Foreign knowledge of U.S. space operations is a necessary precursor to the successful conduct of counterspace operations or camouflage, concealment, and deception (CC&D) activities. Potential adversaries and competitors can learn about U.S. space systems and operations using standard HUMINT, SIGINT or IMINT intelligence collection techniques, as well as through dedicated space object surveillance and identification (SOSI) systems. More recently, with the advent of amateur satellite observers posting data on the Internet, the availability of intelligence regarding U.S. space system capabilities and orbital locations is increasing available to U.S. adversaries. Satellite situational awareness databases are maintained by organized clubs and organizations, which readily publish their information on Internet web pages such as those of the Federation of American Scientists and several Universities. ( More ... )

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Wilson, Tom. Threats to United States Space Capabilities. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Space Commission, 2001. [ 8 quotes ]

 

When it comes to providing space data and capabilities to our allies and the broader international community, I believe AFSPC and the Air Force are delivering in a significant way. We provide space surveillance information (specifically called out in the space policy) as the maintainers of the catalog of space objects. Customers around the world, with a validated need to know, have Web access to information from our space surveillance network under the Commercial and Foreign Entities (CFE) program which assists all concerned with exact satellite location information. This information is critical for situational awareness in space and preventing objects from colliding. We also share missile warning data, weather information and intelligence, not to mention the most pervasive US contribution to the international community, free of charge, the positioning, navigation, and timing information provided by the global positioning system. Rounding out this list are AFSPC international cooperative efforts in fielding future military satellite communications systems.

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Worley II, Robert M. "The New National Space Policy and Air Force Space Command's Role in International Cooperation." High Frontier Journal. Vol. 3, No. 2 (March 2007): 7-9. [ 3 quotes ] [ page 8 ]

 

BUTTERWORTH: The United States government, in a recent letter that our ambassador sent to the Secretary General of the U.N., noted several of these things. For example, under the heading of Transparency and Confidence Building Measures, the U.S. publishes space weather forecasts and unclassified satellite tracking data, provides assistance in collision avoidance analysis for other nations’ human spaceflight missions, enforces national regulations to limit the probability of accidental collision in orbit, participates in bilateral exchanges on space policies and strategies, observes agreed procedures for the notification of re-entry of space nuclear power sources, and so on. And going beyond that, the United States has been working toward further assistance in collision avoidance for analysis for commercial and foreign satellite operators and additional work with foreign military space operators. So again, as with the debris, a lot of work has been done and more is continuing.

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Campbell, John and T.S. Kelso. Examining Codes and Rules for Space. Washington, D.C.: George C. Marshall Institute, June 26, 2007. [ 6 quotes ] [ page 12 ]

 

T.S. KELSO: It should be obvious to all parties, however, that our collective security and the protection of our orbiting space infrastructure from inadvertent collisions will require a collaborative framework to mitigate risk, much as we do today in civil aviation. Whether this is done through an open sharing of information, which would allow in- creased opportunity for innovation, or through some trusted international organization, the task is not difficult to accomplish, as shown by SOCRATES. Despite concern to the contrary, similar examples of collaborative data sharing, such as the Global Posi- tioning System or Google Earth, have not undermined national security. We have the opportunity to act now and avoid a future disaster in space. I hope we will not choose to sit back and wait for something serious and totally avoidable to happen before we decide to act.

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Campbell, John and T.S. Kelso. Examining Codes and Rules for Space. Washington, D.C.: George C. Marshall Institute, June 26, 2007. [ 6 quotes ] [ page 18 ]

 

T.S. KELSO: I am not necessarily advocating that we release information on classified satellites, but working with this community for a long time, I am well aware that many peo- ple are out there actually tracking satellites. As most of you know, the classified satel- lites we put up are not small and the amateur observers actually take it as a challenge to go out and find them themselves. I think it is actually rather naïve to assume that if amateur observers can do this as a hobby, that our potential adversaries can’t do the same as well and do it equally well. But the point is that there is a lot of data out there currently available through the U.S. Space Surveillance Network and if we had the ob- servations available to the public where they could actually innovate and use newer techniques, they could process more of the data. Part of the problem right now is that Air Force Space Command actually can’t make the associations between the observa- tions and a particular object. If I see you today and I see you tomorrow, I don’t neces- sarily know that that was you both days. So if I am trying to associate a track and fig- ure out where you are going over a particular period of time, I have to be able to say, “When I saw this person one day and I saw him the next day and the next day, those were all the same person and I think he was going from Washington to wherever.” If that information was actually released to the public, there are mathematical and astro- dynamic techniques available today which could actually process the data quicker. We need to look at what we can do and how we can do things, not by spending hundreds of millions of dollars, but how we can take what we already have and use existing tech- niques to try to do this better. If we could do that, we could do it more accurately. If I told you your satellite was predicted to have a piece of debris pass within a hundred meters, it would be one hundred meters plus or minus ten meters, which you might not be concerned about, as opposed to one hundred meters plus or minus a kilometer or two, which you would be concerned about because you don’t have any idea what that is telling you.

