China’s relative strategic isolation in relation to the United States is a further complicating factor for Beijing in calculating the vulnerability of its space capabilities. It is worth considering that during operations in Iraq, up to 77 percent of the communications bandwidth used by U.S. deployed forces was provided by commercial suppliers, a significant percentage of which were foreign. Thus, strategic allies will potentially be very important in the new global space environment. ( More ... )

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Hagt, Eric. "Mutually Assured Vulnerabilities." China Security. Vol. 1, No. 2 (2006): 84-106. [ 6 quotes ] [ page 91 ]

 

Despite this, China’s military presence in space is sporadic. It does not have a coherent military space architecture. If an effective military space program entails continuous coverage by intelligence collection satellites and a network of communications satellites, China has not made the effort. This absence in space is not the result of a lack of technological capability, but reflects a national decision about how to spend resources for space. ( More ... )

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Lewis, James A. "China as a Military Space Competitor." Perspectives on Space Security. Ed. Audrey M. Schaffer. Washington, D.C.: Space Policy Institute, December 2005. [ 8 quotes ] [ page 107 ]

 

China persists in underwriting America's instant-gratification lifestyle by exporting cheap consumer goods to the United States while financing a substantial part of the U.S. national debt by buying hundreds of billions of dollars of U.S. Treasury notes. On the other hand, China is regularly portrayed by U.S. hardliners as the next great threat. In its continuing enthusiasm for buying Treasury notes, China underwrites the further development of America's new high-tech way of war. This is distinctly odd behavior for a nation that is presumed to be preparing for a High Noon confrontation with the United States. China is intent on integrating itself into the global economic system- strange behavior indeed for a nation that is regularly depicted as a military threat to the United States and, by extension, the West. ( More ... )

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Moore, Mike. "A New Cold War?." SAIS Review. XXVI, No. 1 (Winter-Spring 2006): 175-188. [ 7 quotes ] [ page 184 ]

 

China's near-term military modernization efforts focus primarily on capabilities to provide an advantage in the advent of a conflict with Taiwan. If a conflict occurred, improvements to Chinese missiles would be most determinative regarding their potential success, though space-based reconnaissance capabilities would also be improtant force enhancers, especially towards keeping U.S. military assistance at bay. Currently, however, no indication exists that the Chinese have focused on integrating space capabilities into either their military doctrine or operation to try and achieve an asymmetric advantage. For now, it appears China's intentions focus on military modernizations and not being potentially shut out of the heavens by the U.S. or left unprepared for the deployment of U.S. space weapons, which the Chinese anticipate will occur. The Chinese are not interested in pursuing a spending race as the Soviets did in response to Star Wars. To the contrary, the Chinese are acutely aware of how that worked out for the Soviets and will not repeat that mistake. But the Chinese are clearly taking their cues from the United States in terms of future military space hardware development.

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Johnson-Freese, Joan. "A New US-Sino Space Relationship: Moving Toward Cooperation." Astropolitics. Vol. 4, No. 2 (Summer 2006): 131-158. [ 1 reference ] [ page 132 ]

 

If the Cold War space competition did not rise to the level of an arms race in some respects, there are strong reasons why the Chinese-U.S. competition can be even less intense. The Chinese leadership is smarter than the Soviet leadership. Beijing will not bankrupt itself in a military competition. Instead, the Chinese military will compete asymmetrically and cost-effectively. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) could employ temporary and reversible effects against U.S. satellites – the Pentagon's preference – or it could fight dirty, with kinetic energy weapons. Presumably one message of its crude A-Sat test was to clarify that, if push comes to shove, China will contest the Pentagon's objective of space control using weapons of its choosing.

Beijing's ambitions in space go well beyond this objective. China's space program is also intimately connected to its economic goals and status consciousness. Beijing's status has been damaged by creating an enduring hazard to space operations in low Earth orbit. Its economic ambitions also will be jeopardized if the Cold War taboo against destroying another nation's satellites is broken. The interconnectedness of the economic and military aspects of space power – another key difference from the Cold War – constitutes another reason why an arms race in space is unlikely.

The Pentagon also has learned important lessons from the Cold War. Back then, the United States had insufficient appreciation of the dangers of space debris. Now all stakeholders in space are keenly aware that debris constitutes an indiscriminate, lethal hazard. This is why the Chinese test was so irresponsible – and why Congress would further damage America's standing and security by emulating Chinese misbehavior.

Perhaps the most important reason why an arms race in space between the United States and China is unlikely is because a race is not required to mess up essential satellites. A single nuclear detonation can do extraordinary harm, as can a modest arsenal of old-fashioned kinetic energy weapons. Neither China nor the United States needs to race to mess up space.

