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Lewis, James A. "China as a Military Space Competitor." Perspectives on Space Security. Ed. Audrey M. Schaffer. Washington, D.C.: Space Policy Institute, December 2005. [ 8 quotes ]

Evidence Related to this Citation

China currently unable to maintain on-orbit presence for critical satellites
 
The major and crucial difference, however, is the on-orbit presence. China does not have a continuous military space presence equal even to what the Soviet or the U.S. were able to muster in the 1960s. In the last decade, the number of Chinese launches has totaled only about twelve percent of U.S. launches. In any given period, the Chinese operate no more than 6-10 satellites with most being communications (or navigation) rather than sensor platforms. The operational life of Chinese satellites, which press reports state is considerably shorter than those of comparable U.S. satellites, also reduce China’s onorbit military presence. While China’s announced goal is to create a multi-satellite system for continuous operation, they have not committed the resources to achieve this. ( More ... )
Lewis, James A. "China as a Military Space Competitor." Perspectives on Space Security. Ed. Audrey M. Schaffer. Washington, D.C.: Space Policy Institute, December 2005. [ 8 quotes ] [ page 95 ]
China does not have a coherent spacepower strategy
 
Despite this, China’s military presence in space is sporadic. It does not have a coherent military space architecture. If an effective military space program entails continuous coverage by intelligence collection satellites and a network of communications satellites, China has not made the effort. This absence in space is not the result of a lack of technological capability, but reflects a national decision about how to spend resources for space. ( More ... )
Lewis, James A. "China as a Military Space Competitor." Perspectives on Space Security. Ed. Audrey M. Schaffer. Washington, D.C.: Space Policy Institute, December 2005. [ 8 quotes ] [ page 107 ]
China's military space program not focusing on systems it needs for an asymmetic advantage
 
If the goal is to gain asymmetric advantage, China should invest primarily in those systems that pose a greater risk to the US or offer greater potential for asymmetric advantage. These include satellite reconnaissance, SIGINT, ASAT and microsatellites. Satellite navigation and communications increase the capabilities of Chinese forces; satellite reconnaissance and anti-satellite programs degrade the capabilities of U.S. forces. China over-invests in navigation and communications satellites. These programs pose less of a challenge to the U.S. and will create less of an advantage for Chinese forces than satellite reconnaissance and anti-satellite capabilities. ( More ... )
Lewis, James A. "China as a Military Space Competitor." Perspectives on Space Security. Ed. Audrey M. Schaffer. Washington, D.C.: Space Policy Institute, December 2005. [ 8 quotes ] [ page 95 ]
U.S. Navy can employ countermeasures to foil Chinese space surveillance
 
China has sought to extend its surveillance capabilities, which have been limited to date by the need to use either ground or aerial platforms, and will probably use any new space-based assets to watch the sea areas around Taiwan. U.S naval forces could still retain an element of surprise the further away they are from the Island. This may require positioning ships further out and launching aircraft at a greater range, which will increase aerial refueling requirements and complicate aircraft recovery. Stealth is not an option for aircraft carriers, so the U.S. may also have to rely more on the use of submarine forces. Spoofing capabilities for ships or for battle groups may also be necessary. ( More ... )
Lewis, James A. "China as a Military Space Competitor." Perspectives on Space Security. Ed. Audrey M. Schaffer. Washington, D.C.: Space Policy Institute, December 2005. [ 8 quotes ] [ page 110 ]
Chinese ASAT development is not a concern because they have not conducted any tests
 
China has a long-standing capacity to track objects in space. It is based on a number of ground stations (including two located outside of china) and four satellite tracking ships. The ability to track object in space is critical for space operations. China would need this capability in order to carry out manned missions as well as for orbiting satellites. However, it is also critical for anti-satellite operations, whether ground-based or for inorbit attacks. Locating U.S. satellites is a necessary precursor to the successful conduct of anti-satellite operations. This combination of tracking capability and a range of experimental anti-satellite programs suggest that anti-satellite efforts could be the greater source of risk for the U.S. This concern needs to be tempered by the lack of actual ASAT tests by the Chinese. An operational ASAT program would test its weapons (as the U.S. and the Soviets did in the past) against space targets. Although there have been terrestrial tests ground of lasers that may have been for anti-satellite purposes, the Chinese have not conducted tests against targets in space. ( More ... )
Lewis, James A. "China as a Military Space Competitor." Perspectives on Space Security. Ed. Audrey M. Schaffer. Washington, D.C.: Space Policy Institute, December 2005. [ 8 quotes ] [ page 106-7 ]
China is not developing the ELINT capability it would need to challenge U.S. navy
 
If China does not invest in space surveillance, the effect is to limit the effectiveness of their new purchases. Despite upgrades to their naval forces and weaponry, the Chinese do not seem to be in any rush to deploy supporting ELINT satellites. This may be only a temporary delay, it could reflect either satisfaction with current levels of collection or a conscious decision not to expend resources on ELINT, or it might be a failure to fully understand the interconnection between space assets and terrestrial force. The best way for foreign analysts to determine if China has increased its SIGINT capabilities in a naval context would be to look for new kinds of antennae on Chinese naval vessels or new kinds data relays coordinated with missile-firing exercises. ( More ... )
Lewis, James A. "China as a Military Space Competitor." Perspectives on Space Security. Ed. Audrey M. Schaffer. Washington, D.C.: Space Policy Institute, December 2005. [ 8 quotes ] [ page 102 ]
China is Working on Indigenous Synthetic Aperture Radar Satellite for Naval Power
 
China has been working on an indigenous synthetic aperture radar satellite for at least a decade. A few recent reports suggest that the China’s remote sensing program may have taken a great leap forward through the acquisition of advanced radar sensors with one meter resolution from a Russian source (other reports put it at twenty meters). If this is true, it would go far to solve the lack of advanced sensors that hampers the Chinese reconnaissance satellite program. Radar can see through clouds or rain and is particularly useful for maritime monitoring. This maritime mission is likely to be of high interest to the Chinese military, given the importance of Taiwan and the limits of their ‘blue water’ naval capability. ( More ... )
Lewis, James A. "China as a Military Space Competitor." Perspectives on Space Security. Ed. Audrey M. Schaffer. Washington, D.C.: Space Policy Institute, December 2005. [ 8 quotes ] [ page 98 ]
U.S. Satellite Export Restrictions do more Harm than Good by Constraining Domestic Research and Innovation
 
This latter concern may be overstated, given the progress we have seen to date in China’s space efforts. The U.S. should reconsider its restrictions on satellite technology transfer. The extent and progress of Chinese military programs, which were the target of these restrictions, suggest that U.S. policy has been ineffective. The restrictions applied primarily to commercial communications satellites and their launch, and had little effect on military programs, where the technology is largely unrelated to communications satellites. In only a few areas, such as advanced space sensors, does it make sense to continue tight restrictions on satellite technology transfer from the U.S. To the extent that the restrictions damage U.S. firms (and there is evidence that suggests that they have driven many subcontractors out of the space business) and make it more difficult for U.S. research centers to cooperate with European or Japanese space programs, they actually do more harm to the U.S. than to China. The goal should be to accelerate innovation in the U.S. rather than continue efforts to slow innovation in China.
Lewis, James A. "China as a Military Space Competitor." Perspectives on Space Security. Ed. Audrey M. Schaffer. Washington, D.C.: Space Policy Institute, December 2005. [ 8 quotes ] [ page 114 ]