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France, Martin E.B. and Richard J. Adams. "The Chinese Threat to US Superiority." High Frontier Journal. Vol. 1, No. 3 (Winter 2005): 17-22. [ 12 quotes ]

Evidence Related to this Citation

China is Developing Spacepower Capabilities to Counter U.S. Conventional Strength, not as a Response to U.S. Spacepower
 
Contrary to the views of space sanctuary and space arms control advocates, fear of an emerging US capability to destroy Chinese satellites is not the primary catalyst behind Beijing's counterspace moves. Chinese interests in space weapons do not hinge on winning a potential US-Chinese ASAT battle or participating in a space arms race. Two other motivations play a much greater role in cultivating China's desire for counterspace weapons: to counter the space-enabled advantage of US conventional forces; and to guarantee the viability of Chinese nuclear forces in the face of emerging American missile defenses. ( More ... )
France, Martin E.B. and Richard J. Adams. "The Chinese Threat to US Superiority." High Frontier Journal. Vol. 1, No. 3 (Winter 2005): 17-22. [ 12 quotes ] [ page 18 ]
Chinese Military Space Program Driven Primarily by Security Interests, not as a Response to U.S. Space Control Initiatives
 
China possesses both the intent and a growing capability to threaten US space systems in the event of a future clash between the two countries. The PLA's development of ASAT weapons is primarily not a reaction to US space control initiatives. It is driven instead by very practical considerations of regional security and influence, and the desire to conduct asymmetric warfare against a superior foe if conflict arises. First, Beijing seeks to offset the dominance of US conventional forces by exploiting their dependence on spaceborne information assets. Second, China hopes to guarantee the viability of it's nuclear deterrent by holding the critical space-segment of American missile defense systems at risk. Both of these goals are deeply rooted in the issue of Taiwanese reunification and the potential for armed conflict over the status of the island. China's growing capability to attack American satellites could play an important role in a future military confrontation over Taiwan. ( More ... )
France, Martin E.B. and Richard J. Adams. "The Chinese Threat to US Superiority." High Frontier Journal. Vol. 1, No. 3 (Winter 2005): 17-22. [ 12 quotes ] [ page 21 ]
China has a Wide Range of Technological Options for Attacking Space Assets
 
Technology accessible to China today enables attack by ground-segment interdiction, computer network disruption, communications jamming, laser blinding, direct ascent ASAT interceptors, space mines, debris rings, and high-altitude nuclear bursts. Interdicting ground stations may be the easiest way to disable space systems. Due to their concentration within US and Allied borders, such attacks would likely be highly escalatory. Computer network attack, communication jamming, and laser blinding have the advantage of being bloodless and potentially deniable, but can be susceptible to countermeasures. Options such as ground-launched missiles, co-orbital mines, fragmentation rings, and high-altitude nuclear bursts (supercharging the Earth's Van Allen radiation belts) offer the advantage of a hard-kill, but are non-discriminatory. China's satellites, as well as those belonging to third parties, would likely be damaged or destroyed by residual debris and radiation. While the above-listed methods provide China a number of technologically-available near-term options, further advances may give them the additional benefits of increased range and precision. ( More ... )
France, Martin E.B. and Richard J. Adams. "The Chinese Threat to US Superiority." High Frontier Journal. Vol. 1, No. 3 (Winter 2005): 17-22. [ 12 quotes ] [ page 19 ]
China Actively Developing Space Control Capabilities
 
Building on a solid base of design, manufacture, integration, test, launch, and TT&C capabilities, China is developing a range of technologies tailored for space control applications. Official sources (e.g., AMS, COSTIND, and the China Aerospace Corporation (CASC)) reflect both an increased interest in counterspace capabilities and the existence of actual ongoing programs. Systems under study and/or development include space-based 'killer' satellites, kinetic-kill vehicles, ground-based lasers, and electronic jammers. Numerous CASC articles describe detailed on-going research on terminal phase tracking and target discrimination using advanced methods such as ultra-wideband radar, thermal imaging, and sensor fusion. Two areas of particular relevance to China's future counterspace capability are directed energy weapons and agile microsats. These sophisticated approaches augment a growing list of ASAT options already available to China. ( More ... )
France, Martin E.B. and Richard J. Adams. "The Chinese Threat to US Superiority." High Frontier Journal. Vol. 1, No. 3 (Winter 2005): 17-22. [ 12 quotes ] [ page 19 ]
China Likely to Target U.S. Space Assets as a Precursor to an Attack Against Taiwan
 
