Despite the rhetoric and ambitious programs, the U.S. military space program has been plagued by mismanagement and budgetary obstacles that have impeded progress for decades.
Keywords: Funding for Space Weapons.
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The Congressional Budget Office estimates that current space acquisition efforts will cost between $10 billion and $14 billion a year by 2010. Congressional appropriators have stated clearly that the Pentagon must reduce its request for space systems. In the 2006 Defense Appropriations bill, Congress slashed funding for two of the Air Force's 'transformational' space acquisition efforts -- Space Radar and the Transformational Satellite System -- to emphasize this point. Congressional concerns have also led to the restructuring of a pair of classified spy satellite programs. Senator Wayne Allard, Republican-Colorado, a long-time supporter of military space programs, expressed the frustration of many members of Congress: "I strongly believe the continued mismanagement of our space acquisition programs is a far greater threat to our space dominance than any external danger." Lewis, Jeffrey, Michael Katz-Hyman et al. "U.S. Space Weapons: Big Intentions, Little Focus." Non Proliferation Review. Vol. 13, No. 1 (March 2006): 35-56. [ 5 quotes ] [ page 48-9 ]
Uncertain Requirements. A different kind of structural constraint arises from the unsettled character of the contemporary global security environment. Unlike the preceding structural issues, which reflected intrinsic features of the political, economic and technological landscape, the present uncertainty about future military and intelligence requirements is probably a temporary condition. During the Cold War, requirements changed relatively slowly, and usually in ways that could be anticipated well in advance of when new capabilities were needed. Today, however, there is great doubt among policymakers about the nature of future threats facing the nation, and efforts to construct a "capabilities-based" defense posture that can address diverse dangers have spawned more confusion than clarity. The reason this presents a challenge for the space sector is that new requirements -- or new ideas about requirements -- arise much faster than the space acquisition system is capable of responding. Unfortunately, there is no way of avoiding the resulting instability, because it reflects geopolitical trends at work in the global environment rather than management choices within the purview of policymakers. Thompson, Loren B. Can the Space Sector Meet Military Goals for Space?. Washington, D.C.: Lexington Institute, October 2005. [ 5 quotes ] [ page 24 ]
Some of the underlying causes to deficient performance in the space sector cannot be fixed. They are called structural issues here because they either reflect intrinsic characteristics of government and industry, or are circumstances that originate outside the sector in a manner that is beyond the capacity of policymakers to change. Intrinsic structural issues such as the fragmented nature of decisionmaking in a government of separated powers or the urge of industry to maximize returns will probably never change. They must simply be accepted as inescapable features of the space enterprise. Circumstantial structural issues such as doubts about future military requirements or uncertainties in the development of new technologies will gradually change with the passage of time, but not in a way that policymakers can fundamentally alter. One of the perennial mistakes that experts make in analyzing the space sector is to propose that such structural issues be corrected. They can't be. Exertions on the part of policymakers may magnify or mitigate the impact of structural factors, but they cannot make them go away. ( More ... ) Thompson, Loren B. Can the Space Sector Meet Military Goals for Space?. Washington, D.C.: Lexington Institute, October 2005. [ 5 quotes ] [ page 22-23 ]
In our view, this situation is unlikely to change in the near term. A space war fighting strategy faces a serious budgetary constraint -- compounded by the overall pressures on the DoD budget that have emerged over the last year -- that we believe will leave new military missions perennially vulnerable in the annual appropriations process to a variety of political and technical objections. Furthermore, ASATs, space-based missile defenses, and space-based strike weapons cannot be deployed without the completion of a very capable supporting infrastructure to provide command, control, and intelligence (C2I) functions. Yet, current programs to "recapitalize" current U.S. space and C2I capabilities are experiencing dramatic delays and cost overruns that threaten to consume the entire military space budget, leaving little money for new military missions in space. "Virtually every major space acquisition program," the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) has observed, "has experienced or sits dangerously close to a Nunn-McCurdy breach" -- a dramatic cost-growth requiring extraordinary intervention to save the program from cancellation. Lewis, Jeffrey, Michael Katz-Hyman et al. "U.S. Space Weapons: Big Intentions, Little Focus." Non Proliferation Review. Vol. 13, No. 1 (March 2006): 35-56. [ 5 quotes ] [ page 48 ]
Nearly all of the military space acquisition programs have experienced at least one Nunn-McCurdy Amendment violation—that is, cost overruns have exceeded the baseline cost by at least 15 percent. The SBIRS program to provide information for missile warning, missile defense, and battlespace characterization is the most egregious public example. Since its inception in 1994, the SBIRS-High program has experienced four Nunn-McCurdy breaches; projected cost has soared from $2 billion to $10 billion; the number of planned satellites have been reduced; its detection and data-processing technologies are no longer state-of-the-art; the launch date for the first GEO satellite has slipped until late 2009 or 2010; software and hardware problems persist; and a spacecraft with similar design features failed in testing. The first SBIRS sensor hosted by a classified satellite in highly elliptical orbit was declared operational in November 2006, but the United States must still primarily rely on Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites first launched in the 1970s to watch for missile launches. The last available DSP satellite was launched in November 2007, exacerbating concerns that U.S. missile warning capability could deteriorate if the SBIRS schedule continues to slip. Steinbruner, John D. and Nancy Gallagher. Reconsidering the Rules for Space Security. College Park, MD: Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM), 2008. [ 17 quotes ] [ page 49 ]
