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Meteyer, David O. The Art of Peace: Dissuading China from Developing Counter-Space Weapons. USAF Academy, CO: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, August 2005. [ 20 quotes ]

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Growth in Military Personnel Devoted to Space Programs shows U.S. Dependence on Space
 
Another data point to consider when discussing US dependency on space is people. US space requirements have grown at such a rate that several large and costly organizations have developed to handle these programs. For example, the lead agent for US military space is Air Force Space Command, which is based out of Colorado Springs Colorado and consists of nearly 40,000 personnel. These forces are responsible for a number of space operations that includes missile warning, satellite communications (SATCOM), and GPS operations. In addition, the entire functional combatant command of Strategic Command is dedicated to nuclear and space warfare. Lastly, the money trail for space acquisition implies that this realm of operations is every bit as important as air, land, and sea. ( More ... )
Meteyer, David O. The Art of Peace: Dissuading China from Developing Counter-Space Weapons. USAF Academy, CO: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, August 2005. [ 20 quotes ] [ page 4 ]
Data indicates U.S. Military Dependence on Space Assets is Significant and Growing
 
A number of data points underscore US dependency on space as well as its integration into operations across the entire spectrum of US forces. The GPS precision-guided munitions (PGM) used in both Desert Strom and Iraqi Freedom demonstrates this point. In Desert Strom 8% of munitions were PGM, as compared to 68% in Iraqi freedom. In addition to supporting PGM, GPS also aides in the prevention of fratricide, enhances close air support (CAS) employment, and fosters economy of force through successful blue force tracking (BFT) capabilities, among other benefits. Satellite communications (SATCOM) usage levels also emphasizes the significant US dependence on space operations. ( More ... )
Meteyer, David O. The Art of Peace: Dissuading China from Developing Counter-Space Weapons. USAF Academy, CO: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, August 2005. [ 20 quotes ] [ page 3 ]
China is Developing Space Systems to Counter U.S. Hegemony
 
On October 15, 2003, China became only the third nation to send a man into space. Astronaut Lieutenant Colonel Lang Liwei’s 21-hour orbit made him an instant hero in China and reaffirmed Beijing’s commitment to modernize the PLA. Observant during the Cold War, Desert Storm, Allied Force, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom, Chinese leaders saw the effect of space support to air, land, and sea operations. They witnessed the value of space enhancement across everything from basic command and control to intelligence gathering to weapon accuracy. In a few instances, they have even begun to capitalize on this recognition. ( More ... )
Meteyer, David O. The Art of Peace: Dissuading China from Developing Counter-Space Weapons. USAF Academy, CO: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, August 2005. [ 20 quotes ] [ page 34-5 ]
China Unlikely to be Dissuaded from Developing Space Weapons
 
Several factors will complicate a US defense policy of dissuasion that aims to reduce the threat of space systems. First, China's space program already has operational systems providing a wide range of military and commercial capabilities. China's space capabilities give it more than just a foot-in-the-door. In fact, China is already reaping the numerous benefits afforded by the highest frontier. In addition, even though China's space programs are relatively immature when compared to the United States, the learning curve for improving upon these technologies is steep. Finally, it is one thing to dissuade someone from doing something they cannot already do and hence cannot appreciate its advantages; it is an entirely different thing to dissuade someone from doing something they already do, especially when it has clear benefits. ( More ... )
Meteyer, David O. The Art of Peace: Dissuading China from Developing Counter-Space Weapons. USAF Academy, CO: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, August 2005. [ 20 quotes ]
Satellite Jamming Weapons most Likely form of Counter-Space Attack U.S. will Face for Several Reasons
 
