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Lambakis, Steven. "Space Weapons: Refuting the Critics." Policy Review. (February 2001). [ 11 quotes ]

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Empirically, accidents have occurred that did not spark international crises
 
Those who believe we run extraordinary risks stemming from clouded perceptions and misunderstandings in an age of computerized space warfare might want to take a look at some real-world situations of high volatility in which potentially provocative actions took place. Take, for example, the tragedies involving the USS Stark and USS Vincennes. ... ( More ... )
Lambakis, Steven. "Space Weapons: Refuting the Critics." Policy Review. (February 2001). [ 11 quotes ] [ page 5-6 ]
History shows that character and motivations of states is more important than technology for determining what is 'destabilizing'
 
When we look at what incites war, history instructs us that what matter most are the character and motivation of the states involved, along with the general balance of power (i.e., are we in the world of 1914, 1945, or 2001?). Fluctuations in national arsenals, be they based on earth or in space, do not determine, but rather more accurately are a reflection of, the course of politics among nations. In other words, it matters not so much that there are nuclear weapons, but rather whether Saddam Hussein or Tony Blair controls them and in what security context. The same may be said for space weapons. ( More ... )
Lambakis, Steven. "Space Weapons: Refuting the Critics." Policy Review. (February 2001). [ 11 quotes ] [ page 4-5 ]
U.S. deployment of space weapons could bring more stability to international system
 
The sway of major powers historically has regulated world stability. It follows that influential countries that support the rule of law and the right of all states to use orbits for nonaggressive purposes would help ensure stability in the age of satellites. The world is not more stable, in other words, if countries like the United States, a standard-bearer for such ideas, "do nothing." Washington's deterrence and engagement strategies would assume new dimensions with the added influence of space weapons, the presence of which could help bolster peacemaking diplomacy and prevent aggression on earth or in space.
Lambakis, Steven. "Space Weapons: Refuting the Critics." Policy Review. (February 2001). [ 11 quotes ] [ page 5-6 ]
Instability and war more often a result of complex political, diplomatic, and military reasons
 
Insofar as we have no experience in space warfare, no cases exist to justify what is in essence a theoretically derived conclusion -- that space combat must be destabilizing. We do know, however, that the causes of war are rarely so uncomplicated. Small events, by themselves, seldom ever explain large-scale events. ( More ... )
Lambakis, Steven. "Space Weapons: Refuting the Critics." Policy Review. (February 2001). [ 11 quotes ]
Multiple historical examples of crises and accidents that did not escalate
 
To these examples we may add a long list of tactical blunders growing out of ambiguous circumstances and faulty intelligence, including the U.S. bombing in 1999 of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade during Kosovo operations. Yet though these tragic actions occurred in near-war or tinderbox situations, they did not escalate or exacerbate local instability. The world also survived U.S.-Soviet "near encounters" during the 1948 Berlin crisis, the 1961 Cuban missile crisis, and the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars. Guarded diplomacy won the day in all cases. Why would disputes affecting space be any different? ( More ... )
Lambakis, Steven. "Space Weapons: Refuting the Critics." Policy Review. (February 2001). [ 11 quotes ]
Loss of a communications satellite won't necessarily cause crisis escalation
 
In other words, it is not at all self-evident that a sudden loss of a communications satellite, for example, would precipitate a wider-scale war or make warfare termination impossible. In the context of U.S.-Russian relations, communications systems to command authorities and forces are redundant. Urgent communications may be routed through land lines or the airwaves. Other means are also available to perform special reconnaissance missions for monitoring a crisis or compliance with an armistice. While improvements are needed, our ability to know what transpires in space is growing -- so we are not always in the dark.
Lambakis, Steven. "Space Weapons: Refuting the Critics." Policy Review. (February 2001). [ 11 quotes ]
Any international backlash against space weapons will be short-lived
 
Political assault is the price the United States pays for having global interests and power. There will always be attempts by foreign leaders and vocal minorities to influence U.S. procurement decisions through arms control and public condemnation. It costs little, and the potential gains are great. Would a vigorous military space program alienate foreign governments to the point at which Washington could never again assemble a coalition similar to the one that defeated Saddam Hussein in 1991? This is doubtful. ( More ... )
Lambakis, Steven. "Space Weapons: Refuting the Critics." Policy Review. (February 2001). [ 11 quotes ]
In a crisis, our Allies will still support U.S. use of space weapons
 
Similar international support may be expected in the future, even if the United States were to deploy space-based interceptors to slap down ballistic missiles aimed at New York or Los Angeles or antisatellite weapons to blind prying eyes in times of crisis or conflict. When the stakes are high and the United States must act militarily in self-defense or to protect its interests, allies and friends are likely to judge U.S. activities in space to affect politico-strategic conditions on Earth appropriately and in context.
Lambakis, Steven. "Space Weapons: Refuting the Critics." Policy Review. (February 2001). [ 11 quotes ]
States will base decision on whether or not to deploy space weapons on their own rational calculus
 
To argue that states must follow Washington and deploy space weapons out of self-interest is to ignore the fact that self-interest has many faces. In the end, foreign officials must weigh personal, national, and party priorities and strategic requirements, understand political tradeoffs, and assess whether the national treasury and domestic resources could support plans to "match" U.S. weapons. ( More ... )
Lambakis, Steven. "Space Weapons: Refuting the Critics." Policy Review. (February 2001). [ 11 quotes ]
Other states unlikely to be influenced by U.S. decision not to deploy space weapons
 
One may ask, just because the United States unilaterally refrains from developing antisatellite weapons or space-based lasers, why do we assume that other countries will pause right alongside Washington? After all, not all innovations in war stem from provocation. While weapons developed and deployed by rival states surely influence decision making, it is unlikely that states procure weapons systems primarily to achieve a balance in arsenals. ( More ... )
Lambakis, Steven. "Space Weapons: Refuting the Critics." Policy Review. (February 2001). [ 11 quotes ]
MIRV experience does not prove technology demonstration causes arms races
 
The U.S.. and Soviet experience with MIRVs is often brought up to show how Washington’s "naïve" foray into missile madness provoked Moscow to respond in kind. But to arrive at this conclusion, one must suspend all awareness of the strategic context surrounding the MIRV decision and assume that America had (and still has) a monopoly on knowledge. ( More ... )
Lambakis, Steven. "Space Weapons: Refuting the Critics." Policy Review. (February 2001). [ 11 quotes ]