History shows that the weaker party will not challenge the dominant player in a medium on the same terms but will employ assymetric methods (stealth, surprise, and varying tempo) to defeat its adversary.
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Moreover, it is quite possible that if a potential enemy did want to develop the ability to attack U.S. space systems, it would choose to do so in ways—such as investing in ground-based ASAT lasers or computer network attack capabilities—that would not involve weaponizing space, and against which the logical defensive countermeasures would not involve placing U.S. weapons in orbit either. ( More ... ) Mueller, Karl P. "Is the Weaponization of Space Inevitable?." . (March 27, 2002). [ 3 quotes ] [ page 11-12 ]
Due to issues of space debris, the lack of reliable anti-satellite technology and negative world opinion, destruction of satellites will probably be used as a last resort during any foreseeable conflict. Therefore, an adversary may choose an economic Course of Action (COA) to lower the overall supply of available capability. For example, if competition from the fiber optic cable market forced SATCOM revenues to fall to a point where providers needed to increase cash flow, they may choose to sell “contracts” for the future use of today's limited bandwidth. If this contract came with a “first right of refusal” clause, the purchaser could deny potential customer the opportunity to use the selected bandwidth during the option period. This option would allow an adversary to decrease the supply of available SATCOM capabilities on the open market during surge operations and potentially hold the US hostage by dictating the “terms of use” of the bandwidth. ( More ... ) Adkins, Larry D. "Space Superiority: Does the US Really Have It?." High Frontier Journal. Vol. 1, No. 3 (Winter 2005): 13-16. [ 2 quotes ] [ page 13 ]
The conventional wisdom appears to be that Russia and China are essentially impotent, and their disapproval irrelevant, which is not accurate. Even if neither they nor any other state is likely to engage the US in an arms race today, they have other options. Professor Robert A. Pape of the University of Chicago recently wrote in the journal International Security about “soft balancing.” Where traditional “hard balancing” in balance of power politics centered on the use or threatened use of military force to counter the power of a threatening state, “soft balancing” involves the use of nonmilitary tools to delay, frustrate, and undermine moves by a state seen as aggressive. The denial of United Nations Security Council approval for the invasion of Iraq by France, Russia, and China, and the refusal of Saudi Arabia and Turkey to provide US forces complete access to their territory, are examples of such soft balancing against the United States prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. ( More ... ) Elhefnawy, Nader. "The National Space Policy and space arms control." The Space Review. November 27, 2006.
The proper way to respond to an adversary's determined space denial counterstrategy is with a space superiority counterstrategy of one's own, not constrained by the "known rules," and involving the full spectrum of warfighting capabilities. It is not possible to precisely describe that strategy. Much will depend on the nature of the threat and the context of operational-level activities. But its characteristics should be familiar, sharing much in common with historical superiority counterstrategies. Is the US properly postured today to develop and execute such a space superiority strategy in the face of a determined adversary? Space power analyst Stephen Lambakis argues that the "United States is secure in space by default, not because there is a deliberate policy framework and well-resourced, organized, and strategically guided military force to guard national space interests". In a sense, the current US approach to space superiority resembles the strategic setting at the start of the air war in Southeast Asia. There is a basic understanding that controlling and exploiting the medium in question is important. An integrated approach to defeating space denial efforts on par with the convoy system does not exist. Neither is there a universally recognized doctrinal and practical mandate for preservation of space superiority in the face of a denial threat. Shaw, John E. "On Cossacks, Subs, and SAMs: Defeating Challenges to U.S. Space Superiority." High Frontier Journal. (Winter 2005): 23. [ 6 quotes ] [ page 27 ]
How, then, might future space denial efforts conform to this characteristic of asymmetric and relatively cheap technologies? It seems they will not fit the current US space infrastructure mold: large, expensive spacecraft and launchers requiring long lead times from production to deployment. A 1998 study identified the most likely threats to be (1) direct ascent anti-satellite weapons (i.e. those launched from ground-mobile or even airborne platforms on small boosters), (2) low-power electromagnetic jammers or directed energy weapons enhanced by the proliferating technology of adaptive optics, and (3) information-based attacks, such as computer viruses constructed by "hackers" and inserted into vulnerable points in space command and control infrastructure. All of these methods fit the mold of "cheap and asymmetric threats," and, more frighteningly, are at or near commercial of-the-shelf status  even a direct ascent capability tested ten years ago on the Russian MiG-31 Foxhound is capable of being exported. Shaw, John E. "On Cossacks, Subs, and SAMs: Defeating Challenges to U.S. Space Superiority." High Frontier Journal. (Winter 2005): 23. [ 6 quotes ] [ page 25 ]
