a fragment from a Chinese launch vehicle that exploded in 2000. Two Russian motors also broke-up in 2005 ­ the first, on 23 April, was a Russian Proton launch vehicle launched as part of the Kosmos 2224 Mission in 1992. The second breakup occurred on 1 June and was associated with the Russian Kosmos 2392 mission launched in mid-2002. As many as 40 objects were initially detected from the second fragmentation, five of which were catalogued by the SSN. On 30 June, that same motor experienced another fragmentation and 50 fragments were initially catalogued. On 21 June, a Russian meteorological observation system generated one small piece of debris. And on 22 June, a Russian Kosmos 3M rocket body released a single piece of debris. The event is believed to have been caused by a collision between the rocket body and a small piece of orbital debris or a meteoroid.
Collard-Wexler, Simon, Thomas Graham et al. Space Security 2006. Waterloo, Ontario: Space Security Index, July 2006. [ 26 quotes ] [ page 36 ]
NASA study shows risk of catastrophic collision with space debris may be higher than previously thought
 
Media reports about a forthcoming NASA study reveal that the risk posed by orbital debris to spacecraft may be higher than previously thought. Leaked information from the study suggests that shuttles now face a 1-in-54 to 1-in-113 chance of being destroyed by space debris. This is much greater than the stated NASA program goals of a 1-in-200 chance. In addition, NASA found that space debris accounts for half of the risk associated with spaceflights and collisions with space debris account for 11 of the 20 problems that could be most fatal to a shuttle and its crew. Because there is disagreement within NASA as to the likelihood of a fatal collision between space debris and the shuttle, NASA officials plan to conduct further study to provide more clarity. ( More ... )
Collard-Wexler, Simon, Thomas Graham et al. Space Security 2006. Waterloo, Ontario: Space Security Index, July 2006. [ 26 quotes ] [ page 38 ]
New U.S. military space policy directive is imminent
 
The US is expected to release a new military space directive to replace the existing policy that was formulated in 1996, although the release has been delayed several times for revisions. Media reports have indicated that the new space directive would provide freer access in space for the USAF and would call for the deployment of capabilities to ensure that space systems or services cannot be used for purposes hostile to US national interests. The new policy directive is widely speculated to build on certain recommendations of the 2001 Rumsfeld Commission report that "explicit national security guidance and defense policy is needed to direct development of doctrine, concepts of operations and capabilities for space, including weapons systems that operate in space." ( More ... )
Collard-Wexler, Simon, Thomas Graham et al. Space Security 2006. Waterloo, Ontario: Space Security Index, July 2006. [ 26 quotes ] [ page 61 ]
Chinese space policy emphasizes international cooperation and peaceful use of outer space
 
China maintains a public commitment to the peaceful use of outer space in the interests of all mankind. While China actively promotes international exchanges and cooperation, it has stated that such efforts must encourage independence and self-reliance in space capabilities. The Chinese White Paper on space also emphasizes that, while due attention will be given to international cooperation and exchanges in the field of space technology, these exchanges must operate on the principles of mutual benefit and reciprocity. China has emphasized Asia-Pacific regional space cooperation, which in 1998 led to the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in Small Multi-Mission Satellite and Related Activities with Iran, Mongolia, Pakistan, South Korea, and Thailand. China has also pursued space cooperation with at least 12 states, and is collaborating with Brazil on a series of Earth resources satellites. ( More ... )
Collard-Wexler, Simon, Thomas Graham et al. Space Security 2006. Waterloo, Ontario: Space Security Index, July 2006. [ 26 quotes ] [ page 53 ]
European Space Agency looking to develop independent space surveillance capability
 
