Current technologies are not sophisticated enough to allow satellite operators to rely on active defenses to protect their satellites.
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In order to conduct a reactive maneuver there are several things that need to be calculated: the amount of fuel available to the satellite, the amount of velocity change a satellite can impart over a short period of time, the velocity of the kill vehicle, the velocity change that the kill vehicle can impart to correct its intercept trajectory, and the ability of the seeker head to track the satellite. This is a scenario where the kill chain of events for the attacker moves much, much faster than the protection chain for the defender. The time it would take for an ASAT traveling at upwards of 9 kilometers per second to get from launch to a satellite at an approximate 1,000 km distance is measured in a handful of minutes. Satellites cannot maneuver on their own – human operators must determine the need for a maneuver, calculate the correct timing and direction of the engine thrust, and then command the burn. This is a process that usually takes days to weeks since the consequences of commanding a bad maneuver can be disastrous in terms of both wasted fuel and if the satellite is maneuvered into the path of another object. Detecting the ASAT launch, calculating its trajectory and speed, determining which satellite(s) are in range, alerting the operators who command the satellite, planning the maneuver burn, and commanding the burn would take far too long. Weeden, Brian. "How China "Wins" a Potential Space War." China Security. Vol. 4, No. 1 (Winter 2008): 134-147. [ 7 quotes ] [ page 136 ]
Even if one assumes that the entire decision chain for detecting, calculating, deciding and commanding the maneuver can be shrunk to zero, there is still the problem of getting those instructions to the satellite. Controllers utilize ground stations consisting of large antennas which transmit instructions up from the ground to the satellite and which allow for data to flow from the satellite. Generally, each satellite constellation has a dedicated ground station or set of ground stations from which it can receive commands, although some action to change this limitation with future generations of satellites is underway. An example of a ground station network can be seen above, which shows the network of GPS ground stations which transmit commands from controllers in Colorado Springs. Until a satellite flies over one of the ground stations with which it can communicate, it cannot receive any new orders from the controllers on the ground. So not only would the warning of an ASAT attack have to be disseminated to different command centers depending on which satellite(s) were threatened, there could be additional delays of many minutes to hours before the threatened satellite flies over one of the correct ground stations and the maneuver command can be sent. By then it would be a cloud of dust. Weeden, Brian. "How China "Wins" a Potential Space War." China Security. Vol. 4, No. 1 (Winter 2008): 134-147. [ 7 quotes ] [ page 137 ]
Almost all electro-optical (EO) intelligence gathering low Earth orbit satellites operate in what are known as sun-synchronous orbits (SSO). These orbits utilize the variations in the shape of the earth to keep the angle between the Sun, the satellite and the earth constant. More specifically, they operate in SSOs with repeating ground tracks – the satellites will overfly the same point on the earth after a set number of orbits. The end result of these two factors is that every time a SSO satellite overflies the same point on the ground it will be with the same sun angle and thus the same shadow length (correcting for seasonal effects). This is a very important feature for trying to collect information on how a ground scene changes over time and requires a very precise orbit with a specific inclination and altitude. Changing either one of those parameters to avoid flying over an ASAT means either more maneuvers to get back on the original ground track, and more fuel wasted, or a complete disruption of the data set. Weeden, Brian. "How China "Wins" a Potential Space War." China Security. Vol. 4, No. 1 (Winter 2008): 134-147. [ 7 quotes ] [ page 138 ]