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Elhefnawy, Nader. "Four Myths About Space Power." Parameters. (Spring 2003): 124-32. [ 6 quotes ]

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U.S. Technological Lead is No Guarantee of Security
 
The dual-use character of so much space technology and the fact that others are likely to be able to imaginatively combine various technologies, improvise, adapt, and even innovate mean it can not be assumed that other states will always field inferior systems. ( More ... )
Elhefnawy, Nader. "Four Myths About Space Power." Parameters. (Spring 2003): 124-32. [ 6 quotes ] [ page 126 ]
U.S. Space Dominance will be Irrelevant to Preventing or Resolving Intra-state and Ethnic Conflicts
 
A common feature of scenarios built around the "omniscient, unobstructed lethality" of an "astrocop" system is that it will stop any tank, plane, or missile from crossing borders, effectively ending interstate war. Unfortunately, such a plan assumes a billiard-ball model of international relations in which states are unitary, self-contained actors, an idea which appears increasingly quaint. (The proponents of such a system, after all, often claim that interstate war is largely a thing of the past, which raises the problem that this enormous investment is being justified through reference to a problem that is supposed to have already disappeared.) Most of the conventional conflicts where such weapons may be effective are civil wars which spill across borders, involving neighboring states. ( More ... )
Elhefnawy, Nader. "Four Myths About Space Power." Parameters. (Spring 2003): 124-32. [ 6 quotes ] [ page 129-0 ]
U.S. Space Dominance Likely to be Counterproductive at Dealing with Terrorism and Failed State Security Issues
 
The threats of Intifada and Armageddon also become the same threat when terrorists possess weapons of mass destruction. As 11 September 2001 reminded the world, large-scale terror is a very real danger, and in addition to the other problems they pose (from threats to investment to refugee flows) failed states are increasingly seen as sanctuaries for those who would commit such acts. The United States is incapable of single-handedly eliminating the problem of failed states. Indeed, managing that problem is not something that can be accomplished solely through military instruments, since the main effort has to be preventative. When the time comes for military action, the real test is less whether planes can smart-bomb bandits than whether ground troops can keep the peace. In fact it is possible that an extension of space power would diminish America's ability to deal with these other problems. One way would be through the fostering of a false sense of invulnerability: the perception will be that the United States can neglect very real problems because it has its fortress in the sky. The sense that wars can be won swiftly from the air will enhance this by reducing the tolerance for more protracted operations, especially when they incur casualties: the success of Desert Storm made Somalia's costs appear all the more unacceptable. ( More ... )
Elhefnawy, Nader. "Four Myths About Space Power." Parameters. (Spring 2003): 124-32. [ 6 quotes ] [ page 130-1 ]
Foreign Adversaries can Utilize Commercial Satellite Services that the U.S. will be Politically Unable to Disable
 
Attacking a commercially owned satellite, even one which is partially leased to or providing information to a belligerent's military, would be broadly equivalent to attacking neutral shipping in wartime. A conflict in which this became a regular practice would be comparable to the unrestricted submarine warfare of the world wars. (It also would represent a practical inconvenience for the United States given the reliance of its economy and military on commercial services.) The number of such services available may offer such redundancy as to make it impossible to totally deny a sophisticated enemy access, even after it has executed its initial strike. ( More ... )
Elhefnawy, Nader. "Four Myths About Space Power." Parameters. (Spring 2003): 124-32. [ 6 quotes ] [ page 124-5 ]
Adversaries could Counter U.S. Space Weapons with Cheaper Imitations of Same Technology
 
Moreover, America's technical lead could be rendered less important even where it does not shrink. America's advantage over Iraq and Yugoslavia was that it was an information-age power fighting an industrial-age power, and the disparity between two information-age powers is likely to be less significant than that. The theft or import of technology may be no substitute for homegrown research and development, but a cheap knock-off may in some cases be good enough to get the job done. This is especially so if the knock-off can be produced in large numbers. The dual-use character of so much space technology and the fact that others are likely to be able to imaginatively combine various technologies, improvise, adapt, and even innovate mean it can not be assumed that other states will always field inferior systems. ( More ... )
Elhefnawy, Nader. "Four Myths About Space Power." Parameters. (Spring 2003): 124-32. [ 6 quotes ] [ page 125 ]
Many Low-Budget, Low-Tech Options Available to Adversaries to Counter U.S. Space Weapons
 
Finally, it has been widely acknowledged that a power disadvantaged in satellites and space-based weapons could use a variety of cheaper weapons and tactics to reduce American space superiority. High-flying drones can provide a partial substitute for a shortage of adequate satellites, at least regionally. Such a capability may be less extensive, secure, or reliable in particular respects than what the United States possesses, but it will be there nonetheless. At the same time, low-budget powers can use a variety of techniques to attack American satellites, including hacker warfare or earth-based laser weapons which will have advantages over the space-based variety. ( More ... )
Elhefnawy, Nader. "Four Myths About Space Power." Parameters. (Spring 2003): 124-32. [ 6 quotes ] [ page 126 ]