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Campbell, John and T.S. Kelso. Examining Codes and Rules for Space. Washington, D.C.: George C. Marshall Institute, June 26, 2007. [ 6 quotes ] [ page 18-19 ]

 

The Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, signed in 1975, already provides part of the legal foundation for an advanced verification arrangement. The convention makes states responsible for space objects that they launch, that they commission others to launch for them, or that are launched from their territory or facility, and it requires that states maintain a national registry of all such objects. The convention further requires that all states report to the UN Secretary General specific information from their national registry; notably, the time and location of launch as well as the orbital parameters and the general function of the object launched. Other agreements include more detailed launch notification and date- exchange obligations; most notably, a U.S.-Russian agreement to establish a Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC) and the multilateral Hague Code of Conduct (CoC). With an ambiguous definition of launching states and no compliance management provisions, the Registration Convention's central registry is far from complete. The United States has not been reporting the launch of intelligence-gathering satellites even though they are usually identified by amateur observers. The United States is not the only country that fails to take seriously its launch registry obligations, but it is the only major spacefaring member of the Hague CoC that currently does not submit the recommended prelaunch notifications to other member states. The United States should improve its own compliance and encourage others to do so by making access to U.S. space surveillance information contingent on compliance.

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Steinbruner, John D. and Nancy Gallagher. Reconsidering the Rules for Space Security. College Park, MD: Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM), 2008. [ 17 quotes ] [ page 75 ]

 

Although they come from a different perspective, tenants of space disarmament have adopted SSA as a major tool to enable a continuing peaceful use of space. This is based on the notion that information sharing and transparency constitute the basis of international trust. Sharing SSA capacities would work toward confidence-building.

The Henry L. Stimson Center is a Washington-based research center with an agenda to reduce threats to international stability. It supports the adoption of an international Code of conduct in space. Similar to the "Incidents at Sea Agreement" signed in 1972 by the U.S. and the USSR, it would organize for instance the sharing of information on launches and space maneuvers, in order to eliminate all risk that unexpected moves be mistaken for an hostile action or cause unwanted collisions. A degree of trust and non-aggression in outer space would allow nations to feel secure and give up the deployment of further military space means. A Code of conduct is less formal than a treaty and therefore easier to push through international bodies such as the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva.

The Stimson Center set up a group of international experts in 2006-2007 to draft a Code and now plans to present it to the government of different space-faring nations. SSA systems constitute an essential element in the functioning process of the "Code of Conduct for Responsible Space-Faring Nations", as it is currently drafted. It mentions "the responsibility of countries to enhance cooperation on Space Situational Awareness", in order to "develop and abide by rules of safe space operations and traffic management".

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Nardon, Laurence. Space Situational Awareness and International Policy. Paris, France: Institut Francais des Relations Internationales, October 2007. [ 4 quotes ] [ page 3 ]

 

Furthering and deepening efforts to improve debris mitigation and space surveillance, therefore, ought to be considered first steps by the international community in attempting to build norms for cooperative behaviour in space. Among possible near- and mid-term actions that could be considered by the United States and the international community are:[12]

i) Space users and observers could press the US Defense Department to move more rapidly to set clear processes and guidelines for its new SpaceTrack programme for sharing orbital data. Although interim guidelines have been put forward, it is unclear how the system may work in the future. Further, the DoD should reverse its trend toward applying restrictions on how approved users may publish/redistribute the data. The basic orbital elements that have been published by NASA for years are of little use to those wishing to target satellites; further, a determined attacker could find a way to do so without access to that data.

Finally, the new fee-paying system for more detailed data and analysis should not overly charge government and/or industry customers, as it is the newly emerging space powers in the developing world that would suffer most if fees are set too high.

ii) The United Nations and COPUOS should continue to encourage the development of improved space surveillance and tracking technologies and methodologies, in particular urging those countries with technical resources to focus attention on the issue.

iii) The emerging effort by the European Union to build coordinated capacity should be further encouraged and supported. However, it would make sense for the Europeans to consider tailoring their effort to fill current gaps in, and add new surveillance capabilities to, the US network rather than simply duplicating US capabilities.

iv) The international community, perhaps under the auspices of COPUOS, should consider the creation of an independent, multinational alternative to the US Space Surveillance Network (SSN) and SpaceTrack. The COPUOS Science and Technical subcommittee should be tasked to: determine which nations have surveillance assets that could be used; review models for networking current and future assets; and explore the technical feasibility of creating such a publicly available surveillance, tracking and data distributing network.

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Hitchens, Theresa. "Safeguarding Space: Building Cooperative Norms to Dampen Negative Trends." Disarmament Diplomacy. No. 81 (Winter 2005). [ 9 quotes ]