Some have argued that existing U.S. missile defense systems have already weaponized outer space because these systems can target satellites much easier than they can target missiles. However, this argument fails to consider the differences in attacking satellites and the limitations of existing missile defense methods.
Keywords: Anti-Satellite Weapon (ASAT), Missile Defense.
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The US Air Force also recently began studying the possibility of utilizing the YAL-1A Airborne Laser for missions other than missile defense. The Airborne Laser (or ABL) is mounted in a modified 747-400F aircraft and uses a powerful laser to intercept ballistic missiles hundreds of miles away. It could theoretically be pointed up instead of sideways, and destroy a satellite, probably simply by overheating it so that its electronics fail. There are several operational advantages of this. One is that it does not create debris in orbit, just a dead satellite - although unlike the CCS, this is not reversible. Another advantage is that the weapon is paid for and operating for another mission,so any ASAT capability would be a bonus. However, ABL has run into numerous development problems of its own and has risked cancellation in recent years. If its missile defense mission is canceled, its ASAT mission would probably not justify the cost of operating the aircraft. Day, Dwayne. "Blunt Arrows: the Limited Utility of ASATs." The Space Review. June 6, 2005.
The embryonic US “National Missile Defense” (NMD) system will give the US an unfairly asymmetric and destabilizing military advantage by threatening low-orbit satellites. References to the “latent antisatellite capability” of the embryonic US anti-missile system in Alaska are somewhat disingenuous since Russia has a deployed anti-missile system with launchers around Moscow and in Kazakhstan, with much the same capability and nobody seems to complain. Most discussions leave the impression the Russian system simply doesn’t exist. Furthermore, range and tracking systems and warhead lifetimes restrict anti-missile systems to very low satellites, if any. Oberg, James. "The Dozen Space Weapons Myths." The Space Review. March 17, 2007.
Equating a boost-phase anti-missile weapon (based at sea, on an aircraft, or even in space) to an anti-satellite weapon overlooks a fundamental design difference, their guidance mode. To kill a missile during ascent, before it has a chance to deploy its warheads and decoys, relies on chasing down its most visible feature: its hot rocket plume. Russian and US space tests have observed such rocket plumes for decades: there were tests from the Mir space station, and from at least one Space Shuttle mission, and there are ongoing tests from new satellite projects. Their purpose isn’t just to develop a kill vehicle, but also to examine how an opponent might do so, and thus what features of one’s own missiles might be modified to make them more survivable. But these experiments shouldn’t deflect attention from one key fact: satellites don’t have hot rocket plumes, and sensors developed to chase such plume generators (i.e., attacking missiles) wouldn’t even see a passively orbiting satellite. It can’t be a target if it’s invisible to the weapon system under development. Oberg, James. "The Dozen Space Weapons Myths." The Space Review. March 17, 2007.