Therefore, it makes sense that current as well as potential adversaries would seek to develop other, more acceptable counter-space technologies. The GPS jammers used by Saddam's forces during Iraqi Freedom and the SATCOM jammer used by Cuba to negate the Voice of America broadcast (i.e., both are OCS systems that target the links element of space systems) represent a lucrative area for growth in counter-space systems. First, they are cheap and relatively easy to build. Second, they have proven capabilities, especially the SATCOM jammer used against Voice of America. Third, they avoid the current dilemma of weaponizing space, although it offers a slippery slope in that direction. Fourth, while it is possible that these systems could target missile-warning systems, they are unlikely to foster the levels of instability created by the Cold War ASAT systems. Finally, they offer the potential of disrupting a key area of US military dominance and subsequently reducing the overall combat effectiveness of American forces. ( More ... )
Meteyer, David O. The Art of Peace: Dissuading China from Developing Counter-Space Weapons. USAF Academy, CO: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, August 2005. [ 20 quotes ] [ page 51 ]
Empirically, U.S. Naval and Aerial Dominance has not Dissuaded Adversaries from Building their own Navy or Air Force
 
Strategy. As a strategy, dissuasion may not provide the same level of clarity in application as other defense policies. In addition, it is highly unlikely that American technological superiority can be harnessed in such a manner that potential adversaries give up pursuing their own security interests. No state has done this. Nonetheless, this is exactly what the 2005 NDS proposes. The US fighter aircraft fleet is far superior to any other air force in the world. However, this does not stop other states from developing fighters, nor does it prevent them from developing systems to counter this superiority. SAMs proliferating around the globe demonstrate the inevitable pushback approaches undertaken by states confronted with an adversary who possesses superior air power. Similarly, the US Navy enjoys dominance on the seas, but this does not dissuade other states from pursuing naval buildup. In fact, it increases the likelihood that others will follow suit. Look no further than the buildup of the PLA Navy (PLAN). Beijing is pursuing a blue-water force capable of protecting and maybe even projecting Chinese influence ostensibly within the Asia-Pacific and possible beyond.
Meteyer, David O. The Art of Peace: Dissuading China from Developing Counter-Space Weapons. USAF Academy, CO: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, August 2005. [ 20 quotes ] [ page 83 ]
Space Systems are Very Difficult to Maintain or Repair
 
Second, space systems are not as durable as other air, land, or sea platforms. U-2 aircraft took their first images 50 years ago, and many of these same aircraft are still flying missions today. By contrast, space systems usually only last for 10 to 15 years. It is true that some satellites have been known to exceed their specified life expectancy, but not by 40 years. In addition, the ability to repair space systems is negligible. Ground station operators can resolve some anomalies, but essentially nothing can be done when problems require physical contact with the satellite. Other air, land, and sea platforms have maintainers readily available to fix problems, or worst case the systems transition to a depot for extensive repairs. Conversely, it is cost prohibitive to physically repair satellites. Whether through use of the space shuttle or some type of retrieval and re-launch process, space systems are not easily repaired. Yet, even in light of these limitations, space systems still provide a wealth of functionality to numerous types of users.
Meteyer, David O. The Art of Peace: Dissuading China from Developing Counter-Space Weapons. USAF Academy, CO: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, August 2005. [ 20 quotes ] [ page 40 ]
Taiwan Situation Illustrates Limits to U.S. Ability to Dissuade China
 
China's Rise. Specific to the rise of China, dissuasion has already proved of little utility. The United States has attempted to dissuade China from solving the Taiwan issue militarily. However, the Chinese continue to pursue a military capable of overrunning Taiwan, amphibious assault forces, a blue water navy, advanced SAM, and counter-space weaponry. Beijing also continues to make strong and even provocative statements about Taiwanese independence. In light of these actions, it appears that dissuasion is failing. The opportunities for dissuasion to succeed with respect to China are similar to those stated in the previous section. Efforts by Washington to dissuade PLA actions and instead channel its efforts in directions more favorable to America are not realistic. This is especially true given China's growing economy, military modernization, and increasing partnerships with other states. However, US strategists are compelled to do something to protect American influence abroad. Britain faced a similar dilemma when it began to fall from its position as global hegemon during the first half of the twentieth century. Unfortunately, Washington is slowly realizing, much like Britain's leadership, that only so much can be done to protect these high levels of power.
Meteyer, David O. The Art of Peace: Dissuading China from Developing Counter-Space Weapons. USAF Academy, CO: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, August 2005. [ 20 quotes ] [ page 84 ]
Existing Defensive Counterspace Techniques are Inadequate to Defend Space Assets
 
