The global nature of the space services market complicates the ability of any one country to dominate outer space militarily. For example, the U.S. military currently relies on the services (bandwidth, imagery, telecommunications, etc) of some multinational space conglomerates that could also control satellites that provide the same services to U.S. adversaries. Technically, the U.S. may be able to disable enemy satellites but it may be politically restrained from doing so.
Keywords: Commercial Space Industry, Export Controls.
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There are many good economic reasons that explain why commercial space needs to be global in nature to survive in a competitive world. Primarily, it is the satellite's capability to connect to ground stations anywhere in the world and to transmit data and information globally (or, if not to all nations, to a vast majority of the world's populated areas). To make a profit on an investment that has high technological risk and very high up-front demands, a large market is essential. The additional cost of adding a new ground station is very small in comparison to the cost of the space system. Since satellites can have global coverage, having a global market becomes an attractive profit potential. It can be easily argued that many space services are "natural monopolies." That is, one large provider can have the ability to serve all customers much more inexpensively than multiple providers. Hertzfeld, Henry R. "Globalization, Commercial Space and Spacepower in the USA." Space Policy. Vol. 23 (2007): 210-220. [ 5 quotes ] [ page 212 ]
In the early years of space, the technological dominance of the USA permitted spacepower to be virtually a given, rivaled only by the competition with the USSR. Today the reality is that the USA, while still the leader in space expenditures, no longer dominates or controls developments in many space applications. Spacepower, as it might be measured by dominance in economic or commercial space activity, is broadly spread around the globe. There are only limited ways the USA can use commercial space for maintaining elements of control over the industry. One is to have the largest market share in any sector which encourages others who may want to compete to adopt compatible standards for interoperability. The other is to be the leader in developing new technology and to establish dominant control over particular markets by protecting that technology. Both methods are risky, expensive, and do not necessarily guarantee success. The only other way the USA can assert spacepower in the commercial sector is by using non-market (political, diplomatic, or military) actions to discourage or deny others access to commercial space. It is highly unlikely in today's world that such measures would be successful. Other nations have independent access to space and space assets. Many companies using space for commercial purposes are multinational enterprises, often with significant US corporate investments and components. And the US government itself depends not only on US commercial space goods and services, but also on foreign systems. Therefore, disrupting the fragile market and price system that is developing for space commercial assets would not be in the best interests of the United States. Hertzfeld, Henry R. "Globalization, Commercial Space and Spacepower in the USA." Space Policy. Vol. 23 (2007): 210-220. [ 5 quotes ] [ page 217 ]
Below, some examples are very briefly listed. The major issue for consideration in the context of spacepower, however, is that many actions taken by the government for very valid purposes that are unrelated to space may create conditions that negate the ability to carry out space policies as prescribed in Presidential Decisions. Alternatively they may create incentives for other nations or the companies in other nations to more aggressively develop systems in direct competition with US capabilities. Taken collectively, many of these actions may make any attempt at a US policy that emphasizes economic space- power very difficult, if not impossible, to carry out. And, looking historically, many of these non-space policies and actions may have created and sped-up the develop- ment of robust space capabilities in other nations. This, in turn, has weakened the economic leadership of the USA in space and diluted its power in space systems develop- ment as well as in the technology and use of space applications. The long delayed decision to allow higher resolution images from earth observations satellites to be released for civil and commercial purposes: By the early 1990s, until when there was a restriction on releasing imagery with a resolution less than 10 m and on permitting private US companies from collecting or selling such imagery, France had begun selling it on the open market, as had Russia. Again, as in the above examples, nations with aggressive economic and industry space policies were able to capture market share from US companies hindered by policies designed for security, not commercial, purposes. The imposition of very strict export controls on space systems and high technology products. Both the US and foreign industry as well as foreign governments have bitterly complained about the very strict enforcement of export control laws since the late 1990s. It is increasingly difficult to share R&D information, to sell US space goods and services abroad, and to cooperate with foreign nations, even on government projects. The hardest hit space industry has been US satellite manufacturing, where foreign competitors have built and are selling equipment worldwide at the expense of a market that formerly was controlled and dominated by the US firms. Sunset provisions on indemnification of space third-party liability. Although perhaps less economically disadvan- tageous to the USA in providing competition in launch services, most foreign launch companies fully indemnify their domestic industry from the unlikely, but possibly nations were given the incentive to develop independent capabilities. And, with the ensuing maturation of launch and satellite technologies, they were able to build very competitive and capable equipment without US compo- nents or assistance. The decision not to authorize launches of foreign operational telecommunications satellites on US launch