The keys to any Chinese military action against Taiwan would first be deterrence of US intervention and then, if an attack is initiated, limiting America's capacity and will to respond. If China elects to use military measures to secure national unity, its primary goal will be to achieve a quick outcome through surprise, speed, and deception. America's space-dependent information infrastructure presents an alluring target, making a non-lethal strike against US space assets a likely precursor or adjunct to an attack. ( More ... )
France, Martin E.B. and Richard J. Adams. "The Chinese Threat to US Superiority." High Frontier Journal. Vol. 1, No. 3 (Winter 2005): 17-22. [ 12 quotes ] [ page 19 ]
China Developing Microsatellite Capabilities for Space Control
 
China's burgeoning microsatellite program enhances its ability to attack American spaceborne assets. Beijing could discretely launch such small, lightweight and difficult to detect satellites as secondary payloads on otherwise overt missions. When desired, the hitchhiker could then maneuver into position for attack. With the help of Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd, (the leading microsat development company in Europe, if not the world) China is making tremendous strides in microsat design, fabrication, and operations. ( More ... )
France, Martin E.B. and Richard J. Adams. "The Chinese Threat to US Superiority." High Frontier Journal. Vol. 1, No. 3 (Winter 2005): 17-22. [ 12 quotes ] [ page 20 ]
China is Developing Laser Weapon System to Attack Satellites
 
It is highly likely China is developing ground-based directed energy weapons with the capability to temporarily disable, damage, or even destroy a satellite. With roughly 300 organizations, 3,000 engineers, and 10,000 total personnel participating in laser-related efforts, Beijing's aggressive pursuit of advanced directed energy technology has given its program world-class status. As early as 1994, the Chinese successfully tested a free electron laser with a 140 megawatt output. They have since pursued miniaturization of laser systems, perhaps to enable a mobile system. According to other reports, China is seeking to build an ASAT system using a high-energy deuterium fluoride laser, mimicking the US Mid-Infrared Advanced Chemical Laser (MIRACL) design. ( More ... )
France, Martin E.B. and Richard J. Adams. "The Chinese Threat to US Superiority." High Frontier Journal. Vol. 1, No. 3 (Winter 2005): 17-22. [ 12 quotes ] [ page 20 ]
China was Shocked by U.S. Demonstration of Spacepower in Recent Conflicts and is Modifying Strategy to Counter U.S. Military
 
Beijing has closely followed the technology-driven revolution in US military affairs that, to a great extent, depends on spaceborne assets. The conventional military prowess demonstrated by the American military in recent operations seized the attention of Chinese strategists who view the space-networked nature of this new American way of war as a potential weakness. As a result, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is developing new doctrine, based on surprise and information systems attack, to counter a threat it sees to its own strategic position. The dramatic space- and information-fueled success of US military operations over the past 15 years profoundly impacted Chinese military thinking. The decisiveness with which the US dismantled the Iraqi army in the 1991 Gulf War shocked Beijing and highlighted the vulnerability of China's technologically inferior forces. ( More ... )
France, Martin E.B. and Richard J. Adams. "The Chinese Threat to US Superiority." High Frontier Journal. Vol. 1, No. 3 (Winter 2005): 17-22. [ 12 quotes ] [ page 18 ]
Top Space Control Priority for the U.S. should be Expanding Space Situational Awareness
 