Similar to a fighter aircraft's ability to dispense chaff and flares and produce threat reaction maneuvers in response to surface-to-air missiles (SAM), space systems must also be able to defend against hostile acts. DCS consists of various measures aimed at defeating an adversary's attack. These measures consist of such tactics as system hardening, dispersal, maneuvering, system configuration changes, and suppression of adversary counterspace capabilities (SACC). Unfortunately, these current measures provide no realistic defense against anti-satellite lasers, parasitic micro satellites, and advanced computer network attacks. While some satellites, like an imaging system, may be able to automatically place a protective cap over the system's lenses, it cannot stop an anti-satellite weapon from physically destroying the entire satellite bus. In addition, while satellite movement is theoretically feasible, this movement in relation to the potential threats is too slow to prevent an attack. Therefore, the United States is attempting to take meaningful steps to improve DCS capabilities.
Meteyer, David O. The Art of Peace: Dissuading China from Developing Counter-Space Weapons. USAF Academy, CO: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, August 2005. [ 20 quotes ] [ page 48 ]
U.S. should Rely on Arms Control and Diplomacy Rather than Dissuasion
 
By leveraging existing space law, advocating space arms control, increasing economic interdependence, and using skillful diplomacy, the United States may prevent a space race as well as avoid the counterproductive results likely to arise from a dissuasive strategy. Table 6 reveals that dissuasion’s success is in fact most likely to occur when a combination of several policy tools are employed simultaneously. However, the 2002 NSS and 2001 QDR do not describe dissuasion in this manner. Instead, both documents focus on increasing military superiority to such a high level that the enemy or allies give up weapons development. Unfortunately, the conditions are not present for this policy as currently defined to succeed. ( More ... )
Meteyer, David O. The Art of Peace: Dissuading China from Developing Counter-Space Weapons. USAF Academy, CO: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, August 2005. [ 20 quotes ] [ page 81 ]
U.S. Unlikely to Meet any of the Conditions for Dissuading China from Developing Space Weapons
 
The military only system criterion represents one portion of the overall military, economic, and diplomatic conditions necessary for the successful dissuasion of China’s space weapons. Other conditions and their respective criteria, summarized in Table 6, are necessary. Conditions include the unassailability of US systems, the overwhelming US economy, and the strong interdependence of US– PRC relations. Unfortunately, it is neither possible nor highly likely that many of the conditions necessary for successful dissuasion exist now or will in the future. For example, it is nearly impossible for the Pentagon to make its systems unassailable, whether it is through advanced defensive mechanisms, replenishment, or alternative source capabilities. The economic condition looks similarly unattainable since the China–US economic gap is rapidly closing. In the future, China may surpass the United States as the biggest economy in the world and would place itself in a position to develop more and better space systems.
Meteyer, David O. The Art of Peace: Dissuading China from Developing Counter-Space Weapons. USAF Academy, CO: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, August 2005. [ 20 quotes ] [ page 77 ]
U.S. Naval Dominance has Increased Submarine Proliferation Rather than Dissuading Adversaries
 
US maritime capability represents another possible example of dissuasion, and in theory, the American naval fleet is so strong that it has in essence dissuaded other nations from developing comparable fleets. Undoubtedly, the United States is the only nation on earth capable of projecting multiple large carrier strike groups in all major waterways. However, one result of this dissuasion has been an increase in the number of states that have mini-subs and anti-ship missiles. In addition, while not necessarily a direct result of the US Navy, the PLA Navy (PLAN) is pursuing a blue water capability, although it would take decades to achieve the quality of US naval operations. Still, these actions seem to go against the desired end state of dissuasion.
Meteyer, David O. The Art of Peace: Dissuading China from Developing Counter-Space Weapons. USAF Academy, CO: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, August 2005. [ 20 quotes ] [ page 25 ]
Chinese Reliance on Aged Soviet Space Technology gives U.S. Opportunity to Pursue Cooperation
 