During the Vietnam War, the North Vietnamese had a major goal: deny America air superiority over Vietnam, and, in so doing, extract material, and, more importantly, political costs (such as downed aircrew turned POWs). The centerpiece of North Vietnam's strategy was a new and ambitious air defense system centered on the Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM). It was a new kind of weapon, based on advanced rocketry and guidance technology, developed in the late 1950s, and used in anger for the first time to down US U2 aircraft over the Soviet Union and Cuba in the early 1960s. Despite these foreshadowings, the SAM threat was not properly anticipated or prepared for in Vietnam: "between 1955 and 1965, the Air Force made no concentrated effort to develop a SAM countermeasure." Between January 1962 and January 1973, over 2300 US fixed wing aircraft fell victim to enemy anti-air efforts. The US soon began to find ways to counter the SAM threat at the tactical level. Anti-radiation missiles such as the Shrike and radar-jamming equipment like the ALQ-71 Electronic Countermeasures pod became available. Ironically, though, it was not until the end of the air war that the US finally overcame the air denial efforts of the North Vietnamese and achieved unopposed air superiority. Just two days before Operation LINEBACKER II ended, the North Vietnamese air defenses shut down, as they had exhausted their national supply of SAMs. Thus, this achievement of air superiority was "won" by a long and costly battle of attrition, not by triumph of superior strategy. Shaw, John E. "On Cossacks, Subs, and SAMs: Defeating Challenges to U.S. Space Superiority." High Frontier Journal. (Winter 2005): 23. [ 6 quotes ] [ page 24 ]
What needs to be done to put the US on the proper trajectory to anticipate and defeat future space denial counterstrategies? A reasonable starting point is to examine that body of thought that seeks to guide operational-level warfighting: Joint Doctrine. Unfortunately, it seems current US joint warfighting doctrine is not optimized to support the development and execution of an effective space superiority strategy. The central problem is that current Joint Doctrine tends to focus on space and the advantages it yields as a logistical support concern to be managed, rather than a medium to be mastered. To be fair, there is some attention in Joint Doctrine documents of the importance of gaining and maintaining space superiority, but these are clearly isolated and minority instances. For example, in the only Joint Publication (JP) devoted to space, JP 3-14, the word "support" appears in the primary text over 200 times, while "superiority" appears only 6 times. Failing to place paramount importance on maintaining superiority within a medium in the face of a denial threat―as demonstrated in the historical campaigns discussed above--carries with it a price. To address this concern, Joint Doctrine must reflect the paramount imperative to gain and maintain space superiority in any Joint campaign, as necessary a condition to victory as gaining air or maritime superiority. In fact, in future conflicts it may very well not be possible to gain superiority within other mediums without first achieving it in space. Ensuring such superiority is the sine qua non for realizing the increasingly critical contributions space capabilities make in modern warfare. Shaw, John E. "On Cossacks, Subs, and SAMs: Defeating Challenges to U.S. Space Superiority." High Frontier Journal. (Winter 2005): 23. [ 6 quotes ] [ page 27 ]
One obvious but important observation about those powers that seek to maintain superiority over a medium is that their means to do so are overt, obvious, and continuous: Napoleon's armies, the Allies? WWII fleets and convoys, and the US air presence in Vietnam all fit this description. Accordingly, the means employed to deny superiority uniformly take on alternative characteristics: stealth, surprise, and varying tempo of operations. Russian armies proved ever elusive to Napoleon, evading battle, striking with Cossack raids on flanks and the rear, and doing so quickly. Even more decisively, German U-boats attacked targets without warning, and at high tempo, often escaping the scene of attack before their torpedoes even struck. North Vietnamese SAM and anti-aircraft batteries relied often on ambush methods to achieve success, as a founder of the Naval Fighter Weapons School noted: "They had timed us so many times on our bombing runs that they knew how long we were going to be there, and when we were going out." SAM sites, including radars and launchers, were highly mobile, and could relocate in under four hours. Shaw, John E. "On Cossacks, Subs, and SAMs: Defeating Challenges to U.S. Space Superiority." High Frontier Journal. (Winter 2005): 23. [ 6 quotes ] [ page 24 ]
Even if the United States decided to introduce weapons in space, Russia would be unlikely to follow. Its experience with anti-satellite programs is discouraging—the capabilities of the Soviet system were very limited and if used would have had virtually no impact on the ability of the United States to op- erate its own space-based systems. With the increase in U.S. capabilities in space, a system of the kind that the Soviet Union had in the 1970s would be even less useful today. Among other factors that would make development of space-related weapons systems less likely are the very high cost of such sys- tems and the lack of a proper organizational structure to support a development project in this area. It is more likely that Russia would turn to a policy of "asymmetric response," planning measures to counter the systems developed by the United States should they present a threat to Russia's space assets. This policy would be relatively easy to implement, for, as already noted, Russia's limited reliance on space systems does not make its armed forces overly susceptible to an attack on space assets. Zhang, Hui and Pavel Podvig. Russian and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space. Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2008. [ 16 quotes ] [ page 28-9 ]