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Hyten, John E. "Moral and Ethical Decisions Regarding Space Warfare." Air & Space Power Journal. Vol. 28, No. 2 (Summer 2004): 51-60. [ 3 quotes ]
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U.S. has already Weaponized Space through its Sophisticated Use of GPS and Precision-Guided Munitions
One of the more overused statements—bordering on myth—in discussions of the current state of military space is that space has been militarized but not yet weaponized. Proponents of this argument contend that today’s military space force structure is postured to provide force enhancement effects on the battlefield; space has no weapons that directly impact targets—either in space or in the terrestrial environment. The Taliban and Iraqi Republican Guard forces, who were on the receiving end of global positioning system (GPS)–guided weapons, likely have a different impression. ( More ... )
Hyten, John E. "Moral and Ethical Decisions Regarding Space Warfare." Air & Space Power Journal. Vol. 28, No. 2 (Summer 2004): 51-60. [ 3 quotes ]
NATO Forces Struck Serbian Satellite Ground Stations in Operation Allied Force
The Serbs, under President Slobodan Milosevic, used satellite television to provide command and control, among other means, to transmit propaganda. Col Konrad Freytag, NATO spokesman, reported on 23 April 1999 to the world press that "last night, NATO continued to disrupt the national command network and to degrade the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's propaganda apparatus; our forces struck at the regime leadership's ability to transmit their version of the news and to transmit their instructions to the troops in the field prosecuting their campaign of repression and destruction in Kosovo. . . . The building also housed a large multipurpose communications satellite antenna dish." News reports from three days before had stated that "Mount Zlatibor, a ski resort 120 miles south of Belgrade, was hit by eight explosions. . . . Hilltops in Yugoslavia are often sites for communications links. The news agency also said NATO had fired four missiles at a satellite ground station in Prilike near Ivanjica." NATO military planners could not know if civilians would be in the target area when the Ivanjica satellite ground station was attacked; therefore it is not clear if, or how many, civilian casualties occurred, but the possibility certainly existed. Although arguments about whether this was a legitimate target continue to this day, NATO attacked this target with the best precision weapons available, ensuring the target was eliminated while minimizing, but not eliminating, collateral damage.
Hyten, John E. "Moral and Ethical Decisions Regarding Space Warfare." Air & Space Power Journal. Vol. 28, No. 2 (Summer 2004): 51-60. [ 3 quotes ]
Coalition in Operation Iraqi Freedom Attacked Iraq's Satellite Ground Stations
In a March 25 strike, the unmanned Predator fired a laser-guided Hellfire missile at a TV satellite dish in downtown Baghdad, as part of the United States Air Force's dogged effort to take Iraq's state-run television off the air. The Predator, controlled by Air Force personnel at a base elsewhere in the Persian Gulf area, scored a direct hit. Yet Saddam Hussein�s regime continues to keep the signal on. "We're still trying to take Iraq TV off the air," a senior allied officer said this week. "He's been preparing for something like this for 12 years. He's got redundancy into redundancy. But it's getting harder and harder for him to bring it back." In the Predator flight, air planners decided its 100-pound Hellfire was better suited for some downtown targets than a 1,000-pound-warhead Tomahawk cruise missile or a one-ton satellite guided bomb. The TV dish sat near a school and other civilian buildings. "A 2,000-pound bomb probably would have caused more damage, so the Predator took it out," said a senior allied officer, who asked not to be identified. "We really do worry about collateral damage. We target and we choose the weapons in a very deliberate way. You try never, never to use any more weapon than you actually need." The mission was similar to the one against Ivanjica during OAF, but different methods were chosen, reflecting a desire to minimize collateral damage. The effect in Iraq, however, was not as complete as it had been in Serbia. The Iraqi regime had learned from OAF and built redundancy into all its communications, which included its satellites' ground infrastructure. That made it much more difficult for allied forces to eliminate the ground segment of their space capability.
Hyten, John E. "Moral and Ethical Decisions Regarding Space Warfare." Air & Space Power Journal. Vol. 28, No. 2 (Summer 2004): 51-60. [ 3 quotes ]