One inroad to satisfying this criterion is the development of Chinese space systems by US manufacturers. Indeed, several PRC space systems have been built by American firms, such as AsiaSat-1, - 3, and -3SA, which were built by Hughes and AsiaSat-2 which was built by Lockheed Martin.112 In fact, many experts, such as Elizabeth Van Wie Davis of the Asia-Pacific Center, believe that Beijing is much more likely to procure rather than produce its space program.113 Another noted space expert, James Oberg, recently testified to Congress with an assessment of China's space program. One highlight of the testimony was his comparison of the PRC and USSR space programs. Using two nearly identical images, one of Yuri Gagarin's space flight in 1961 and one of Lang Liwei's in 2003, Oberg effectively underscored the fact that China is using old Soviet systems to build up its own space program.114 Besides the obvious implication that China lacks the ability to produce many of its own systems, another implication is that China is ripe for space collaboration, and it may be in Washington's best interest to spearhead these efforts rather than the European Union.
Meteyer, David O. The Art of Peace: Dissuading China from Developing Counter-Space Weapons. USAF Academy, CO: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, August 2005. [ 20 quotes ] [ page 73 ]
Economic Cost of Competing with U.S. could Dissuade Adversaries
 
Modern Military Industrial Complex. Current US naval capabilities offer an example of this criterion. The substantial industrial tail that goes along with the sizable US naval fleet would be difficult for another country to imitate. The amount of finances required to build 12 aircraft carriers, associated support vessels, docking facilities, logistical supplies, capable seamen, as well as executable doctrine and training is well beyond anything that China or any other country in the world could afford. In essence, the gap between the US navy and other navies is so wide that states are dissuaded from pursuing a large capital fleet because of the economic costs associated with such a venture is just too high, relative to the strategic advantages it would afford. Japan and Germany both attempted to pursue navies that were beyond their means in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and both failed at sustaining them. A host of arguments can be made that explain this failure and some even argue that it had less to do with economics and more to do with the long-standing interests of these states. Regardless of exactly how much economics was a factor, whether it was the most important or simply one of many, it was nonetheless a factor in these failures.
Meteyer, David O. The Art of Peace: Dissuading China from Developing Counter-Space Weapons. USAF Academy, CO: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, August 2005. [ 20 quotes ] [ page 67 ]
Doubtful that U.S. Pursuit of SDI Dissuaded Soviet Union
 
The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) put forth by President Reagan in 1983 is poor evidence that a policy of dissuasion can work. It is debatable at best that SDI caused the USSR to do anything, let alone to concede the arms race or bow out of the Cold War. First, SDI in 1983 was far from being technologically feasible. In fact, even given current technology, ground-based ABM systems have proven less than reliable. Moreover, as ABM technologies proceed upwards, costs and challenges soar. The Airborne Laser (ABL) under development at Edwards Air Force Base (AFB), California is considerably further behind in research and development than the ground-based concepts frequently tested over the Pacific Ocean. To go one step further and try to mount an ABM system aboard a satellite would require vast sums of money and technological breakthroughs. Therefore, any belief that SDI caused the USSR to pause and reconsider its interests is doubtful. Second, even if SDI could have been developed and tested to some degree of reliability, it is also argumentative that it necessarily caused the Soviets to "give up."
Meteyer, David O. The Art of Peace: Dissuading China from Developing Counter-Space Weapons. USAF Academy, CO: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, August 2005. [ 20 quotes ] [ page 83 ]
Directed Energy Weapons not yet Viable for use as an ASAT Weapon
 
Another potential counter-space system that offers equally appealing effects is lasers that could target space nodes, links, and possibly even terrestrial nodes. However, several differences exist between lasers and jammers. One difference is that jammers are a more proven commodity and in some cases have worked remarkably well in actual employment. In addition, various forms of electronic jamming have been taking place for decades. For example, the US military used a variety of airborne jammers during the initial stages of Desert Storm to help confuse the enemy. Conversely, laser technology as a space weapon is still confined to research and development, and it seems to be a long way from actual operational status, not to mention doctrinally proven and integrated into other operations. For many of these same reasons, space mines are unlikely to reach operational status in the near future. In sum, with respect to space-based counter-space systems, many problems exist.
Meteyer, David O. The Art of Peace: Dissuading China from Developing Counter-Space Weapons. USAF Academy, CO: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, August 2005. [ 20 quotes ] [ page 52 ]
China has Range of Launch Options at its Disposal
 