In 2005, members of a Panel of Experts on Space and Security submitted a report to the EC recommending, among other things, that Europe
develop an independent space surveillance network. Other sources indicated that the Panel members, whose views do not reflect official
EC or EU member state policy, had recommended a single network linking existing ground radars and optical telescopes with other European
systems already in place or under development. Such a network could integrate France's GRAVES and Monge systems with Germany's FGAN
Tracking and Image Radar system, and would require the European Automated Transfer Vehicle, an unmanned spacecraft used to transfer
equipment, food, air, and water to the ISS, to be fitted with technology for space-based surveillance. While the report garnered support from all EU member states, many officials pointed out that the network could be construed as a means of facilitating a missile defense system, which some EU members currently oppose. To examine a scenario for a European civil network for space surveillance, ESA ordered a pre-feasibility study to be conducted by the French aerospace research institute ONERA. ( More ... )
Collard-Wexler, Simon, Thomas Graham et al. Space Security 2006. Waterloo, Ontario: Space Security Index, July 2006. [ 26 quotes ] [ page 43 ]
U.S. remains committed to pursuing international cooperation in outer space
 
The US has the most to offer to international cooperative space efforts, but at the same time is the least dependent upon such efforts to achieve its national space policy objectives. US national space policy declares an intention to "pursue greater levels of partnership and
cooperation in national and international space activities and work with other nations to ensure the continued exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes." Such cooperation aims to promote cost-sharing and provide benefits to the US by increasing access to foreign scientific and technological data as well as foreign research and development facilities. It also seeks to enhance relations with US allies and Russia, while supporting initiatives with emerging space-faring states. US national space policy also notes that space cooperation must protect the commercial value of American intellectual property and ensure that technology transfers do not undermine US competitiveness and
national security. Overall, it is clear that US space efforts have played a central role in the dissemination of space access and use capabilities to other states.
Collard-Wexler, Simon, Thomas Graham et al. Space Security 2006. Waterloo, Ontario: Space Security Index, July 2006. [ 26 quotes ] [ page 52 ]
U.S. has placed restrictions on space surveillance data because of security concerns
 
Growing concerns about the potentially adversarial use of US satellite and space debris tracking data led US authorities to place new restrictions on the public availability of such information, as mandated in the 2004 Defense Authorization Act. A review found that
available data could be employed to damage or jam satellites or to strategically move space assets to avoid detection. In accordance with stipulations in the US Defense Authorization Act, as of 3 January 2005 such information is only available on a new site requiring access permissions, and users are prohibited from sharing any information without prior approval by appropriate DOD authorities. For approved users, and in some cases at a fee, more precise data on satellite coordinates is available. Questions and concerns regarding the implementation and effectiveness of the new restrictions on tracking data continue to be raised, particularly by scientists and astronomers whose research depends on unrestricted access to data.
Collard-Wexler, Simon, Thomas Graham et al. Space Security 2006. Waterloo, Ontario: Space Security Index, July 2006. [ 26 quotes ] [ page 42 ]
U.S. investing in building up space surveillance capability
 
The broader category of space situational awareness, within which space surveillance is a primary capability, remains one of the ³most
urgent space security shortcomings² of the US according to leading experts. Therefore, it has been bolstering such capabilities. The US
Deep View program plans to develop a high-resolution radar-imaging capability to characterize smaller objects in Earth orbit. The US
Space Surveillance Telescope program will ³demonstrate an advanced ground-based optical system to enable detection and tracking of faint
objects in space, while providing rapid, wide-area search capability.² Also under development are the SBSS, set for launch in 2007, and the
Orbital Deep Space Imager. Both surveillance systems are expected to have inherent capabilities for identifying and tracking orbital debris in GEO, but are being developed as part of the broader US space control mission (see Space Systems Negation). The Naval Fence was transferred to Air Force control in 2004 when it was renamed the Air Force Space Surveillance System. The oldest US space surveillance system, it consists of three transmitters and six receivers capable of making some 5-million detections each month of objects larger than a basketball.
Collard-Wexler, Simon, Thomas Graham et al. Space Security 2006. Waterloo, Ontario: Space Security Index, July 2006. [ 26 quotes ] [ page 34 ]
More and more states are achieving access to outer space
 
