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Lewis, Leo and Phillip E. Coyle. Ensuring America's Space Security. Washington, D.C.: Federation of American Scientists, September 2004. [ 7 quotes ]

Evidence Related to this Citation

Microsatellite Technology within Range of Dozens of Countries and Spreading Rapidly
 
The first is the matter of small satellites expanding access to space. Small satellites can be designed and built much more quickly and cheaply than larger, more complex satellites, and their launch costs are lower (but not necessarily low). The number of countries that have launched a small satellite in orbit has increased from about 10 in 1990 to about 30 now, with approximately 400 such satellites having been launched over the last 20 years. While the overall rate of small satellite launches has not increased greatly over this time, the capabilities of small satellites appear to be increasing significantly. Small spacecraft technology is also rapidly becoming widespread, in part because of deliberate efforts to spread this technology. For example, Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd. (SSTL, a company affiliated with Surrey University in Great Britain) will build micro- or mini-satellites for any country (subject to British export controls). It also has a technology transfer program designed to help countries develop the capability to build their own satellites. So far, participants in this program include Pakistan, South Africa, South Korea, Portugal, Chile, Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, and China. Recent collaborators include Algeria, Nigeria, and Turkey. ( More ... )
Lewis, Leo and Phillip E. Coyle. Ensuring America's Space Security. Washington, D.C.: Federation of American Scientists, September 2004. [ 7 quotes ] [ page 16-7 ]
Microsatellite Technology Lowers Barriers to Developing ASATs
 
The second concern is that small satellites can reduce launch requirements. Small satellites may enable a country that would otherwise be unable to launch a satellite to do so, because a smaller rocket launcher could be used. However, the significance of this possibility should not be exaggerated. Given that a number of countries are already providing commercial launch services, and the competition among these launch providers, most countries should have little difficulty finding a launcher for any "legitimate" satellite (that is, not an ASAT). This route is likely to be significantly cheaper than developing its own launcher. Thus to the extent that small satellites may make launching satellites easier, it could affect the possible development of ASATs. ( More ... )
Lewis, Leo and Phillip E. Coyle. Ensuring America's Space Security. Washington, D.C.: Federation of American Scientists, September 2004. [ 7 quotes ] [ page 17 ]
Microsatellites are a Threat because they are Difficult to Detect and Track
 
The last concern is that small satellites may be difficult to detect. The small size of micro- or smaller satellites may pose a serious problem for U.S. space tracking capabilities. The ability to avoid detection or tracking could significantly increase the effectiveness of a co-orbital ASAT or a space mine. Although the United States has a missile launch detection capability that would almost certainly detect the launch of any rocket capable of placing a satellite in orbit, its capability to detect and track a small satellite released from such a rocket is less robust. The United States currently employs a range of optical and radar sensors for tracking objects in space. Although the U.S. space surveillance system currently tracks over 8,000 objects in orbit, the lower limit on the size of objects it can detect is frequently described as being about 10 centimeters and it is "currently limited in its ability to detect and track objects smaller than 30 centimeters." Thus some small satellites may be able to avoid detection and tracking-particularly if they have been intentionally designed to have reduced radar and optical signatures. ( More ... )
Lewis, Leo and Phillip E. Coyle. Ensuring America's Space Security. Washington, D.C.: Federation of American Scientists, September 2004. [ 7 quotes ] [ page 17-8 ]
Microsatellites can be Concealed in other Satellites ("Parasite Satellites")
 
Moreover, countering potential co-orbital ASATs would require detection and tracking to occur very shortly after launch. A solution to this problem,-to the extent it is a problem,-may require a system that could track a satellite as soon as it is released from its rocket booster. A space-based tracking system, such as the proposed SBIRS-Low missile defense system, might be capable of carrying out this mission. However, even in this case, small satellites could be secretly launched from larger satellites. This capability has already been demonstrated by the Orbiting Picosatellite Automatic Launcher (OPAL) program, developed by Stanford University. It consisted of a "mothership" satellite that housed and successfully launched six "daughtership" satellites that each weighed a kilogram or less. The design is similar to the one reported by a Chinese news agency and cited in the Rumsfeld report as a "parasitic satellite" ASAT system. ( More ... )
Lewis, Leo and Phillip E. Coyle. Ensuring America's Space Security. Washington, D.C.: Federation of American Scientists, September 2004. [ 7 quotes ] [ page 18 ]
Even Low-Power Lasers can Seriously Damage Optical Satellites by Blinding
 
Satellites in low earth orbit (LEO) are also vulnerable to laser illumination that could potentially cause loss of power due to solar cell degradation as discussed in Dr. Geoffrey Forden's article "Anti-Satellite Weapons" found in Appendix B. Even low power lasers can cause permanent damage to satellites with large optics, typical of many reconnaissance satellites. A U.S. experiment in 1997 demonstrated that even a low power laser with output much lower than a megawatt-class laser could saturate an infrared detector whose wavelength was in-band with the laser. ( More ... )
Lewis, Leo and Phillip E. Coyle. Ensuring America's Space Security. Washington, D.C.: Federation of American Scientists, September 2004. [ 7 quotes ] [ page 20 ]
GPS Satellite System Adequately Hardened against HAND Attack
 
The GPS constellation consists of 24 satellites, which are spread over different orbital planes at an altitude of 20,000 kilometers. To substantially degrade the GPS, the satellites have to be attacked individually, which is difficult to do. The satellites are also hardened against nuclear effects and have on-orbit spares. The robustness of the GPS constellation has been analyzed by Geoffrey Forden and is reported in Appendix D. The analysis shows that the GPS constellation is robust to the extent that it can lose up to four satellites and yet only suffer from periodic loss of function at any place. As stated earlier, this robustness makes the vulnerability of the GPS constellation to ASAT-type attacks rather small. ( More ... )
Lewis, Leo and Phillip E. Coyle. Ensuring America's Space Security. Washington, D.C.: Federation of American Scientists, September 2004. [ 7 quotes ] [ page 28 ]
Most Satellites Already Hardened against Natural Levels of Space Radiation
 
However, the simple fact that most satellites have weathered the vagaries of natural space radiation so well over time indicates their normal design hardening is better than assumed. Military satellites in LEO are much more hardened, whereas the hardness of commercial platforms may vary. It is noteworthy that natural background radiation does vary significantly over time and yet not many satellites are known to have failed due to this variability. For example, under natural background radiation conditions in LEO, the peak flux for electrons with energy greater than 1 MeV ranges from 10^4 for the outer radiation belt to 10^6 for the inner. Enhanced solar flux is said to have resulted in >1 MeV electron flux to reach 10^8 particles/sq cm sec. Coincidentally, this is the same magnitude that is computed by the model due to a high-altitude nuclear explosion one day after the burst over Korea. ( More ... )
Lewis, Leo and Phillip E. Coyle. Ensuring America's Space Security. Washington, D.C.: Federation of American Scientists, September 2004. [ 7 quotes ] [ page 26-7 ]