From a space launch perspective, China has a solid history of successes. Currently, only a handful of states or organizations (United States, Russia, China, European Space Agency (ESA), India, Israel, and Japan) possess space launch capacity. China’s inventory of space launch systems is substantial, and as of 2003, they had launched 73 satellites. China’s Long March series of rockets (12 different versions) possesses the capability to place satellites into low-earth orbit (LEO) and geostationary orbits (GEO). China is looking to increase its heavy lift capacity to a gaudy 25 tons for LEO and 14 tons for GEO. These numbers compare favorably to the European Space Agency (ESA) and the US space lift fleet. ( More ... )
Meteyer, David O. The Art of Peace: Dissuading China from Developing Counter-Space Weapons. USAF Academy, CO: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, August 2005. [ 20 quotes ] [ page 58 ]
Space Systems are Composed of Satellites, Data, and the Ground Receivers
 
DoD Joint Publications 3-14, Space Operations, states that
"Space capabilities are based on complex systems that include the following: ground stations; launch facilities; satellite production, checkout, and storage facilities; communications links; user terminals; and spacecraft (both manned and unmanned)."
The definition reveals that space systems consist of more than just satellites (i.e., space nodes), but also include the associated ground stations (i.e., terrestrial nodes) and communication signals (i.e., links) transiting between space and earth (reference Figure 10). ( More ... )
Meteyer, David O. The Art of Peace: Dissuading China from Developing Counter-Space Weapons. USAF Academy, CO: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, August 2005. [ 20 quotes ] [ page 42-3 ]
U.S. Currently Unable to Implement Replenishment Strategy
 
The concept of replenishment is another option for this criterion. This option entails the US replenishing space systems faster than the destruction caused by Chinese space weapons. China would have to ask itself, "Why attack US space systems if the systems will in effect be rapidly replaced in such a way that US capabilities remain intact?" Unfortunately, this option requires two nearly unachievable capabilities for the United States. One is the ability to rapidly launch multiple spare satellites within minutes of destruction and quickly make them operational, and the other is having the necessary spare satellites ready and loaded on spacelift vehicles. Even with the advent of the newest launch vehicles, spacelift processing times will still take months, not the minutes required for unassailability. Moreover, the high cost of satellites, sometimes as much as $1 billion, makes spare satellite inventory financially unacceptable.
Meteyer, David O. The Art of Peace: Dissuading China from Developing Counter-Space Weapons. USAF Academy, CO: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, August 2005. [ 20 quotes ] [ page 64 ]
China Unlikely to be Dissuaded by U.S. Space Dominance because it has a Narrower set of Strategic Interests
 
Another key component of an economic analysis between China and the United States is a comparison of each state’s security interests. Compared against the US global designation of military regions, it is evident that the Chinese only need to expend resources to defend their existing continental territory. The only exception, although a significant one nonetheless, to this situation is Taiwan, where the PLA is investing resources to develop a legitimate amphibious assault force. In contrast, US regions spread across every square inch of the globe and includes bases, ports, and liaisons in many countries and on every continent. The economic consequences of this vast military diversification are the necessity to spread out defense dollars across these regions. Furthermore, the United States must develop and sustain the capability to transport forces rapidly to and from each region. Conversely, the logistical cost to Beijing is considerably less than it is for Washington. This translates into a similar relationship for space system expenditures, where China only needs to support enough space systems to enhance regional operations whereas the United States must maintain enough systems to simultaneously support multiple regions for a continuous global presence.
Meteyer, David O. The Art of Peace: Dissuading China from Developing Counter-Space Weapons. USAF Academy, CO: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, August 2005. [ 20 quotes ] [ page 68-9 ]