Space activity, particularly manned spaceflight, also yields considerable prestige, prestige that translates into political prowess. China, as a rising Asian power, is inherently interested in prestige cum geostrategic influence.
Keywords: China.
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Beijing views U.S. military power in the Pacific as an impediment to China's aspiration of becoming the dominant regional power. Beijing is modernizing and expanding China's military capabilities not only to keep an increasingly independent Taiwan in line, but also to effectively deny the U.S. military the ability to operate against China or its interests in Asia. Chinese military planners have realized that area denial operations require the conduct of space-based surveillance and the other dual-use benefits of space technology. The Dragon is eyeing the moon because the Dragon is also eyeing us. Antonellis, Robert and William S. Murray. "China's Space Program: The Dragon Eyes the Moon (and Us)." Orbis. (Fall 2003): 645-652. [ 1 reference ] [ page 652 ]
Finally, it must also be mentioned that China has long coveted participation on the International Space Station (ISS) program. ISS represents a partnership among the "family of spacefaring nations" to which China dearly seeks acceptance. That status would confer Western legitimacy on the Chinese space program, and by association the Chinese Communist Party which runs the country and backed the program. The United States has long balked at including China in ISS. For many years the excuse was that China had neither the money nor the technology to be a partner. With the inclusion of Brazil in the ISS partnership, a country with far less money and technology than China, it became clear that politics was the real reason for keeping China at bay. The feelings of U.S. government officials such as California Congressman Dana Rohrabacher exemplify the issue. In 2001, for example, Rohrabacher acknowledged that China might have the resources to contribute to the station, but ruled out inclusion due to China's human rights record, saying: "The space station's supposed to stand for something better." More recently, China's January 2007 ASAT test will likely preclude any consideration that might have been percolating for altering the U.S. stance. Johnson-Freese, Joan. China's Space Ambitions. Paris, France: Institut Francais des Relations Internationales, Summer 2007. [ 9 quotes ] [ page 15 ]
Space activity, particularly manned spaceflight, also yields considerable prestige, prestige that translates into political prowess. China, as a rising Asian power, is inherently interested in prestige cum geostrategic influence. The implications of a manned space launch did not go unnoticed, for example, by the Japanese. After the first Chinese launch in 2003, one Japanese official was quoted as saying, "Japan is likely to be the one to take the severest blow from the Chinese success. A country capable of launching any time will have a large influence in terms of diplomacy at the United Nations and military affairs. Moves to buy products from a country succeeding in manned space flight may occur." The point about buying products from a country having successfully launched a man into space relates back to economic growth and the creation of technical jobs. As Tsinghua University Professor Yan Xuetong said in 2003, "Now people will realize that we don't only make clothes and shoes." Johnson-Freese, Joan. China's Space Ambitions. Paris, France: Institut Francais des Relations Internationales, Summer 2007. [ 9 quotes ] [ page 7 ]
Quite simply, prestige, as part of a larger package of actions, can have geostrategic implications. For the past several years, China has embarked on somewhat of a charm campaign throughout Asia and other parts of the world as well. It has carefully and deliberately sought to transform its image from that of a bully to that of a partner, using very realist political means. Aid packages to Africa, trade and aid packages throughout Asia, inroads into South American countries, not altruistically, but for resources, have nevertheless woven China into the tapestry of the international community. Polls taken in 2005 are indicative of China's success. According to a Pew Research Center poll taken in April and May 2005, "China now has a better image than the U.S. in most European nations surveyed." China's manned space program provides gloss to its positive image, especially in the developing world, which is in its benefit to perpetuate. Johnson-Freese, Joan. China's Space Ambitions. Paris, France: Institut Francais des Relations Internationales, Summer 2007. [ 9 quotes ] [ page 13 ]
The development of advanced technology with its corresponding (and overlapping) economic and military benefits has replaced the dynamic of political alignment, which was prevalent during the Cold War, as a major international system variable. This century’s analogue to Cold War geopolitical competition is geotechnological maneuvering. Numerous China experts have recently pointed out two realities that need to be factored into future world order considerations. First, China’s rise in world affairs is inevitable. While Washington would like to maintain the status quo in Asia for as long as possible, for its benefits to the USA, Beijing is no longer satisfied with being a passive non-player in world events. Furthermore, China increasingly has the clout to demand to be a player. The second reality is that China has been largely successful in transforming its image from that of a dissatisfied and defensive power to that of a regional power with which other countries want to co-operate. During China’s diplomatic transformation, the image of the USA has changed as well, from that of a public goods provider worthy of emulation, to -- at least in some quarters—that of an ‘empire-building’ unilateralist power. A poll released in June 2005 by the Pew Research Center found that in six out of nine Western publics China received higher percentages of favorable ratings than did the USA. That being the case, growing Sino--European cooperation, particularly in space, can be partially explained by those great powers’ strategic interests in (1) maximizing their respective economic positions vis-a` -vis competitors such as the USA and Japan and (2) to some extent, balancing against preponderant American power. As of 1 May 2004, the EU overtook Japan as China’s largest trading partner. China has imported over $75 billion in technology from Europe, more than from any other source. At over $160 billion in 2004, Sino--EU trade is already three times of that of Sino--Russian trade. Johnson-Freese, Joan. "The Emerging China-EU Space Partnership: A Geo-Technological Balancer." Space Policy. Vol. 22, No. 1 (February 2006): 12-22. [ 8 quotes ] [ page 13 ]
China specialists John Lewis and Xue Litai point out that China’s military industrial complex heralded the rise of techno-nationalism by leading Beijing’s transition from politics to science in command - - "For the first time— ironically coming during the high tide of the political furor and ideological torment of the Cultural Revolution -- technology and Western military concepts had begun to displace politics and ideology as the underpinnings of China’s military policies." Starting with Deng Xiaoping, China’s recent leaders broadened the scope of technonationalism to guide all aspects of China’s comprehensive national development [jiehe guojia fazhan]. Techno-nationalism holds that technological development is not a superpower luxury. When it comes to such key national interests as space development, all potential great powers, believing that they must depend only on themselves, engage in techno-nationalist realpolitik. Johnson-Freese, Joan. "The Emerging China-EU Space Partnership: A Geo-Technological Balancer." Space Policy. Vol. 22, No. 1 (February 2006): 12-22. [ 8 quotes ] [ page 15 ]
The two biggest forces driving the race between China and India are their insistence on self-reliance and the idea that space exploration feeds national prestige. Naturally, the two ideas work in tandem. India was shut out from NASA and European space missions for years after testing its first nuclear bomb in 1974; now many technologies for its space program have been developed by Indian engineers with little outside help. (India has agreed to carry U.S. and European payloads on its moon launch.) Beijing has watched U.S.- Russian cooperation on the International Space Station rise and fall with their diplomatic relations. "The most important thing is that China has developed and formed its own system for space aviation independently," says Huang Hai of the China Aviation Science and Research Institute. Ouyang Ziyuan, a space expert at the Chinese Academy of Sciences, summed it up to People's Daily: China's program "suggests comprehensive national strength …, increasing China's international prestige and the cohesive power of the Chinese nation." "The Real Space Race Is In Asia." Newsweek. September 20, 2008.