James Clay Moltz has an optimistic new article in the latest Space Policy (sadly, not currently available online without subscription):
His argument is that a careful review of the past three ‘high risk’ periods in space security show that governments have consistently pursued the goal of preserving “safe access to space”, despite their rhetoric to the contrary:
This article first analyzes in greater detail the histories of the three “high risk” periods in space security mentioned above: 1962, 1983, and 2001. It examines the stated intentions and expectations of key actors, what factors led them to change their plans, and what actual results followed. Next, it draws on these cases to develop a series of lessons from the first 50 years of space security. Overall, it makes the argument that while national leaders may have talked tough, they have actually behaved more or less consistently with the aim of protecting “safe access to space” as their highest priority, rather than pursuing unilateralist aims of “space dominance.” This is not to say that some highly influential thinkers and politicians did not entertain such views. But other national and international factors prevented such courses of action from being followed. This suggests that outcomes in the arena of space security–whether contemporary decision makers pursued this objective consciously or not–might best be understood as stemming primarily from calculations of “environmental security,” rather than mainly from traditional military-strategic factors.
The four common elements that he identifies are:
- Risks of collective bads that would threaten the use of outer space for all parties (i.e. space debris, HAND);
- Fear of igniting a space arms race;
- High monetary cost and low survivability of space weapons compared to conventional means;
- Transparent nature of outer space increases risks of getting caught developing covert space weapon programs.
His argument is very encouraging, especially as it predicts a peaceful future for outer space, governed by collective security agreements and emerging international organizations. However, I am still cautious about his conclusions as his article is imprecise on the definition of space weapon programs. For example, he is right to point out that the space-based missile defense programs and kinetic anti-satellite weapons have ran into political difficulties recently, due to several of the common elements he identified. However, other counterspace programs like the Counter Communications System are thriving because they can avoid these same environmental factors.
The U.S. military is well aware of the political and environmental risks from kinetic-kill ASATs and is researching counterspace methods that would allow them to temporarily jam, dazzle, or disable an adversary’s satellite to avoid these. I’m not convinced that there is an inevitable trend towards greater international cooperation in Outer Space, especially with the current administration’s aversion to any kind of international agreement including the environmental regimes he cites. Clay Moltz’s article appears to be a preview of his forthcoming book The Politics of Space Security, 1957-2007, and I’m looking forward to exploring his full argument.
Two other articles from the same issue of Space Policy that are worth checking out:
Updated: March 22, 2008: I’ve created a new argument for this as a supporting argument to the the argument that “Space Weapons are not Inevitable”:
There is an Inherent Norm against the Use of Space Weapons