The year 2005 saw more states access space. Iran's first satellite was launched with the help of Russia in October, making Iran the 45th
space-faring state. The same launch put the NCUBE-2, Norway's first domestically developed satellite, into orbit, to be used to track
reindeer and ship movements. Kazakhstan had planned the launch of its first satellite for 25 December 2005, but the launch was delayed until 2006 by unspecified technical difficulties. Reports in February 2005 announced that Sudan planned to have its first satellite launched before the end of 2005, but the launch did not take place. In December 2005 the New Zealand government approved plans to have the country's first satellite launched in 2010. In addition, the Prime Minister of Vietnam formally requested that authorities consider allowing the country to have its own satellite by 2008. Vietnam Posts and Telecommunications Corp was asked to begin bidding for the "Vinasat" satellite, which would occupy the 132 degrees East GEO orbital slot. Vietnam has until the second quarter of 2008 to put a satellite into GEO before it loses rights to the orbital slot it reserved several years ago with the ITU.
Collard-Wexler, Simon, Thomas Graham et al. Space Security 2006. Waterloo, Ontario: Space Security Index, July 2006. [ 26 quotes ] [ page 40 ]
Export controls inhibit growth of commercial space sector
 
While government contracts were a major contributor to commercial space revenues in 2005, export regulations continued to hamper growth. The International Space Business Council cited the International Traffic in Arms Regulations as the “industry’s most serious issue,”
arguing that “what initially was a nuisance to businesses has evolved into a serious problem for US industry.” Many American manufacturers believe that the US export control policy is hampering their commercial competitiveness. ( More ... )
Collard-Wexler, Simon, Thomas Graham et al. Space Security 2006. Waterloo, Ontario: Space Security Index, July 2006. [ 26 quotes ] [ page 94 ]
Israel is working on building up its remote sensing capability
 
Israel is working to overcome the 6 September 2004 failure of its Shavit-1 SLV and destruction of the Ofeq-6 satellite by developing the Ofeq-7 and the TechSAR surveillance and reconnaissance satellites. TechSAR’s launch is scheduled for 2006 at an estimated cost of $15-million. It has become a top priority for the acquisition of strategic image intelligence, intended to have a 14-kilometer-wide imaging swath. Both the Ofeq and TechSAR satellites were developed indigenously as part of Israel’s plan to expand its recently created military space command and boost reconnaissance capabilities. Additionally, Israel has signed on to cooperate with the EU’s Galileo satellite navigation system and is pursuing air launched surveillance microsatellites. ( More ... )
Collard-Wexler, Simon, Thomas Graham et al. Space Security 2006. Waterloo, Ontario: Space Security Index, July 2006. [ 26 quotes ]
India working with Israel to develop its remote sensing capability
 
The Indian satellite-based Military Surveillance and Reconnaissance System that was to be operational in 2005 is now scheduled for 2007. A joint venture between ISRO and the Defence Research and Development Organization, the remote sensing satellite system would work with extensive ground-based surveillance systems to enable India to keep watch on all areas of concern within the region, including missile silos. India has also entered into discussions with the Israeli MOD and Israel Aircraft Industries Ltd. regarding the possible purchase of a TechSAR reconnaissance satellite. India has not launched any explicitly military satellites to date, though several of its civilian satellites have resolutions that would make them acceptable reconnaissance satellites: Cartosat-1, launched on 7 May 2005, has a resolution of 2.5 meters. The future Cartosat-2 will have better resolution than its predecessor. According to ISRO, Cartosat-2 will provide scene resolution that is better than one meter.
Collard-Wexler, Simon, Thomas Graham et al. Space Security 2006. Waterloo, Ontario: Space Security Index, July 2006. [ 26 quotes ] [ page 112 ]
U.S. and European Union continuing work on hypersonic flight programs
 