vehicles. Again, as with other similar restrictive policies, nations were given the incentive to develop independent capabilities. And, with the ensuing maturation of launch and satellite technologies, they were able to build very competitive and capable equipment without US compo- nents or assistance. The decision to retain the governance of the GPS system in the DoD. Even though the GPS system was funded, designed, built and operated by the DoD, the latter had provided an unencrypted free signal for worldwide use as part of the program. Use of this signal has grown into a multi-billion dollar industry very quickly. Receivers are manufactured in many nations, and today the system has become one of the very important infra- structure services offered from space. It is important now to both the military and to civilian communications and timing systems. From the mid-1990s to today, it is the only fully operational space navigation system. That is about to change as Europe, Russia, and possibly China develop their own system. Nobody questions the integrity or value of the US GPS system but, partially because it is controlled by the DoD without any inputs from other nations, there are incentives to invest billions of dollars abroad to duplicate the capability. Again, from a military point of view, not giving up any control of a very critical technology is understandable, but from a practical and economic perspective, the USA could probably have maintained a monopoly position, or at least greatly stalled foreign developments, if the government had been able to compromise on this policy. Hertzfeld, Henry R. "Globalization, Commercial Space and Spacepower in the USA." Space Policy. Vol. 23 (2007): 210-220. [ 5 quotes ] [ page 218-220 ]
Today, just about everything has turned around. There is no technological race with another superpower. Nuclear technology, although still under strict controls, has spread across the world anyway. Space capabilities ranging from launch vehicles to satellites are likewise available to almost any nation with the money and inclination to purchase them. Space technical and manufacturing capability exists in just about every developed region of the world and nations are not dependent on the USA. The world economy has become far more interconnected and the importance of international trade in goods and services for the USA has grown from some 5% of GDP in the 1960s to about 20%. The issue that confronts US space policy in regard to economic and commercial spacepower is whether any policy that attempts to put the USA in a dominant economic role in space will be effective. The above discussion has amply illustrated that most such policies have backfired. They have encouraged other nations to invest in competitive systems so as to develop and maintain their own independent capabilities in space. Although worldwide competition in space infrastructure as well as in space-related products and services may have many benefits, it does severely limit the amount of control any one nation might have on very important dual-use technologies in space. Hertzfeld, Henry R. "Globalization, Commercial Space and Spacepower in the USA." Space Policy. Vol. 23 (2007): 210-220. [ 5 quotes ] [ page 220 ]
The problem of dealing with commercial non-governmental organizations gravely complicates this issue. With corporations the matter revolves less around the definition of a hostile act and more around the possible measures of retaliation those corporations could take. Suppose that the Iraqis establish contracts to purchase satellite imagery from, say, a major Canadian communications company. Suppose that when called upon to stop providing such imagery, that company refuses, citing its legal rights to continue to execute its contracts in the absence of international information embargoes. Suppose that the United States takes measures to blind the satellites of that company as they pass over Iraq. Suppose that the company retaliates by shutting down its communications systems in protest.[4] The disruption caused by these actions would reverberate throughout America's own military capabilities. Moreover, it would cause such an outcry in the American business community that the political leadership would almost certainly be forced to abandon the measures. The power of information means that those who obtain and disseminate it are themselves very powerful. Should they resist efforts to restrict the flow of information, it will be very difficult, in the real world, to coerce them to do so. All of which is to say that it may be extremely difficult to cut off completely the flow of information to a second-tier enemy even though we can easily destroy his own space assets quickly. There is no doubt that an attack on an adversary's space systems will seriously degrade his intelligence and his command and control capabilities, but it will not eliminate them. American logistics bases and other fixed assets within range of the enemy's strike systems will continue to be at risk. Even American ground forces that do not remain more or less continually in motion may be at risk from enemy systems using satellite still imagery an hour or more old to target them. Information operations in the real world are likely to be much less decisive than the most radical supporters of a revolution in military affairs would have us believe, even against second-tier enemies. Kagan, Frederick W. "Star Wars in Real Life: Political Limitations on Space Warfare." Parameters. (Autumn 1998): 112-20. [ 2 quotes ]
We will, almost certainly, be technically able to blind neutral space systems as they pass over a theater of operations, but we will probably be unable to do so politically. Worse still, apart from the difficulty of verifying whether neutrals are providing such information, we will probably have virtually no leverage with which to pressure them to stop selling intelligence to our adversaries even as we are fighting them. To understand the problem, we should cast the question of information operations in the paradigm of trade and commerce in time of war. From that standpoint it becomes clear that we will be unable politically to shut off the flow of information to the enemy. ( More ... ) Kagan, Frederick W. "Star Wars in Real Life: Political Limitations on Space Warfare." Parameters. (Autumn 1998): 112-20. [ 2 quotes ]