The global nature of the space services market complicates the ability of any one country to dominate outer space militarily. For example, the U.S. military currently relies on the services (bandwidth, imagery, telecommunications, etc) of some multinational space conglomerates that could also control satellites that provide the same services to U.S. adversaries. Technically, the U.S. may be able to disable enemy satellites but it may be politically restrained from doing so.
Keywords: Commercial Space Industry.
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There are many good economic reasons that explain why commercial space needs to be global in nature to survive in a competitive world. Primarily, it is the satellite's capability to connect to ground stations anywhere in the world and to transmit data and information globally (or, if not to all nations, to a vast majority of the world's populated areas). To make a profit on an investment that has high technological risk and very high up-front demands, a large market is essential. The additional cost of adding a new ground station is very small in comparison to the cost of the space system. Since satellites can have global coverage, having a global market becomes an attractive profit potential. It can be easily argued that many space services are "natural monopolies." That is, one large provider can have the ability to serve all customers much more inexpensively than multiple providers. Hertzfeld, Henry R. "Globalization, Commercial Space and Spacepower in the USA." Space Policy. Vol. 23 (2007): 210-220. [ 5 quotes ] [ page 212 ]
Today, just about everything has turned around. There is no technological race with another superpower. Nuclear technology, although still under strict controls, has spread across the world anyway. Space capabilities ranging from launch vehicles to satellites are likewise available to almost any nation with the money and inclination to purchase them. Space technical and manufacturing capability exists in just about every developed region of the world and nations are not dependent on the USA. The world economy has become far more interconnected and the importance of international trade in goods and services for the USA has grown from some 5% of GDP in the 1960s to about 20%. The issue that confronts US space policy in regard to economic and commercial spacepower is whether any policy that attempts to put the USA in a dominant economic role in space will be effective. The above discussion has amply illustrated that most such policies have backfired. They have encouraged other nations to invest in competitive systems so as to develop and maintain their own independent capabilities in space. Although worldwide competition in space infrastructure as well as in space-related products and services may have many benefits, it does severely limit the amount of control any one nation might have on very important dual-use technologies in space. Hertzfeld, Henry R. "Globalization, Commercial Space and Spacepower in the USA." Space Policy. Vol. 23 (2007): 210-220. [ 5 quotes ] [ page 220 ]
The problem of dealing with commercial non-governmental organizations gravely complicates this issue. With corporations the matter revolves less around the definition of a hostile act and more around the possible measures of retaliation those corporations could take. Suppose that the Iraqis establish contracts to purchase satellite imagery from, say, a major Canadian communications company. Suppose that when called upon to stop providing such imagery, that company refuses, citing its legal rights to continue to execute its contracts in the absence of international information embargoes. Suppose that the United States takes measures to blind the satellites of that company as they pass over Iraq. Suppose that the company retaliates by shutting down its communications systems in protest.[4] The disruption caused by these actions would reverberate throughout America's own military capabilities. Moreover, it would cause such an outcry in the American business community that the political leadership would almost certainly be forced to abandon the measures. The power of information means that those who obtain and disseminate it are themselves very powerful. Should they resist efforts to restrict the flow of information, it will be very difficult, in the real world, to coerce them to do so. All of which is to say that it may be extremely difficult to cut off completely the flow of information to a second-tier enemy even though we can easily destroy his own space assets quickly. There is no doubt that an attack on an adversary's space systems will seriously degrade his intelligence and his command and control capabilities, but it will not eliminate them. American logistics bases and other fixed assets within range of the enemy's strike systems will continue to be at risk. Even American ground forces that do not remain more or less continually in motion may be at risk from enemy systems using satellite still imagery an hour or more old to target them. Information operations in the real world are likely to be much less decisive than the most radical supporters of a revolution in military affairs would have us believe, even against second-tier enemies. Kagan, Frederick W. "Star Wars in Real Life: Political Limitations on Space Warfare." Parameters. (Autumn 1998): 112-20. [ 2 quotes ]
We will, almost certainly, be technically able to blind neutral space systems as they pass over a theater of operations, but we will probably be unable to do so politically. Worse still, apart from the difficulty of verifying whether neutrals are providing such information, we will probably have virtually no leverage with which to pressure them to stop selling intelligence to our adversaries even as we are fighting them. To understand the problem, we should cast the question of information operations in the paradigm of trade and commerce in time of war. From that standpoint it becomes clear that we will be unable politically to shut off the flow of information to the enemy. ( More ... ) Kagan, Frederick W. "Star Wars in Real Life: Political Limitations on Space Warfare." Parameters. (Autumn 1998): 112-20. [ 2 quotes ]