If the US wishes to enjoy the advantages of space-enabled communications, navigation, precision timing, weather, missile warning, and ISR in any potential conflict with China, the National Security Space community should aggressively pursue methods to defend its systems from attack. First and foremost, the Air Force ­ as Defense Department executive agent for space ­ must develop better Space Situation Awareness (SSA), both in breadth and depth. In breadth, the Air Force should build and maintain an improved catalog of objects from lowEarth to geosynchronous orbits. The catalog must not only be complete, capturing increasingly smaller objects; it needs also to be timely to ensure maneuvering vehicles are discovered in time to permit defensive action. In depth, America should develop the capacity to better characterize the nature and capabilities of known satellites. The US must improve its ability to identify the existence, origin, and nature of attacks on its space assets―differentiating these attacks from system or environmental anomalies. The need for depth and breadth in SSA extends to ground-based counterspace systems that might be employed against friendly forces. Passive and active defensive systems should follow and leverage SSA improvements to "close the loop" on American vulnerabilities. America stands a better chance of deterring aggression against its critical onorbit assets if it possesses the capability to recognize emerging threats, capture timely indications and warnings, and respond (defensively or offensively) when attacked. To do otherwise presents an inviting vulnerability to an adversary seeking unconventional means to neutralize or defeat a stronger foe.
France, Martin E.B. and Richard J. Adams. "The Chinese Threat to US Superiority." High Frontier Journal. Vol. 1, No. 3 (Winter 2005): 17-22. [ 12 quotes ] [ page 21 ]
China's Space Power Efforts motivated by desire to counter U.S. Strength and Preserve its Nuclear Deterrent
 
In the event of a future Sino-American conflict, it is likely China intends to exploit the vulnerability of US space systems. Two key factors motivate Beijing to develop, deploy, and employ counterspace capabilities. The first is the need to neutralize the overwhelming conventional military advantage America currently derives from its space assets. In particular, China fears that American technical dominance encourages Taiwanese defiance and emboldens the US to intervene militarily in a future crisis. Second, the Chinese desire to bolster the viability of their nuclear deterrent by securing the means to threaten a space-reliant US anti-ballistic missile (ABM) network. Both objectives are driving China to evolve its military doctrine and expand its technical ability to function against a high-tech, information-hungry enemy.
France, Martin E.B. and Richard J. Adams. "The Chinese Threat to US Superiority." High Frontier Journal. Vol. 1, No. 3 (Winter 2005): 17-22. [ 12 quotes ] [ page 18 ]
China Recognizes U.S. Dependence on Outer Space
 
The conduct of these operations increasingly leads Chinese strategists to focus on US Forces' dependence on space, as evidenced by several recent studies. A 1994 report by China's Academy of Military Science (AMS) emphasized the American military appetite for satellite services, noting 70 percent of all US military communications and 90 percent of all military intelligence flows through spaceborne systems. A 1997 paper by China's Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry (COSTIND) characterized US military exploitation of space-based systems as a potential Achilles? Heel. In 2000, a report from Xinhua, a state news agency of the PRC, described US over reliance on technology and space as part of "The US Military's Soft Ribs and Strategic Weakness." The report went on to state, "For countries that can never win a war with the United States by using the method of tanks and planes, attacking the US space system may be an irresistible and most tempting choice. Part of the reason is that the Pentagon is greatly dependent on space for its military action."
France, Martin E.B. and Richard J. Adams. "The Chinese Threat to US Superiority." High Frontier Journal. Vol. 1, No. 3 (Winter 2005): 17-22. [ 12 quotes ] [ page 18 ]
Chinese Publications show Interest in Countering U.S. Space Assets
 
Open source Chinese publications reflect Beijing's increased interest in spaceborne targets. In a 1995 meeting, members of China's Central Military Commission (CMC) listed an adversary's "nervous system and brain" as essential objectives in modern warfare. In a 1998 article, Captain Shen Zhongchang, Director of Research and Development at the Navy Research Institute in Beijing, described "mastery of outer space" as a precondition for victory in future battles. In 1999, the Vice Minister of COSTIND stated, "Since GPS is playing an ever-increasing role in long-range precision attacks, precision bombing, accurate deployment of troops, requests for reinforcements and unified actions for command and control, anti-satellite systems centered on satellite navigation will be developed..." It is apparent Chinese strategists have identified American space systems as a Center of Gravity and seek to degrade this asymmetric advantage through development of counterspace means.
France, Martin E.B. and Richard J. Adams. "The Chinese Threat to US Superiority." High Frontier Journal. Vol. 1, No. 3 (Winter 2005): 17-22. [ 12 quotes ] [ page 18 ]