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Deblois, Bruce M., Jeremy C. Marwell et al. "Space Weapons: Crossing the U.S. Rubicon." International Security. Vol. 29, No. 2 (Fall 2004): 50-84. [ 3 quotes ]

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Physically destroying a ground-based laser site before damage could be done to a U.S. satellite would be nearly impossible, even with space weapons. At the speed of light—300,000 kilometers per second (km/s)—a laser's propagation from Earth to space is essentially instantaneous, although it would take minutes or seconds to aim the laser in addition to whatever "burn time" was necessary for destructive effect once the laser had focused on its target. ( More ... )
Deblois, Bruce M., Jeremy C. Marwell et al. "Space Weapons: Crossing the U.S. Rubicon." International Security. Vol. 29, No. 2 (Fall 2004): 50-84. [ 3 quotes ] [ page 58 ]
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Deblois, Bruce M., Jeremy C. Marwell et al. "Space Weapons: Crossing the U.S. Rubicon." International Security. Vol. 29, No. 2 (Fall 2004): 50-84. [ 3 quotes ] [ page 59 ]
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Deblois, Bruce M., Jeremy C. Marwell et al. "Space Weapons: Crossing the U.S. Rubicon." International Security. Vol. 29, No. 2 (Fall 2004): 50-84. [ 3 quotes ] [ page 45 ]