Both the US and ESA continued to develop hypersonic flight programs. Under the aegis of Prompt Global Strike, the US continued work on the Common Aerothermodynamic Vehicle (CAV) and the FALCON programs. If completed, the CAV will be an unpowered, maneuverable, hypersonic glide vehicle capable of carrying 455 kilograms of munitions, with a range of approximately 4,830 kilometers. The FALCON will be a reusable hypersonic cruise vehicle that can strike targets approximately 14,500 kilometers away in less than two hours, while carrying a payload close to 5,500 kilograms comprised of CAVs, cruise missiles, small diameter bombs, or other munitions. FALCON could also conceivably be used for launch-on-demand of SBSW or other space assets. The European Union (EU) has begun work on the European Experimental Re-entry Testbed (EXPERT), which is an in-flight aerothermodynamic research program. France's ONERA has proposed measurement techniques to be employed on EXPERT in order to continue the studies on re-entry aerothermodynamics, as well as thermal protection systems.
Collard-Wexler, Simon, Thomas Graham et al. Space Security 2006. Waterloo, Ontario: Space Security Index, July 2006. [ 26 quotes ] [ page 155 ]
U.S. working on solid-state laser weapon for use in anti-satellite weapon
 
Since size and the need for refueling limit current laser weapons designs, the US is pursuing solid state laser (SSL) designs, which are generally lighter, smaller, and of longer operational life, but have not been able to generate the same level of continuous power as other types. The Pentagon's Joint High-Power Solid-State Laser (JHPSSL) program is funding the development of a 25-kilowatt SSL capable of more than 300 seconds of run-time. Twenty-five kilowatts is the approximate minimum power needed to heat-to-kill electronics on satellites in LEO and 300 seconds is the typical flyover time of a satellite in LEO. JHPSSL contractor Northrop Grumman announced on 9 November 2005 that it had successfully tested a 27-kilowatt SSL for 350 seconds, the most powerful continuous SSL to date. ( More ... )
Collard-Wexler, Simon, Thomas Graham et al. Space Security 2006. Waterloo, Ontario: Space Security Index, July 2006. [ 26 quotes ] [ page 140 ]
Chinese satellites jammed by Falun Gong protesters, neighboring states in 2005
 
China continued to be a target of satellite jamming incidents in 2005. AsiaSat's 3S satellite's television service to China was disrupted on 13 March 2005 when six of its transponders were jammed, interrupting at least eight television stations with anti-government messages timed to coincide with annual meetings of the Chinese Communist Party. While AsiaSat promptly blamed the Falun Gong spiritual movement, representatives denied any involvement in the attack and the perpetrators have yet to be apprehended. As the satellite's coverage extends well beyond China's borders, the attack could have originated from any number of neighboring countries. China has responded to past jamming incidents by purchasing and developing "jam-proof" satellites such as the APSTAR VI, launched on 12 April 2005. However, by 3 July 2005, the broadcasts of the CCTV channel to China using the APSTAR VI satellite were overridden by signals also allegedly from the Falun Gong.
Collard-Wexler, Simon, Thomas Graham et al. Space Security 2006. Waterloo, Ontario: Space Security Index, July 2006. [ 26 quotes ] [ page 138 ]
Iran continues to improve on its ability to jam satellite transmissions over large area
 
Iran continued to jam satellite reception in Tehran in 2005. While satellite dishes are technically banned in Iran, the government has reportedly taken additional steps to prevent reception of international opposition television stations, including Voice of America's Persianlanguage programming. The jammers did not affect the uplink, but instead broadcast microwave signals across Tehran to prevent reception over the local area, a procedure that is not banned by international law. The US Broadcasting Board of Governors responded on 17 June 2005 in support of Voice of America and other affected stations by providing access to a third satellite to broadcast their signals simultaneously with the current two (Telstar 12 and EutelSat's Hotbird), thus making it more difficult for Iranian authorities to jam the signals. This local jamming technique would be applicable to counter-intelligence or battlefield situations as well, providing the ability to temporarily block satellite reception over specific areas without damaging space assets or disrupting services outside of the area.
Collard-Wexler, Simon, Thomas Graham et al. Space Security 2006. Waterloo, Ontario: Space Security Index, July 2006. [ 26 quotes ] [ page 138 ]
Iran launched its first remote sensing satellite in 2005 and plans to launch more advanced versions
 
