While the issue of whether there is a threat to U.S. space assets is open to debate, the response would not be to develop anti-satellite weapons. U.S. anti-satellite weapons would not dissuade our adversaries from developing their own because the U.S. has the most to lose in outer space. It would be better for the U.S. to focus its space control strategy on improving passive defenses for its existing satellites and building redundancy into its space-dependent systems. Finally, the U.S. can always rely on conventional attacks against the ground-based components of threatening systems.
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The decision whether America can utilize its space assets to protect and advance its national interests must not be placed in the hands of our adversaries. The need to undertake serious preparations to preserve the right of US space systems to pass through and operate in space without interference is an imperative. America urgently needs to confront the impending challenge to the freedom of space. It would be extremely imprudent for the US to neglect to pursue a broad range of tactical, technical, and procedural approaches to enhancing the survivability and endurance of satellite systems. Given the strength of the offense in space, and America’s need to exploit the medium rather than simply deny an enemy its use, a mix of active and passive defense measures should be the approach to providing both the credible deterrent and warfighting capability necessary to protect our space assets. In general, such a mix will be more robust than relying upon either active or passive measures alone because of the synergy produced by a combination of offense and defense. The danger of pursuing such a course is less the risk of inciting an arms race than America creating an Achilles Heel because of the extent of its dependence upon space assets and an inadequate approach to their mission protection. Berkowitz, Marc J. "Protecting America's Freedom of Action in Space." High Frontier Journal. Vol. 3, No. 2 (March 2007): 13-18. [ 11 quotes ] [ page 17-8 ]
The United States, Russia and China have each developed and tested dedicated ASAT systems. But only Russia appears to currently possess a dedicated ASAT interceptor capability—a relatively primitive co-orbital system—and it is unclear whether this system is still active. However, many other countries posses a limited inherent ASAT capability, primarily in the form of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles that could be modified for ASAT use. If the country also has nuclear weapons its inherent ASAT capability would be significantly greater. As with ballistic missile defenses and prompt-strike systems, the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of ASAT weapons—whether space- or terrestrial-based—could be substantially, and perhaps dramatically, reduced through the use of various countermeasures. Possible ASAT countermeasures include satellite hardening and the use of decoys. On the other hand, some types of satellites might be difficult to protect. Taken together, these findings suggest that, even assuming the United States would benefit from the acquisition of a significant ASAT capability, there may be no need, at least for the foreseeable future, for the US military to develop and deploy space-based ASAT systems. Moreover, relying on its existing force of dedicated ground-based jammers and the inherent ASAT capabilities the US military currently possess, or is developing, in a variety of different terrestrial-based systems (rather than developing, testing and deploying dedicated space-based ASAT systems) might help minimize the visibility and provocativeness of the US military's ASAT capabilities. In turn, this could help prevent, or at least defer, an ASAT arms race that it would be very much in the interest of the United States to avoid—because of the unmatched size, effectiveness and cost of its network of satellites, and its greater dependence on those capabilities relative to potential adversaries. Kosiak, Steven M. Arming the Heavens: A Preliminary Assessment of the Potential Cost and Cost Effectiveness of Space-Based Weapons. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, October 31, 2007. [ 19 quotes ] [ page 88 ]