However, as indicated, much of China's interest in space seems to stem
directly from concerns about American military activities in space.
According to the Nuclear Threat Initiative, China's worries
about protecting its space-based assets are due to concern about
American development of missile defences and future American global dominance as a result of American space power. ( More ... )

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Hitchens, Theresa. "Monsters and Shadows: Left Unchecked, American Fears Regarding Threats to Space Assets Will Drive Weaponization." Disarmament Forum. No. 1 (2003): 15-33. [ 5 quotes ] [ page 25 ]

 

For example, in 2000 the PRC Defense Minister said that space-power is
viewed as the key to China's planning to supplant the United States.
PLA doctrine would deny the advantages of space to the US, seeking to
leverage space for China's own advantage. This is in direct
confrontation with the recently released Rumsfeld Commission report
characterizing space as a "vital national interest" for the United
States. ( More ... )

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Thompson, David J. China in Space: Civillian and Military Developments. Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF Air University, August 2001. [ 4 quotes ] [ page 10 ]

 

Chinese strategists recognize the potential importance of ASAT weapons as a tool of asymmetrical warfare and Chinese scientists are pursuing research with potential ASAT applications. China's existing civilian and military space programs also provide a base of capabilities that could potentially be applied to the development of ASAT weapons. Although open source information clearly indicates Chinese interest and scientific research in ASAT weapons and technologies, the available evidence is insufficient to determine if China has an active program to develop and deploy ASAT weapons. ( More ... )

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Deters, Angela, Jing-dong Yuan et al. China's Space Capabilities and the Strategic Logic of Anti-Satellite Weapons. Monterey, CA: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, July 22, 2002. [ 5 quotes ]

 

Chinese attention to future space warfare has also been driven by such considerations as potential conflict over Taiwan and U.S. plans to deploy missile defense. These developments have not only strained Sino-U.S. relations, but also led China to view itself as the target of U.S. defense strategies. People's Liberation Army (PLA) analysts are aware of U.S. preparations for possible future space warfare against China. A 2001 war game held by U.S. Space Command pitted U.S. forces against an opponent threatening a small neighbor (i.e., China threatening Taiwan) and focused on the use of space assets by the two main countries. The war game's significance was not lost on Chinese commentators. As the United States intensifies efforts to deploy missile defenses, China's military planners are increasingly concerned about how missile defenses might affect their ability to deter unwanted U.S. actions, especially with regards to Taiwan. ( More ... )

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Deters, Angela, Jing-dong Yuan et al. China's Space Capabilities and the Strategic Logic of Anti-Satellite Weapons. Monterey, CA: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, July 22, 2002. [ 5 quotes ]

 

On October 15, 2003, China became only the third nation to send a man into space. Astronaut Lieutenant Colonel Lang Liwei’s 21-hour orbit made him an instant hero in China and reaffirmed Beijing’s commitment to modernize the PLA. Observant during the Cold War, Desert Storm, Allied Force, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom, Chinese leaders saw the effect of space support to air, land, and sea operations. They witnessed the value of space enhancement across everything from basic command and control to intelligence gathering to weapon accuracy. In a few instances, they have even begun to capitalize on this recognition. ( More ... )

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Meteyer, David O. The Art of Peace: Dissuading China from Developing Counter-Space Weapons. USAF Academy, CO: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, August 2005. [ 20 quotes ] [ page 34-5 ]

 

Finally, to focus only on the impact on the future security in space by this ASAT weapon test would be to miss the larger strategic undercurrent that it represents. While its purpose may have been only a specific challenge to U.S. intentions to dominate space, China has lucidly demonstrated a willingness to challenge U.S. policies and strategies that are inherently threatening to China. America's unipolar moment probably died with its decision to go into Iraq. Now, its ability to act without consideration of others' security interests is being challenged. The Chinese call this "hegemony" and they are now opposing it openly. As this article began, China was not challenging U.S. power in space; it was challenging the U.S. self-described right to dominate it. With America's vulnerability in space, this test is in fact the easier way to challenge the United States (to do so conventionally would be suicidal). If the United States continues to pursue its own strategic and security interests at the exclusion of China (or others), it should be prepared for more confrontation, especially if that impinges on China's core national interests. Conceding this is not about surrendering strategic ground to a potential or future adversary, it's about reaching accommodation and common ground that is not only equitable but inevitable.

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Hagt, Eric. "China's ASAT Test: Strategic Response." China Security. (Winter 2007): 31-51. [ 5 quotes ] [ page 44 ]

 

In the event of a future Sino-American conflict, it is likely China intends to exploit the vulnerability of US space systems. Two key factors motivate Beijing to develop, deploy, and employ counterspace capabilities. The first is the need to neutralize the overwhelming conventional military advantage America currently derives from its space assets. In particular, China fears that American technical dominance encourages Taiwanese defiance and emboldens the US to intervene militarily in a future crisis. Second, the Chinese desire to bolster the viability of their nuclear deterrent by securing the means to threaten a space-reliant US anti-ballistic missile (ABM) network. Both objectives are driving China to evolve its military doctrine and expand its technical ability to function against a high-tech, information-hungry enemy.

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France, Martin E.B. and Richard J. Adams. "The Chinese Threat to US Superiority." High Frontier Journal. Vol. 1, No. 3 (Winter 2005): 17-22. [ 12 quotes ] [ page 18 ]

 

It seems paradoxical that a system, which is too inaccurate to be used for guiding conventional munitions, could be used to improve the accuracy of strategic weapons. It turns out that is exactly the case. This paper discusses two possible methods the Chinese Beidou constellation of navigational satellites could possible use to improve the accuracy of ICBMs to substantially better than 1 km. One method, using a velocity measurement to determine the shutoff point for the main engines, turns out to be impractical. A second method, of guiding a post-boost vehicle or bus, could improve the accuracy of Chinese ICBMs to better than .5 km as well as give China a MIRV (Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle) capacity.