On 27 October 2005, Iran became the 45th country in the world to own a satellite, the Sina-1, which was launched by a Russian Kosmos-3 launcher. Designed by the Russian firm Polyot, Sina-1 has a resolution precision of about 45 meters and the Iranian government claims that the satellite will be used to collect data on ground and water resources, as well as meteorological conditions. However, less than a month after its launch, the head of Iran's space program said the Sina-1 is capable of spying on Israel and some suggest it is a response to Israel's Ofeq-5 reconnaissance satellite. However, the resolution precision of the Sina-1 clearly limits the effectiveness of any military reconnaissance functions. In cooperation with Italy's Carlo Gavazzi Space, Iran plans to launch a remote sensing Mesbah satellite in the near future and is still pursuing its own Space Launch Vehicle (SLV) – the Shehab-4 missile.
Collard-Wexler, Simon, Thomas Graham et al. Space Security 2006. Waterloo, Ontario: Space Security Index, July 2006. [ 26 quotes ] [ page 138 ]
Libya routinely jams commerical and military satellites
 
Libya has been accused of blocking broadcasts of two international satellites (Eutelsat's Hotbird and Loral Skynet's Telsat 12), interrupting signals of several TV and radio stations serving Europe as well as some American diplomatic, military, and intelligence communications. The primary target is thought to be Sowt Libya (Voice of Libya), a Britishand Arab-owned commercial radio station broadcasting on human rights issues to Libya. ( More ... )
Collard-Wexler, Simon, Thomas Graham et al. Space Security 2006. Waterloo, Ontario: Space Security Index, July 2006. [ 26 quotes ] [ page 138 ]
U.S. working on pre-cursor technology for anti-satellite weapons
 
The US has a variety of ongoing programs developing advanced technologies that would be foundational for a space-based conventional ASAT program, including maneuverability, docking, and on-board optics. The Experimental Spacecraft System (XSS) employs microsatellites to test proximity operations, including autonomous rendezvous, maneuvering, and close-up inspection of a target. For example, XSS-10 was launched in 2002 and performed maneuvers within 40 meters of another satellite. The Near-Field Infrared Experiment (NFIRE), designed to provide support to ballistic missile defense, would employ a kill vehicle to encounter a ballistic missile at close range, with a sensor to record the findings. Although NFIRE is not designed for space systems negation, it could be modified for such use. Another missile defense technology currently under development which could enable space systems negation is the space-based interceptor (SBI). The SBI, tentatively scheduled for a 2011-2012 deployment, will test ballistic missile interception using small, light-weight kill vehicles from a space-based platform. ( More ... )
Collard-Wexler, Simon, Thomas Graham et al. Space Security 2006. Waterloo, Ontario: Space Security Index, July 2006. [ 26 quotes ] [ page 136 ]
Russia Continues its Committment to International Cooperation in Outer Space
 
Russia also has a Space Surveillance System (SSS), which functions using Russia's early warning radars in space and more than 20 optical and electro-optical facilities at 14 locations on Earth. The main optical observation system, Okno, allows detection of objects to an altitude of 40,000 kilometers,63 although its capacity to detect smaller objects is unclear. The Russian Academy of Sciences also participates in the SSS. The system cannot track satellites at very low inclinations and the operation of Russian surveillance sensors is reportedly erratic. The network as a whole carries out some 50,000 observations daily, contributing to a catalogue of approximately 5,000 objects, mostly in LEO. While information from the system is not classified, Russia does not have a formal structure to widely disseminate information about observations.
Collard-Wexler, Simon, Thomas Graham et al. Space Security 2006. Waterloo, Ontario: Space Security Index, July 2006. [ 26 quotes ] [ page 52-3 ]
France Working on Space Surveillance Radar Capabilities
 
