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Robb, Charles S. "Star Wars II." Washington Quarterly. Vol. 22, No. 13 (Winter 1999): 81-86. [ 3 quotes ]
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MIRV Experience shows how Damaging Initiating Arms Races can be to U.S. Security
From the musket to the repeating rifle to the machine gun, each innovation changed the face of warfare temporarily, but none provided a lasting advantage to the original developer. In some cases, the rush to deploy a new weapon was, in hindsight, counterproductive and unwise. Take our experience with multiple, independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs)--the multiple warheads on a single ballistic missile each of which can be directed independently at a different target. In the early 1970s, acting on a desire to overwhelm what turned out to be a very limited Soviet missile defense and on thin evidence that a Soviet MIRV deployment was imminent, the United States deployed MIRVs with virtually no constraints from the administration at the time. The Soviets did not sit idle. Within several years they, too, were deploying MIRVed systems. ( More ... )
Robb, Charles S. "Star Wars II." Washington Quarterly. Vol. 22, No. 13 (Winter 1999): 81-86. [ 3 quotes ]
Once Started, Space Weaponization would be Irreversible because of Limits of Verification
The second consequence would be that a space-based arms race would be essentially irreversible--we would face the difficulty, if not impossibility, of assessing what is being put into space. Under the START regime, signatories currently cooperate in inspecting and monitoring each other's intercontinental ballistic missiles, bombers, and submarines, all of which operate within a narrow band above and below sea level. Most space payloads, however, are built and launched with great secrecy and can operate at any distance from the earth, even on celestial bodies such as the moon. Most satellites would operate up to geostationary orbit, or about 22,000 miles from the earth's surface, yielding a total operational volume millions of times greater than that now occupied by missiles, bombers, and submarines. Attempting to monitor weapons in this vast volume of space would be daunting. ( More ... )
Robb, Charles S. "Star Wars II." Washington Quarterly. Vol. 22, No. 13 (Winter 1999): 81-86. [ 3 quotes ]
Vulnerability of Space Weapons Demands Faster Response Times, Increasing Incentives to Pre-emptively First
The third consequence of U.S. space weaponization would be the heightened probability of strategic conflict. Anyone familiar with the destabilizing impact of MIRVs will understand that weapons in space will bring a new meaning to the expression "hair trigger." Lasers can engage targets in seconds. Munitions fired from satellites in low-earth orbit can reach the earth's surface in minutes. As in the MIRV scenario, the side to strike first would be able to destroy much of its opponent's space weaponry before the opponent had a chance to respond. The temptation to strike first during a crisis would be overwhelming; much of the decisionmaking would have to be automated. ( More ... )
Robb, Charles S. "Star Wars II." Washington Quarterly. Vol. 22, No. 13 (Winter 1999): 81-86. [ 3 quotes ]