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Klotz, Frank G. Space, Commerce, and National Security. Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, January 1999. [ 12 quotes ]

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Unlikely that States would Agree to a Ban on Anti-Satellite Weapons
 
Only rarely has international law specifically prohibited the use of particular weapons or specific activities in warfare, and then usually in cases where the treatment of noncombatants is at issue or considerable opprobrium is attached to the weapon or activity in question--such as poison gas. While attacks on satellites might have profound military or economic consequences, they would hardly generate the same kind of moral outrage. Thus, it stretches the imagination to believe any nation would ever consent to an arms agreement that would categorically foreclose the option of attacks on space systems in wartime or would actually refrain from attacking a satellite if it concluded that significant military advantage could be gained from doing so. ( More ... )
Klotz, Frank G. Space, Commerce, and National Security. Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, January 1999. [ 12 quotes ] [ page 17-18 ]
Existing International Agreements do not Preclude Deployment of Space Weapons
 
Yet, despite the Outer Space Treaty's emphasis on peaceful use and the specific provisions on unimpeded access and noninterference, the existing legal regime does not-as is often supposed-categorically rule out the use of space for military purposes. ( More ... )
Klotz, Frank G. Space, Commerce, and National Security. Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, January 1999. [ 12 quotes ] [ page 12 ]
Basic Problem with Space Arms Control is that Virtually any Space System could Perform an Anti-Satellite Role
 
Additionally, some of the systems that might be used to attack satellites, which would therefore be subject to limitation, might also have other, entirely legitimate civilian or military purposes. Reductio ad adsurdum, any satellite that can be maneuvered in such a way as to collide with another satellite could theoretically be used for "antisatellite" purposes. While one might counter that the functions of individual satellites are generally widely known, not everyone will agree. The Soviet Union, for example, objected to the U.S. space shuttle as a potential antisatellite platform since it had the capability to "snatch" satellites in orbit. ( More ... )
Klotz, Frank G. Space, Commerce, and National Security. Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, January 1999. [ 12 quotes ] [ page 17 ]
Guiding U.S. Goal should be to Preserve its Leadership in Outer Space
 
In this environment of mounting political and economic pressures, a principal objective of the United States should be to maintain a leadership role in all aspects of human activity in space. One way or another, rules of the road for national activities in space will evolve to account for the phenomenal growth in its importance for both the military and commerce. For much of the space age, the United States and the Soviet Union wrote these rules-first by actual practice, and then by leading the process of codifying them into treaties and international agreements. Other nations have, as has been shown, achieved modest success in influencing international practice and law on space, particularly in the allocation of geosynchronous orbital slots and radio frequencies. But the failure of the Moon treaty and other efforts to circumscribe the activities of the major space powers shows the importance of a major and continuous U.S. presence in space to writing the rules in such a way as to promote (or at least not hinder) American interests there. Thus, the most important order of business for the United States in the years immediately ahead is to maintain and build upon its status as the leading spacefaring nation. ( More ... )
Klotz, Frank G. Space, Commerce, and National Security. Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, January 1999. [ 12 quotes ] [ page 26-7 ]
International Community could Decide to Mutually Refrain from Weaponizing Outer Space
 
While legally banning antisatellite systems or activities associated with their use would not appear to add much value at the moment, it may be possible for nations to mutually refrain from activities that might be construed as threatening to the satellites of others. Such undertakings are not without precedent. When it has been within their general interests, nations have held back from employing certain weapons and engaging in certain activities during wartime, even in the absence of specific agreements. ( More ... )
Klotz, Frank G. Space, Commerce, and National Security. Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, January 1999. [ 12 quotes ] [ page 18 ]
Contribution of Space to Global Economy Increasing
 
[W]hile the public continues to identify space most closely with scientific exploration and high adventure, space has also become a big business and represents a huge investment in terms of capital assets and jobs. The root cause for this explosion in space activity has been the ever-widening array of goods and services satellites provide to both the national security and commercial sectors. ( More ... )
Klotz, Frank G. Space, Commerce, and National Security. Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, January 1999. [ 12 quotes ] [ page 6 ]
Military has a Role in Protecting Space Assets just as the Navy Protects the Sea Lanes for Commerce
 