France was expecting its GRAVES space surveillance radar to be fully operational before 2006, capable of monitoring space objects, including orbital debris. This radar will also be able to observe satellites up to 1,000 kilometers in altitude and follow more than a quarter of total satellites, particularly those that France considers "the most threatening." France has also cited the necessity of developing this system to decrease reliance on US surveillance information, and to ensure the availability of data in the event of a data distribution blackout. The Belgian Federal Parliament also indicated the importance it places on space surveillance by adopting a law on the activities of launching, flight operations, and guidance of space objects on 28 June 2005. The law establishes a National Register of Space Objects and a system of liability-sharing for damage caused by space debris.
Collard-Wexler, Simon, Thomas Graham et al. Space Security 2006. Waterloo, Ontario: Space Security Index, July 2006. [ 26 quotes ] [ page 43 ]
U.S. Military Dependent on access to Commercial Systems
 
Space systems, including commercial systems, are increasingly viewed as national critical infrastructure and strategic assets. In the 1990s, the US military began to take advantage of the commercial industry’s overcapacity by employing commercial satellite systems for nonsensitive communications and imagery applications. During the 1991 Gulf War, 60 percent of the 100 megabytes per second of bandwidth required by US forces was supplied by commercial providers. During Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001, the US military used 700 megabytes per second of bandwidth, 75 percent of which was commercial. By November 2003, it was estimated that the US military was spending more than $400- million each year on commercial satellite services. This growing dependence upon commercial services prompted a December 2003 US General Accounting Office report to recommend that the US military be more strategic in planning for and acquiring bandwidth, including consolidating bandwidth needs among military actors to capitalize on bulk purchases. A 2004 study of the US National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Satellite Task Force noted the great dependence of the national security and homeland security communities on commercial space.
Collard-Wexler, Simon, Thomas Graham et al. Space Security 2006. Waterloo, Ontario: Space Security Index, July 2006. [ 26 quotes ] [ page 87 ]
China Working on Developing Indigenous Space Surveillance and Tracking Capability
 
China, since joining the IADC in 1995, also maintains its own catalogue of space objects, using data from the SSN to perform avoidance maneuver calculations and debris modeling. Space surveillance is an area of growth for China, which announced new investments in optical telescopes for debris monitoring in 2003. Prior to the launch of the Shenzou V in 2003, it was revealed that the spacecraft had a debris 'alarm system' warning of potential collisions. In 2005, the Chinese Academy of Sciences established a Space Object and Debris Monitoring and Research Center at Purple Mountain Observatory that employs researchers to develop a debris warning system for China’s space assets. In support of its growing space program, China has established a tracking, telemetry and control (TT&C) system consisting of six ground stations in China and two on foreign soil, in Namibia and Pakistan, as well as a fleet of four Yuan Wang satellite tracking ships. These assets provide the foundation for space surveillance but have limited capacity to track uncooperative space objects.
Collard-Wexler, Simon, Thomas Graham et al. Space Security 2006. Waterloo, Ontario: Space Security Index, July 2006. [ 26 quotes ] [ page 35 ]
U.S. Pursuing Tactical Satellite Capabilities
 
Since 2003, the US Air Force (USAF) has promoted a concept called Operationally Responsive Spacelift (ORS), that aims to reduce satellite costs and deployment times from years or months to days. Such savings are made possible by new launch capabilities, combined with miniaturization technologies that have dramatically increased the “capability per kilogram on orbit” equation for satellites. These ORS efforts seek the capability to replace US satellites on short notice, allowing the US to rapidly recover from space negation attacks and reducing general space system vulnerabilities. ORS would also allow deployments of space systems designed to meet the needs of specific military operations. For example, the US TacSat will be an ORS demonstration imaging satellite, weighing just 110 kilograms and combining existing military and commercial technologies with new commercial launch systems to provide “more rapid and less expensive access to space.” The satellite will be controlled directly by deployed US commanders.
Collard-Wexler, Simon, Thomas Graham et al. Space Security 2006. Waterloo, Ontario: Space Security Index, July 2006. [ 26 quotes ] [ page 99 ]