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Wilson, Tom. Threats to United States Space Capabilities. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Space Commission, 2001. [ 8 quotes ]

Evidence Related to this Citation

Russia has Researched Space Mines as Countermeasure to a Strategic Defense System
 
During the 1980s, Soviet authors frequently listed space mines as potential counters to space-based elements of a strategic defense system. For example, in the 1986 book "Weaponry in Space: The Dilemma of Security," the authors note: "Another good way of simultaneously putting out of action several stations would be to use the so-called 'space mines,' which are essentially satellites with high-yield explosives placed into orbits close to the opponents' battle stations, which explode on command from the ground. The mines could be supplied with all sorts of fuses, in particular mechanical- or thermal-actuated ones." ( More ... )
Wilson, Tom. Threats to United States Space Capabilities. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Space Commission, 2001. [ 8 quotes ]
Offensive Counterspace Technology is Spreading Throughout the World
 
The ability to restrict or deny freedom of access to and operations in space is no longer limited to global military powers. The reality is that there are many extant capabilities to deny, disrupt or physically destroy space systems and the ground facilities that command and control them. Knowledge of U.S. space systems functions, locations and physical characteristics, as well as the means to conduct counterspace operations, is increasingly available on the international market. Nations or groups hostile to the U.S. possess or can acquire the means to disrupt or destroy U.S. space systems by attacking the satellites in space, their communications nodes on the ground and in space, or ground nodes that command the satellites. ( More ... )
Wilson, Tom. Threats to United States Space Capabilities. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Space Commission, 2001. [ 8 quotes ]
Satellites Could be Defended with Built-in Self-Defense Capability
 
The ability for a satellite to defend itself against an ASAT attack is a reasonable way to increase the survivability of a high-value space system. One method of self-defense would be to design a suite of optical or radar sensors and small, lightweight missiles into the satellite. Analysts estimate that employment of an on-board self-defense system would increase the total system cost by between ten and twenty percent of the total satellite cost. Alternatively, a small escort satellite carrying the same capabilities might be a more capable system, especially if the goal was to detect, track and intercept the ASAT while the primary satellite continued its mission. ( More ... )
Wilson, Tom. Threats to United States Space Capabilities. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Space Commission, 2001. [ 8 quotes ]
On-board Decoys could Defend Satellites from Attack
 
Decoys that credibly simulate the radar and optical signatures of the satellite are effective, potentially low-cost methods for diverting an ASAT attack from the actual satellite. The decoy would be located on or inside the host satellite and released at the precise moment for the most effective deployment. Decoys could also include lightweight optical or RF jamming systems to nullify or confuse an ASAT's homing system. Analysts estimate that employment of a decoy system would increase the total system cost by between one and ten percent of the total satellite cost. ( More ... )
Wilson, Tom. Threats to United States Space Capabilities. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Space Commission, 2001. [ 8 quotes ]
Space Situtational Awareness Capabilities Widely Available
 
Foreign knowledge of U.S. space operations is a necessary precursor to the successful conduct of counterspace operations or camouflage, concealment, and deception (CC&D) activities. Potential adversaries and competitors can learn about U.S. space systems and operations using standard HUMINT, SIGINT or IMINT intelligence collection techniques, as well as through dedicated space object surveillance and identification (SOSI) systems. More recently, with the advent of amateur satellite observers posting data on the Internet, the availability of intelligence regarding U.S. space system capabilities and orbital locations is increasing available to U.S. adversaries. Satellite situational awareness databases are maintained by organized clubs and organizations, which readily publish their information on Internet web pages such as those of the Federation of American Scientists and several Universities. ( More ... )
Wilson, Tom. Threats to United States Space Capabilities. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Space Commission, 2001. [ 8 quotes ]
GPS System could be Disabled by an Attack on Ground-Based Monitoring Stations and Satellites
 
While most mission control facilities for U.S. space systems are located within the continental U.S., there are still many of these facilities located outside the U.S., in remote areas, which can make physical security of the site difficult. For example, the Global Positioning System (GPS) has five fixed monitoring stations, and four fixed ground antennas located around the world. The accuracy of the GPS system is highly dependent on contact between the GPS satellites, the five fixed monitoring stations and the GPS Master Control Station in Colorado. Loss of some of the monitoring stations or ground antennas could result in a significant decrease in GPS performance worldwide. ( More ... )
Wilson, Tom. Threats to United States Space Capabilities. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Space Commission, 2001. [ 8 quotes ]
Directed-Energy Weapons can Disable Satellites from a Distance
 
Stand off ASAT weapons include lasers, radio frequency (RF) and particle beam weapons. They are termed "stand off" because they are predominantly either ground or air-based systems that never get very close to their target. Most of these concepts tend to be more technically sophisticated and may attack the target from longer ranges than the aforementioned interceptors. In addition, these technologies are capable of engaging multiple targets, whereas interceptors tend to be single shot systems. Furthermore, if the geometric conditions are right, directed-energy weapons can target and attack their targets in seconds; interceptor engagement times tend to be much longer. Finally, stand off directed energy weapons offer the adversary a degree of deniability. This is largely due to the fact that the attack is relatively quick so there may be no intelligence indicators associated with the attack, and because the degradation of the target spacecraft may not be immediately apparent, making it difficult to figure out when and where the attack occurred. ( More ... )
Wilson, Tom. Threats to United States Space Capabilities. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Space Commission, 2001. [ 8 quotes ]
Space-Based Particle Beam ASAT Weapons can Disable other Satellites
 
Particle beam ASAT weapon concepts are space-based systems that fire an intense beam of elementary particles at a satellite, disabling electronic components. These weapons accelerate atomic particles, such as negative hydrogen or deuterium ions, to relativistic velocities (significant fractions of the speed of light) toward their target. They can cause permanent damage by radiating enough energy to overload the satellite's internal electronics. Since these accelerated particles cannot penetrate the atmosphere, weapons using this technology against satellites must be based in space. Particle beam weapons include both charged particle beam (CPB) weapons and neutral particle beam (NPB) weapons. Charged particle beams do not propagate in straight lines in outer space because of the Earth's magnetic field. Because of this, their utility in the ASAT role appears limited. However, neutral particles can propagate long, linear distances in outer space. ( More ... )
Wilson, Tom. Threats to United States Space Capabilities. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Space Commission, 2001. [ 8 quotes ]