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Billick, Thomas W. Arms Control Implications for Military Operations in Space. Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF Air University, May 2001. [ 6 quotes ]

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Confidence Building Measures would be a Constructive Intermediate Step Towards Preventing an Arms Race in Outer Space
 
Still other states favor intermediate steps in the form of confidence-building measures believing that such measures would constitute a constructive move towards the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The process of building confidence between states involves step-by-step reductions in perceptions of threat or conditions of uncertainty. In connection with military operations in space, the purpose of confidence-building measures is to obtain greater transparency and predictability through activities such as notification, verification, and monitoring, in order to reduce suspicion and tension between nations while enhancing international peace and stability. ( More ... )
Billick, Thomas W. Arms Control Implications for Military Operations in Space. Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF Air University, May 2001. [ 6 quotes ] [ page 47 ]
U.S. is Opposed to Space Arms Control Negotiations
 
It is clear that the U.S. perceives its own national interests to be at variance with international interests in space arms control negotiations, at least as represented in the CD. Like other states, the U.S. has shown considerable antipathy toward arms control agreements that significantly restrict current and future military flexibility or limit arenas in which the U.S. has a substantial advantage or a particular interest. ( More ... )
Billick, Thomas W. Arms Control Implications for Military Operations in Space. Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF Air University, May 2001. [ 6 quotes ] [ page 47 ]
The U.S. has Opposed Space Arms Control in the U.N. Conference on Disarmament because it believes that there is no Threat of a Space Arms Race
 
Ambassador Robert T. Grey, Jr., United States Representative to the Conference on Disarmament, has made several statements to the CD to explain the U.S. position and deflect criticism by other states, particularly China, on the issue of preventing an arms race in outer space. In doing so, Ambassador Grey has made a number of important points. . . . Third, there is no arms race in outer space, no foreseeable prospect of an arms race in outer space, and no indication of significant ongoing development by any state with respect to arms in space. Fourth, allegations that actions or plans of the United States attest to a desire for hegemony, or any intent to carry out nuclear blackmail, or any supposed quest for absolute freedom to use force or threaten to use force in international relations have no basis in reality. ( More ... )
Billick, Thomas W. Arms Control Implications for Military Operations in Space. Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF Air University, May 2001. [ 6 quotes ] [ page 52 ]
U.S. Position is that Existing Treaties are Adequate to Govern Outer Space
 
Fifth, the Charter of the United Nations, existing multilateral treaties relating to outer space, arms control provisions of other multilateral and certain bilateral treaties relating to outer space, together with customary international law and the domestic law of individual nations, interact with and complement each other in such a way that together, they provide an extensive and comprehensive system for limiting the uses of outer space to those that are peaceful, while providing a framework for the legitimate military uses of outer space. Therefore, the U.S. believes new legally binding instruments are unnecessary at this time. Lastly, Ambassador Grey questioned the logic for immediate negotiations on a space arms control treaty. ( More ... )
Billick, Thomas W. Arms Control Implications for Military Operations in Space. Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF Air University, May 2001. [ 6 quotes ] [ page 52 ]
Previous Conference on Disarmament Discussions have Demonstrated Problems with Verification of Space Arms Control
 
Third, previous discussions in the CD have demonstrated that verifying compliance with any new space arms control agreement will be problematic at best. The U.S. believes that many states would be unwilling to accept international inspections of space payloads prior to launch. Yet without such an inspection or development of a prohibitively expensive international space monitoring system, interested states will have little confidence that any violations of military significance would be detected in time to permit a response if necessary. Even if such measures were put into effect, it would be extremely difficult to determine if a satellite anomaly or failure was the result of an accidental collision, solar radiation, aging equipment, or purposeful interference or attack. ( More ... )
Billick, Thomas W. Arms Control Implications for Military Operations in Space. Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF Air University, May 2001. [ 6 quotes ] [ page 52 ]
Space Arms Control Complicated because anything can be Defined as a Space Weapon
 
In an effort to diffuse the perceived threat space weapons pose to the international community, the U.S. could make several new points in statements issued to the CD. First, practically any active satellite has the potential to be used as a weapon to destroy or disrupt other satellites. Satellites are typically built with a limited capacity to maneuver in order to maintain attitude and position throughout their useful life. It would be a relatively simple proposition to maneuver a given satellite into striking or blocking another, especially one already in close proximity. The point is that a ban on space systems designed as weapons will not necessarily prevent the use of weapons in space. ( More ... )
Billick, Thomas W. Arms Control Implications for Military Operations in Space. Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF Air University, May 2001. [ 6 quotes ] [ page 52 ]