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Lambakis, Steven. "Space Control in Desert Storm and Beyond." Orbis. Vol. 39, No. 3 (Summer 1995). [ 6 quotes ]

Evidence Related to this Citation

Russia Successfully Developed and Deployed Co-Orbital Anti-Satellite Weapon during Soviet Era
 
The absence of hostile anti-satellite systems during Desert Storm also made the achievement of space control for the positive uses of space extraordinarily simple. Not too long ago, however, the United States could not take the liberty of planning for war without providing for satellite survivability. During the cold war, the United States had to defend against an enemy that had developed the capability to disrupt and destroy space systems. For almost two decades, until its collapse, the Soviet Union maintained a dedicated co-orbital interceptor in readiness at its launch site at the Tyuratam cosmodrome. The Soviets also deployed exoatmospheric nuclear-tipped anti-ballistic missiles around Moscow, which could have been used against U.S. satellites in low Earth orbit. It was believed that Moscow also sponsored research and development of directed-energy weapons, lasers, and nonnuclear direct-ascent interceptors for use against enemy satellites. Today, Russia continues to deploy nuclear interceptors and may still have an operational co-orbital anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon. ( More ... )
Lambakis, Steven. "Space Control in Desert Storm and Beyond." Orbis. Vol. 39, No. 3 (Summer 1995). [ 6 quotes ]
Desert Storm Convinced U.S. Military of Need for Space Control
 
Desert Storm was America's first space war, the first significant
conflict wherein sure and rapid success depended upon steady access to
satellites for all of the armed services. Space operational support
usually did not make front page news, no doubt adding to the public's
lack of appreciation for the importance of military space power.
Nevertheless, U.S. dependence on military capabilities in space is
rising with each passing year. The Persian Gulf war teaches the defense
community that certain advantages accrue to the nation that ensures its
freedom to use Earth's orbits. Conversely, an inability to exploit space
(owing to our own policy and material deficiencies, or to enemy actions)
will place our warriors at a distinct disadvantage that may someday
spell the difference between victory and defeat. ( More ... )
Lambakis, Steven. "Space Control in Desert Storm and Beyond." Orbis. Vol. 39, No. 3 (Summer 1995). [ 6 quotes ]
A 1994 U.S. Navy War Game Showed that China could Devastate U.S. by Attacking U.S. Space Assets
 
Some instruction on these points may be found in a simulated war against the People's Republic of China conducted at the Naval War College in the spring of 1994. The war game, set in the year 2010, was a part of the Pentagon's ongoing study of the revolution in military affairs. In the scenario, Beijing provokes the U.S. Navy into patrolling China's shores, luring vulnerable aircraft carriers and other surface ships within range of precision-guided cruise missiles. The Chinese begin their ambush by attacking U.S. satellites, which confounds American targeting abilities and precludes any significant counter-offensive by the U.S. Navy. The Chinese also use space-based assets to enhance the effectiveness of their own forces. U.S. players in this war game were routed, their forces hit before they could throw up adequate defenses. ( More ... )
Lambakis, Steven. "Space Control in Desert Storm and Beyond." Orbis. Vol. 39, No. 3 (Summer 1995). [ 6 quotes ]
Ground Attack Strategy Limited by Inadequate Intelligence
 
A number of points demonstrate how limited, and prone to failure, such a space control strategy [targeting ground stations] could be. First, in order for a target list to be useful, it must be updated and expanded regularly. To do that, the United States would need good to near-perfect intelligence. Assume U.S. intelligence agencies had the luxury of needing to watch only one potential enemy. To understand how difficult obtaining the required intelligence would be on just one country under a spotlight, remember that the United States was unaware of the true extent of Iraq's nuclear production facilities in peacetime prior to the Persian Gulf war, and that coalition air forces experienced agonizing difficulties in locating mobile Scud missiles during the war. Defense planners and policy makers who rely heavily on satellites for intelligence need to adopt a bit of humility, appreciating how much we do not and cannot know. ( More ... )
Lambakis, Steven. "Space Control in Desert Storm and Beyond." Orbis. Vol. 39, No. 3 (Summer 1995). [ 6 quotes ]
Anti-Satellite Weapons more Efficient than Ground-Based Strikes
 
ASAT weapons, however unpleasant to some sensibilities, promise a distinct capability to strike at the enemy's center of gravity. Imagine a proliferation of ground-based transmitting installations and mobile communications facilities spread over a vast area on enemy soil. The task of locating and launching air strikes against every space station, node, and terminal relevant to enemy military operations, perhaps during the night or under enemy fire, may be impossible. Given recent technological advances, the number of space data receivers and transmitters can be increased without bounds, especially as new technologies allow for further miniaturization. When the redundancy of an enemy's ground-based telecommunications and C3I targets can be increased two-, five-, or even ten-fold, the only effective way to paralyze his C3I is by hitting the space links. Military space policy must therefore legitimize and enable a diversity of offensive as well as defensive tactics.
Lambakis, Steven. "Space Control in Desert Storm and Beyond." Orbis. Vol. 39, No. 3 (Summer 1995). [ 6 quotes ]
Ground-Based Attacks on an Enemy's Satellite Nodes may not be Practical Logistically
 
Fourthly, tremendous logistical burdens may be involved in an intense, ground-oriented space control strategy. During Desert Storm, air combat fighters and bombers found convenient basing in-theater. Absent such basing our forces will have to rely more on long-range bombers to accomplish their missions. That will mean fewer sorties flown and fierce competition among targeters for the allocation of precious bombing runs. The course of the war may demand attacks on armored columns rather than on ground nodes and terminals. And lastly, one must consider the question of time. In a long war, an intense air campaign to destroy hundreds or thousands of targets is plausible. In a short, high-tempo war, such a space-control strategy may be only partially executed and
fall short of its goal.
Lambakis, Steven. "Space Control in Desert Storm and Beyond." Orbis. Vol. 39, No. 3 (Summer 1995). [ 6 quotes ]