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Katz-Hyman, Michael and Michael Krepon. "An Arms Race in Space Isn't the Problem." Space News. February 12, 2007.

 

Despite the need for an effective deterrent to meet security challenges that China may confront in space, it will not initiate a space weapons race with the United States or any other country. First, China does not have the ambition to enter a space weapons race. During the Cold War period, faced with a threat of nuclear war, China did not join in the nuclear weapons race between the United States and the Soviet Union. Today, China's space program is pointed in the direction of peaceful development. The new political and diplomatic doctrines – a harmonious society and world – also curb China's entrance to a space weapons race. Second, China does not have the ability to enter a space weapons race. Although China has ambitious plans in space, the technical gap, especially in the military area vis-à-vis the United States, is difficult if not impossible to fill. China will not and cannot expend significant budgetary resources pursuing space weapons, but will instead focus on civilian and commercial space assets. So, if China owns space weapons, their number and quality will be limited in their capacity to act as an effective defense mechanism and will not be a threat to other countries.

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Shixiu, Bao. "Deterrence Revisited: Outer Space." China Security. (Winter 2007): 2-11. [ 4 quotes ] [ page 10 ]

 

One space expert suggested that China may be using a competitive strategies approach against the United States. Space may become an "offensive dominant" arena. By demonstrating a relatively inexpensive response to U.S. space dominance, China may calculate that the United States will pursue costly options that divert resources from other areas. China could avoid an expensive arms race by minimizing reliance on space assets and developing a relatively inexpensive set of asymmetric capabilities. Conversely, other China experts suggested that China's dependence on space for military purposes is likely to increase dramatically over the next 5 to 10 years. Foregoing space capabilities would greatly limit China's ability to fight an "informationalized war." The shift toward more symmetrical U.S. and Chinese dependence on space may create opportunities for arms control or restraint in the development of space weapons.

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Lutes, Charles D. and Phillip C. Saunders. China's ASAT Test: Motivations and Implications. Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, June 2007. [ 10 quotes ] [ page 3 ]

 

In this way Tellis subtly, though assertively, leaps from ascribing to China a defensive posture to one that seeks to challenge and even rival US military power. The literature is not nearly so definitive. Such theorising of China's strategic intent is highly speculative. ...

In fact, China's strategic considerations toward the United States are influenced and constrained by factors beyond a direct militarily antagonistic relationship. They range from China's profound domestic development challenges; its precarious geopolitical relations with regional players; and its deep dependence on global commercial and energy markets. China also has a unique set of historical experiences (colonialism, foreign occupation, border wars) as well as the lessons learned from current events, not the least of which is the US quagmire in Iraq. These point to conditions for China and an international environment significantly different than were extant during the Cold War. ( More ... )

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Hagt, Eric. "China's Military Space Stategy: An Exchange -- "Mirror-imaging and Worst-case Scenarios"." Survival. Vol. 50, No.1 (February-March 2008): 157-198. [ 4 quotes ] [ page 165 ]

 

Even if one assumes that some form of challenge to US hegemony is inevitable, China has a growing kit of tools at its disposal to wield nonmilitary influence. China now has clout in financial, trade and even softpower terms, all of which could bring to bear considerable economic and political pressure on a potential adversary or strategic competitor. This is not to suggest China would forgo its military options in a conflict with the United States. But it should, at the very least, give pause to consider alternative strategic modalities by China. Tellis doesn’t mention any of these, much less figure them into China’s counterspace strategy.

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Hagt, Eric. "China's Military Space Stategy: An Exchange -- "Mirror-imaging and Worst-case Scenarios"." Survival. Vol. 50, No.1 (February-March 2008): 157-198. [ 4 quotes ] [ page 166 ]

 

History is history, but the situation is always changing. China’s leaders have asserted repeatedly that China is not superpower, nor will it ever become one. China does not seek hegemony or world dominance. In fact, China is sticking to peaceful development; concentrating efforts on economic construction and endeavouring to build a well-to-do society; pursuing a independent and peaceful foreign policy; and persevering in efforts to safeguard and promote a peaceful and stable international environment. China fights for and takes advantage of a stable international milieu for development and in turn promotes world peace and progress through that development. China does not and will not interfere in the internal affairs of or threaten other countries. China is not interested in challenging the United States’ space goals short of weaponisation or related capabilities that impinge on China’s core national interests. That is the real picture of China’s ambitions in the new century.

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Shixiu, Bao. "China's Military Space Stategy: An Exchange -- "Clearing up a Misunderstanding"." Survival. Vol. 50, No. 1 (February-March 2008): 157-198. [ 1 reference ] [ page 177 ]