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Forden, Geoffrey. "China's Satellite-Based Navigation System: Implications for Conventional and Strategic Forces." MIT Breakthroughs. XIII, No. 1 (Spring 2004): 8-13. [ 1 reference ] [ page 24 ]

 

Concerns about arms races in space should be taken seriously, but there is no arms-control solution. China is pursuing counterspace programs not in protest against the George W. Bush administration's space policies but as part of a considered strategy designed to counter the overall military capability of the United States. The weapons that China seeks to blunt are not space based; they are instead U.S. naval and air forces that operate in China's vicinity. What is in space are the sensory organs, which find and fix targets for these forces, and the nervous system, which connects all the combatant elements and permits them to operate cohesively. There is simply no feasible way to ban or control the use of space for such purposes. Beijing's diplomats, who repeatedly call for negotiations to assure the peaceful use of space, clearly understand this. And the Chinese military appreciates better than most that its best chance of countering the massive conventional superiority of the United States lies in being able to attack the relatively vulnerable eyes, ears, and voice of American power. Consequently, Beijing will continue to systematically pursue a variety of space-denial programs, even as it persists in issuing clarion calls for the demilitarization of space.

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Tellis, Ashley J. Punching the U.S. Military's "Soft Ribs": China's Anti-Satellite Weapon Test in Strategic Perspective. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2007. [ 15 quotes ] [ page 1-2 ]

 

Many arms-control specialists believe that China’s counterspace programs are driven primarily by its desire to accumulate bargaining chips that could be traded for an eventual ban on space weapons. In reality, however, Beijing’s investments in space denial technology are driven by strategic concerns that have little to do with arms-limitation agreements of any kind. In the near term, China is heavily focused on developing all possible means of defeating the superior U.S. conventional forces it expects to encounter in any war over Taiwan. And over the longer term, China is seeking to prepare for a prospective geopolitical rivalry with the United States. To achieve these goals, China must be able to exercise sufficient control over its land and sea borders to prevent U.S. forces from mounting attacks on the Chinese heartland from them. It must also be able to protect its nuclear deterrent from being neutralized by U.S. theater and national missile defenses. And it must be able to construct a sufficiently secure regional system within which it can shape the political choices of its major neighbors and prevent any local adversaries from challenging it under the cover of American protection.

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Tellis, Ashley J. Punching the U.S. Military's "Soft Ribs": China's Anti-Satellite Weapon Test in Strategic Perspective. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2007. [ 15 quotes ] [ page 2 ]

 

The near-term objective of preventing what Beijing would call Taiwanese secession from the mainland—and defeating any U.S. expeditionary forces that may be committed in support -- remains the dominant consideration for China's military modernization. The resulting capabilities would then become the nucleus for servicing more ambitious geostrategic aims as the country's economic strength increases over time. For the moment, both objectives converge admirably in that they require Beijing to develop all the capabilities required to prevent superior U.S. forces from being able to enter the relevant theater of operations and, if that goal should prove unsuccessful, deny them the freedom to operate. Whether the theater of action is the limited geographic area around Taiwan or a wider expanse like the western Pacific, the tasks facing the Peoples' Liberation Army (PLA) therefore remain the same in the short to medium terms: It must be able to successfully prosecute antiaccess and battle-spacedenial operations against all threatening American military forces.

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Tellis, Ashley J. Punching the U.S. Military's "Soft Ribs": China's Anti-Satellite Weapon Test in Strategic Perspective. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2007. [ 15 quotes ] [ page 2 ]

 

The implications of this logic devastate the hopes of arms-control theorists who believe that Chinese counterspace investments are primarily bargaining chips aimed at creating a peaceful space regime. In fact, they are just the opposite; they represent China's best hope for prevailing against the superior conventional military power deployed by the United States. For China to give up its emerging counterspace capabilities -- whether through unilateral abnegation or a negotiated arrangement -- would be to condemn its armed forces to inevitable defeat in any encounter with American power. This would mean, among other things, to risk the "loss" of Taiwan with all its attendant consequences for the unity of China and the survival of its Communist leadership. It would be equally unthinkable for Chinese leaders to abandon their efforts to stave off American forward-operating forces in the western Pacific or to allow the Chinese nuclear deterrent to be neutralized by emerging U.S. strategic defenses. Because these goals -- which are relatively conservative from Beijing's point of view -- are so critical to China as a rising power, it cannot be expected to trade away its counterspace capabilities for any arms-control regime that would have the effect of further accentuating the military advantages enjoyed by its competitors. ( More ... )

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Tellis, Ashley J. Punching the U.S. Military's "Soft Ribs": China's Anti-Satellite Weapon Test in Strategic Perspective. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2007. [ 15 quotes ] [ page 3 ]

 

First, because Chinese counterspace investments are deeply rooted in strategic necessity and not capricious state choices, the suggestion that President Bush ought to move urgently to guarantee the protection of American space assets by initiating an international agreement to ban the development, testing, and deployment of space weapons ought to be approached cautiously by his administration. Although well intentioned, such recommendations are illusory because China—its rhetoric notwithstanding—will not conclude any space-control agreement that eliminates the best chance it may have of asymmetrically defeating U.S. military power and thereby protecting its interests.

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Tellis, Ashley J. Punching the U.S. Military's "Soft Ribs": China's Anti-Satellite Weapon Test in Strategic Perspective. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2007. [ 15 quotes ] [ page 6 ]