As implied above, another factor that has affected the prospects of space's weaponization has been the extremely high costs involved. The root of this problem lies in the great expense of placing any objects into space, but it is exacerbated by the fact that orbiting objects are difficult to maintain and modernize, particularly if there are changes in technical capabilities and/or targeting information. But perhaps the most damaging factor in regard to cost is the fact that orbital physics require that any militarily significant constellation of interceptors placed in space must be deployed in considerable numbers, given the "absentee problem"--i.e., the fact that a harmful attack could be undertaken by an adversary at an "inconvenient" time in the orbit of any defensive system. ( More ... )

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Moltz, James Clay. "Protecting Safe Access to Space: Lessons from the First 50 Years of Space Security." Space Policy. Vol. 23 (November 2007): 199-205. [ 12 quotes ] [ page 203 ]

 

The cost of developing and procuring space mines is difficult to estimate. Among other things, this is because the space mines could vary substantially in terms of size and sophistication. Based on historical cost relationships between satellite weight and costs, however, and assuming average system complexity, a reasonable estimate is that space mines in the 10-100 kilogram class would cost an average of some $5–25 million to acquire. Assuming, consistent with the above discussion of SBI ASAT requirements, that the US military would want to be capable of targeting 10-100 enemy satellites, total acquisition costs for such a system would be projected to range from some $100–500 million for 10 space mines, to perhaps $500 million to $2 billion for 100 space mines. Development costs might account for as much as half of total acquisition costs in the case of a 10-satellite purchase, and 15 percent of those costs in the case of a 100-satellite buy.

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Kosiak, Steven M. Arming the Heavens: A Preliminary Assessment of the Potential Cost and Cost Effectiveness of Space-Based Weapons. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, October 31, 2007. [ 19 quotes ] [ page 61 ]

 

Under one of these options, CBO concluded that assuming the United States could develop and deploy an SBI capable of speeds of 4 km/sec, and North Korea and Iran were able to develop only relatively slow burning liquid fuel ICBMs, it would need a constellation consisting of 368 SBI to provide continuous coverage of potential ICBM launch sites in the two countries. This estimate was based on the assumption that the United States would always want to have at least two SBIs within range of those sites, to increase the likelihood that a successful intercept could be made (consistent with current Missile Defense Agency doctrine). These figures imply an "absentee ratio" of about 184-to-1. In other words, on average, each individual SBI would be on station within range of North Korean or Iranian launch sites only about 0.5 percent of the time. The other 99.5 percent of the time they would be out of position, either over the ocean of over other countries.

In the second option, CBO assumed that interceptor speed could be increased to 6 km/sec. In this case, the effective range of each SBI would grow and, as a result, the absentee ratio would decline. Specifically, the size of the required constellation would drop to 156 SBIs.10 According to CBO, however, developing this capability would require a "technological leap" in kill vehicle miniaturization.

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Kosiak, Steven M. Arming the Heavens: A Preliminary Assessment of the Potential Cost and Cost Effectiveness of Space-Based Weapons. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, October 31, 2007. [ 19 quotes ] [ page 11 ]

 

The wisdom and feasibility of acquiring and deploying one or more of these kinds of space-based weapons can only be determined through an analysis that takes into account a broad range of strategic, operational, technological, political, and financial considerations. Of all of these factors, historically, the area that has received the least attention has been the financial costs—specifically, the funding requirements—that would be associated with the acquisition and support of space-based weapons.

This is understandable to some extent. Weapon system cost estimates can only be as accurate as the quality of information available concerning the system's technical characteristics, overall system architecture and operational concept. In the case of space-based weapons, the quality of such information is typically poor. Moreover, estimating weapon system costs is notoriously difficult even in the case of relatively well-understood and mature technologies. In the case of space-based weapons, which in many instances would make use of technologies that are, at present, relatively immature and untested, the margin of error is likely to be far greater. On the other hand, an analysis of space weapons that does not consider the system's budgetary requirements is, at best, an incomplete one. At worst, such an analysis can provide a highly misleading picture of the system's potential cost-effectiveness.

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Kosiak, Steven M. Arming the Heavens: A Preliminary Assessment of the Potential Cost and Cost Effectiveness of Space-Based Weapons. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, October 31, 2007. [ 19 quotes ] [ page 2 ]