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In this environment of mounting political and economic pressures, a principal objective of the United States should be to maintain a leadership role in all aspects of human activity in space. One way or another, rules of the road for national activities in space will evolve to account for the phenomenal growth in its importance for both the military and commerce. For much of the space age, the United States and the Soviet Union wrote these rules-first by actual practice, and then by leading the process of codifying them into treaties and international agreements. Other nations have, as has been shown, achieved modest success in influencing international practice and law on space, particularly in the allocation of geosynchronous orbital slots and radio frequencies. But the failure of the Moon treaty and other efforts to circumscribe the activities of the major space powers shows the importance of a major and continuous U.S. presence in space to writing the rules in such a way as to promote (or at least not hinder) American interests there. Thus, the most important order of business for the United States in the years immediately ahead is to maintain and build upon its status as the leading spacefaring nation. ( More ... ) Klotz, Frank G. Space, Commerce, and National Security. Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, January 1999. [ 12 quotes ] [ page 26-7 ]
In summary, for a variety of reasons, the USA cannot return to the space era and space policies of the 1960s. The USA can be and is a leader in space technology, but it is not the leader in all aspects of space. Spacepower through commercial prowess is likely to be shared among space- faring nations. Policies aimed at isolation and at protection of commercial industries only encourage others to develop similar (and sometimes better) products. The only policy that can now be effective in developing a larger and more powerful economic competitive engine for space pro- ducts is one that encourages R&D investments by space firms. The introduction of new and more advanced products will create a larger global market for the USA. A policy emphasizing offense rather than defense would be advantageous for stimulating spacepower through space commerce. Hertzfeld, Henry R. "Globalization, Commercial Space and Spacepower in the USA." Space Policy. Vol. 23 (2007): 210-220. [ 5 quotes ] [ page 220 ]
The problem for the United States is that other nations believe it seeks to monopolize space in order to further its hegemonic dominance.7 In recent years, a growing number of nations have vocally objected to this perceived agenda. Poor US diplomacy on the issue of space weaponization contributes to increased geopolitical backlashes of the sort leading to the recent decline in US soft power—the ability to attract others by the legitimacy of policies and the values that underlie them—which, in turn, has restrained overall US national power despite any gains in hard power (i.e., the ability to coerce). Brown, Trevor. "Soft Power and Space Weaponization." Air & Space Power Journal. XXIII, No. 1 (Spring 2009). [ 10 quotes ] [ page 67 ]
Evidently, rhetoric emanating from the United States regarding space has made members of the international community suspicious that America could bar them from the medium on nothing more than a whim. Such apprehensions unnecessarily contribute to further reductions in soft power. The United States should take care to ensure that other nations receive the impression that it has no intention of hindering their peaceful use of space. If those countries find current US space supremacy tolerable, then perhaps in time they could endure the United States' possession of weapons if this were a significant aspect of US primacy in space and maintenance of the status quo. But if US rhetoric and posturing leave other nations with the belief that the United States has stratagems for orbital despotism, then the international system will hesitate to look to it for leadership. Furthermore, even if most nations cannot compete in space, they will nevertheless do whatever they can to oppose the United States. Brown, Trevor. "Soft Power and Space Weaponization." Air & Space Power Journal. XXIII, No. 1 (Spring 2009). [ 10 quotes ] [ page 70 ]
A glance at the global strategic situation reveals many nations rushing to develop space capabilities. Ostensibly civilian, the capabilities in development around the world are largely dual use and will have profound effects on the balance of power. The United States, therefore, would be foolish to slow the pace of its own space development. The issue at hand is not whether to proceed with space weapons but how to proceed with these capabilities and effectively manage the security dilemmas that will inevitably arise. By assuming a posture which suggests that its intentions in space are competitive scientific and commercial pursuits—and which does not suggest the desire to barricade the medium in times of peace for the purpose of geopolitical leverage—the United States can proceed without causing undue angst in the international community. Once we have laid the foundation for commercial activities (i.e., "merchant shipping"), military capabilities—or "military shipping"—will follow in due course and with far less controversy. If US policy makers can showcase scientific and commercial space endeavors while avoiding the perception of orbital despotism, they can steadily build dominant military space capabilities and retain soft power. Brown, Trevor. "Soft Power and Space Weaponization." Air & Space Power Journal. XXIII, No. 1 (Spring 2009). [ 10 quotes ] [ page 71 ]
In the years ahead, the United States will remain a pre-eminent space power, though other countries, most especially China, will very possibly diminish the margin. US space policy of the recent past has exhibited an incomplete appreciation of this new strategic environment and has been incautious in some policy dimensions. This is because of the absence of both a clearly thought-out space doctrine and a coherent national space security strategy. Other countries, though in different ways, have also exhibited an incomplete appreciation of the new strategic landscape of space. To avoid the dangers inherent to seeking dominance, the United States could aim instead for a posture of space excellence: the most capable in space, a space leader. The United States could seek a non-hegemonic “best-in-class” posture: a state with more advanced space capabilities than other countries, deriving substantially more benefits from space than others, but which would not dominate in space. This space excellence would provide leverage in commercial, civilian and military applications, but would not make space a new battleground. MacDonald, Bruce W. "Steps to Strategic Security and Stability in Space." Disarmament Forum. No. 4 (Winter 2009): 17-26. [ 8 quotes ] [ page 19 ]