For example, as European commerce began to expand to other regions of the world in earlier centuries, the opening of new trade routes and establishment of overseas outposts were initially undertaken by ostensibly private enterprises, such as the British East India Company. However, the European powers eventually found it necessary to create large navies and expeditionary forces to protect the sea lanes as well as the foreign holdings of their merchants. In other words, the flag followed trade. Moreover, conflicts between the great powers that arose from predominantly local disputes frequently entailed clashes among rival military forces at sea and in territories far removed from European shores. In the same manner, national security officials contend, future conflicts on the Earth's surface will inevitably entail attempts to disrupt the new "lines of communication" in space. And, just as navies were called upon to protect the sea lines of communication, the military has a role in protecting the space lines of communication. ( More ... )
Klotz, Frank G. Space, Commerce, and National Security. Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, January 1999. [ 12 quotes ] [ page 11 ]
U.S. must be Prepared to Deny Adversaries the Use of Space Capabilities
 
It also suggested to thoughtful observers that the United States should not count on an indefinite monopoly in this field--particularly as spaced-based products and services became increasingly available in the commercial market. The consequences of facing an enemy with the same or similar capabilities of observing the battlefield from space or providing precise navigation data to its forces would be profound. ... Thus, in future conflicts, the United States would no doubt want to deny the use of space capabilities to its enemies, lest they achieve the same advantages in space. The central dilemma is how to accomplish both ends-protecting one's own use of space, while at the same denying it to an adversary. ( More ... )
Klotz, Frank G. Space, Commerce, and National Security. Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, January 1999. [ 12 quotes ] [ page 15 ]
Conventional Strikes on Satellite Ground Stations may be Faster, Easier, and Cheaper than Using Space Weapons
 
Conventional military forces can also be employed to deny an adversary access to space goods and services. A satellite is only one segment of the total system that is required to deliver space products and services. Equally important are ground-based antennas, control centers, relay stations, and distribution nodes. All of these segments can be targeted by familiar military tactics (e.g., bombing or missile attack), as well as emerging techniques popularly referred to as information or cyber-warfare. ( More ... )
Klotz, Frank G. Space, Commerce, and National Security. Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, January 1999. [ 12 quotes ] [ page 19 ]
Arms Control Agreements cannot Keep Pace with Advances in Space Technology
 
In the absence of an extant threat, an agreement aimed at weapons that could pose a threat to satellites can only speculate as to the types of systems, capabilities, or activities that should be subject to restriction. Space technology is developing so rapidly that entirely unforeseen threats could emerge within the life of a formal arms control treaty. Thus, limiting a particular kind of capability-such as the rocket-mounted satellite interceptors developed by the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War-would provide little protection against systems based on entirely new or different technology and could engender a false sense of security. ( More ... )
Klotz, Frank G. Space, Commerce, and National Security. Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, January 1999. [ 12 quotes ] [ page 16-17 ]
U.S. Pursuit of Space Weapons and Long-Range Strike Options Based on Need to Preserve Flexibility and Increase Options
 
Ground targets might not be readily accessible due to distance, sophisticated defenses, or the lack of American or allied forces in the region. Concerns about overflight and collateral damage might impose political or operational restrictions. Therefore, as U.S. Space Command has argued in its Long Range Plan, the United States should have at its disposal military capabilities specifically tailored to quickly and precisely "produce reversible and permanent effects against all nodes of a potential adversary's space systems (emphasis added)." Additionally, such capabilities should be flexible enough to account for the fact that both friends and foes may be using space services from satellites in the same vicinity. According to U.S. Space Command, candidate systems that hold promise for meeting these desiderata over the next 10 to 15 years include ground-based lasers, and relocatable radio frequency and laser jammers. By the year 2020, its candidate list grows to also include space-based jammers and lasers, as well as a space operations vehicle (the current term of art for a military spaceplane). ( More ... )
Klotz, Frank G. Space, Commerce, and National Security. Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, January 1999. [ 12 quotes ] [ page 19-20 ]
GSO Slot Interference - both Inadvertent or Deliberate - could lead to Conflict
 
The scramble for geosynchronous slots and frequency allocations may in fact intensify as even more telecommunications satellites are launched and space becomes even more "crowded." For the most part, the ITU has resolved most conflicts. Nevertheless, the occasional breakdowns in the process for managing and regulating this competition give pause for concern. Interference--inadvertent or deliberate--could in fact pose a more immediate threat to U.S. military and commercial interests than any nascent capability on the part of potential adversaries to deliberately attack American space systems in crisis or conflict. The possible interruption of the GPS signal by commercial communications satellites-with all its implications for military operations and the global information infrastructure-is a case in point.
Klotz, Frank G. Space, Commerce, and National Security. Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, January 1999. [ 12 quotes ] [ page 23-4 ]