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Blair, Bruce and Chen Yali. "The Space Security Dilemma." China Security. Vol. 1, No. 2 (2006): 2-15. [ 3 quotes ]

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China Views Space as a Conflict over Resources
 
A zero-sum mindset toward space is hardening in China as a result of this apprehension, as amply illustrated in the public media. Space is eyed in China as an area of resources and possibilities to be acquired before it's too late. Shu Xing, whose book is reviewed later in this journal, likens the grabbing of satellite orbits to the “Enclosure Movement” in late 18th Century England in which the more capability one has, the more resources one can seize. Another reviewed author argued that countries scramble into space to fight for the tremendous resources found there and “once this fight for resources causes irreconcilable conflicts, it may lead to radical space confrontations.” A space war seems to many Chinese to be another form of resource war. Such urgency in seeking control over resources is not unique to space, but also applies to energy and other areas. Given China's population and rapid economic growth, controlling resources is understandably a paramount concern. Regarding space, however, a zero-sum (‘win-lose') attitude is narrow-minded and misguided. If feverish competition for resources in space causes Sino-American relations to deteriorate or leads to the outbreak of war between them, then both parties lose.
Blair, Bruce and Chen Yali. "The Space Security Dilemma." China Security. Vol. 1, No. 2 (2006): 2-15. [ 3 quotes ] [ page 4 ]
Logic of China Threat Analysts makes it next to Impossible for China to Prove they are not a Threat
 
American threat assessments, however, focus almost exclusively on real or potential capabilities. Because intentions can be easily changed, asserting peaceful aims carries little weight for Americans. Such assurances do little to assuage suspicions or downgrade threat projections. Also, since the late 1990s, the predominance of "hawkish" American attitudes toward potential threats has pushed the U.S. intelligence community to adopt extremely conservative criteria for projecting threat -- for instance, by assessing an adversary's 'possible capabilities' instead of 'likely capabilities.' This is a throwback to the early Cold War habit of using 'greater-than-expected' threats as the basis for building up U.S. nuclear forces. 'Possible' threat is even more extreme than 'greater-than-expected' threat. In any case, there is nothing China can do to convince American worst-case analysts that China could not possibly adapt its dual-use space capabilities for 'possibly' posing military threats to the United States. There is no escape from this logic trap.
Blair, Bruce and Chen Yali. "The Space Security Dilemma." China Security. Vol. 1, No. 2 (2006): 2-15. [ 3 quotes ] [ page 5 ]
Restructuring of Chinese Space Program has Severely Constrained their Military Space Program
 
The wholesale reconfiguration of China's space sector thus resulted in civilian, commercially competitive technologies with marginal military applications. Its re-institutionalization and restructuring that continues to this day all but precluded any ambitious military projects or planning for space warfare because the Chinese military was stripped off its previously predominant influence and, in our view, relegated to a distant secondary status in the hierarchy of priorities. This institutional history preordained an inherent technological tilt toward commercial applications that at best allow for minor military defensive-protective measures to evolve alongside. In broader terms, as Wu puts it, “…a large portion of the civilian space program, in terms of the technological sophistication, thus is not useful in modern military terms.” At the same time, she implies that the opportunity to pursue dedicated military space weaponry, let alone modern offensive space weapons, has been severely constrained.
Blair, Bruce and Chen Yali. "The Space Security Dilemma." China Security. Vol. 1, No. 2 (2006): 2-15. [ 3 quotes ] [ page 14 ]