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Watts, Barry D. The Military Use of Space: A Diagnostic Assessment. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, February 2001. [ 8 quotes ]

Evidence Related to this Citation

No country has used lethal or destructive force from, to, or within space
 
Nor has any other country clearly crossed this threshold. It is believed that in October and November of 1975, the Soviets used intense beams of radiation to interfere with three American satellites, although the US government later officially explained these incidents as having been caused by forest fires or volcanoes. More recently, disruption of satellite systems -- by Russia against satellite phone communications being used by Chechen rebels and by Iran against Western satellite broadcasts -- has been reported. Also, one could interpret American air attacks on Iraqi satellite ground stations early in the 1991 Persian Gulf War as space control insofar as the intent was to deny Iraq access to overhead systems. Nonetheless, lethal or destructive force application from, to, or within near-earth space basically lies in the future. ( More ... )
Watts, Barry D. The Military Use of Space: A Diagnostic Assessment. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, February 2001. [ 8 quotes ] [ page 10 ]
U.S. wasn't able to fully exploit space during Persian Gulf war
 
The exploitation of orbital assets by the US-led Coalition before and during the 1991 Persian Gulf war (January 17-February 28, 1991) reinforces this conclusion. The preponderant utilization of space assets during this conflict was force enhancement of terrestrial operations. The United States and its allies made heavy use of communications satellites for both inter-theater and intra-theater command and control as well as for long-distance communications. Sixteen military and five commercial communications satellites were utilized by Coalition forces; taken together, these systems provided a transmission rate of some 200 million bits per second, or about 39,000 simultaneous telephone calls. Imagery satellites—both electro-optical (EO) and radar—were employed for order-of-battle and target intelligence, as well as for bomb damage assessment (BDA) following coalition air strikes.30 Additionally, ELINT and SIGINT satellites were used to establish Iraqi electronic order-of-battle and to monitor the operation of such things as Iraqi air defenses and military communications. By and large, though, none of these activities employed space systems as an integral, real-time element of lethal kill chains during combat operations. ( More ... )
Watts, Barry D. The Military Use of Space: A Diagnostic Assessment. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, February 2001. [ 8 quotes ] [ page 11 ]
U.S. only realizing a fraction of space's potential for force enhancement
 
Fourth, while the American military is currently far ahead of any other military in the ability to exploit space systems, even the United States has probably realized no more than 10–15 percent of space's potential for force enhancement. ... " Even today, operational exploitation of national systems appears to remain, at best, an "applique" that continues to be unevenly utilized across Services and from one contingency to the next. ( More ... )
Watts, Barry D. The Military Use of Space: A Diagnostic Assessment. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, February 2001. [ 8 quotes ] [ page 14 ]
Even HAND attack on satellites would not significantly reduce U.S. military power
 
Finally, it is far from clear that a country planning on or engaged in fighting the United States would appreciably reduce the amount of military power the United States could ultimately bring to bear by attacking LEO satellite constellations with a nuclear burst above the sensible atmosphere. ... The costs of such a wantonly destructive act would be high and the likely benefits for the perpetrator, at best, fleeting and short term. ( More ... )
Watts, Barry D. The Military Use of Space: A Diagnostic Assessment. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, February 2001. [ 8 quotes ] [ page 28 ]
Not clear that attacking a satellite is an act of war in the same way attacking a ship would be
 
Nevertheless, damaging or destroying satellites does not seem to have quite the same status as damaging or sinking a nation's ships and killing its crew. Satellites may have owners and operators, but, in contrast to sailors, they do not have mothers. Granted, the destruction of a KH-11 or comparable satellite at a key juncture in a crisis with a major regional power would be taken very seriously by American leaders. Whether this act would inevitability lead to war, however, is far from clear. ( More ... )
Watts, Barry D. The Military Use of Space: A Diagnostic Assessment. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, February 2001. [ 8 quotes ] [ page 28 ]
Satellites have yet to achieve the economic importance that the Spanish treasure galleons had for the British Royal Navy
 
While ASAT systems have been tested and fielded in the past, US capabilities are currently limited to a US Army developmental program for a kinetickill vehicle launched by a Minuteman missile, and one cannot help but wonder about the readiness of the Russian nonnuclear ASAT system inherited from the Soviet era. Again, one must wonder why this happens to be so. And the most straightforward answer is that orbital assets have yet to acquire the economic import of Spanish treasure galleons. ( More ... )
Watts, Barry D. The Military Use of Space: A Diagnostic Assessment. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, February 2001. [ 8 quotes ] [ page 28 ]
British Experience with Carrier Aviation after World War I Demonstrates Difficulty in Preserving Technological Dominance
 
In this regard it should be stressed there can be no guarantee that the United States will retain its present commanding margin of advantage indefinitely. Consider, after all, how far ahead the Royal Navy was in carrier aviation at the end of World War I. ( More ... )
Watts, Barry D. The Military Use of Space: A Diagnostic Assessment. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, February 2001. [ 8 quotes ] [ page 48 ]
Adversaries Could Respond Assymetrically in a Way that Would Nullify any Strategic Advantage
 
The rub, of course, is that potential adversaries may not elect to emulate American approaches to the military use of orbital space. A regional opponent primarily concerned with preventing the United States from projecting its military power into its region of the world could choose to exploit space assets in very different ways than mirroring American capabilities. Some focused capabilities in orbit along with a willingness to combat or negate US advantages derived from space using terrestrial means could very well go far to level the playing field between the United States and a future regional opponent. ( More ... )
Watts, Barry D. The Military Use of Space: A Diagnostic Assessment. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, February 2001. [ 8 quotes ] [ page 95 ]