In general, the Bush administration has been trying to spend as much money as Congress will allow on acquiring new military space capabilities, with annual requests that continue to rise despite congressional pressure for cost reductions and reallocations. So far, however, increased spending has not been matched by comparable advances in capabilities. Growing budget scrutiny and cost constraints have stimulated debate about whether the United States should devote even more of its military space acquisition budget to completing Clinton-era upgrades or whether it should leapfrog over next-generation satellites and invest more heavily in research on transformational systems that are at least a decade from deployment. The more fundamental question is whether a sustained commitment to either the incremental or the revolutionary acquisition route could reasonably be expected to reach the full SPACECOM vision. The experience of the past five years suggests that no matter how hard the Bush administration or subsequent U.S. leaders try, the costs and technical challenges of—not to mention other countries’ probable military reactions to—unilateral space security will keep total dominance out of reach. Steinbruner, John D. and Nancy Gallagher. Reconsidering the Rules for Space Security. College Park, MD: Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM), 2008. [ 17 quotes ] [ page 54 ]
Like the SBIRS program, a number of major space acquisition programs fit a pattern in which DOD's rush to develop complex new weapons systems based on immature technology and inadequate knowledge has led to major cost overruns, quantity reductions, per unit cost increases, and performance shortfalls. Contrary to predictions that advanced information technology and the integration of satellites into a "system of systems" architecture would provide much greater capabilities at much lower costs, these technological trends and the post–September 11, 2001, surge in U.S. defense spending are increasing the costs and uncertainties associated with transformational military projects. The United States is the undisputed front-runner when it comes to military space spending, but the faster it runs, the more it seems to trip over its own feet. Steinbruner, John D. and Nancy Gallagher. Reconsidering the Rules for Space Security. College Park, MD: Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM), 2008. [ 17 quotes ] [ page 56 ]
The evident deficiencies of the military space acquisition process have deep roots. A 2003 Defense Science Board/Air Force Scientific Advisory Board report (the "Young Panel") identified serious systemic problems, including undisciplined definition of and uncontrolled growth in requirements, an acquisition process biased to produce unrealistically low cost estimates, an erosion of engineering and managerial competence among government overseers, and industry failure to follow best practices. The GAO observed that "DOD starts more programs than it can afford over the long run, forcing programs to underestimate costs and overpromise capabilities" in order to get funded each year. Senior defense officials do not want to make difficult choices among space programs or scale back the desired capabilities in response to budget shortfalls, so product developers "pursue exotic solutions and technologies that can, in theory, do it all"—a form of denial that perpetuates the problem. Steinbruner, John D. and Nancy Gallagher. Reconsidering the Rules for Space Security. College Park, MD: Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM), 2008. [ 17 quotes ] [ page 56 ]
Supporters of the SPACECOM program understand that massive cost over-runs and development delays are eroding congressional support for major projects that are integral to plans for U.S. military space dominance, defense transformation, and the coercive prevention strategy. Senator Wayne Allard told the National Defense Industrial Association that "the Air Force and its contractors have lost all credibility with Congress when it comes to space acquisition" and that "continued mismanagement of our space acquisition programs is a far greater threat to our space dominance than any external threat." But much as Allard and senior SPACECOM officials might like to believe that military space acquisition problems can be rectified by slowing the pace, relying more on proven technology, and reorganizing management, informed observers have come to believe that the factors driving the exorbitant costs of high-tech military acquisition in general, and space projects in particular, "have become so widespread and chronic that they threaten to undermine the viability of the entire transformation agenda." Simon "Pete" Worden, a retired senior Air Force officer with a long history of support for expanded U.S. military space activities, has observed that "the most compelling case against space weapons is that the U.S. space industry and associated military space leadership are incapable of delivering any space capability, let alone a space weapon." Steinbruner, John D. and Nancy Gallagher. Reconsidering the Rules for Space Security. College Park, MD: Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM), 2008. [ 17 quotes ] [ page 57 ]
The fixation on unilateral military space dominance contributes to military space acquisition problems in several ways. First, trying to revolutionize U.S. military space capabilities on an accelerated schedule in an atmosphere of radical uncertainty about future threats, missions, and technologies is bound to produce expensive programs that cannot provide all the promised results. Getting diverse parts of the U.S. military, intelligence, and homeland security communities to agree on required capabilities that should be designed into satellites that will not be deployed for a decade or more is difficult enough. Even more challenging is coordinating space acquisition projects with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies who recognize the benefits of interoperable communications and navigation systems but who lack SPACECOM's lavish acquisition budget and do not share its highly adversarial view of space security. Steinbruner, John D. and Nancy Gallagher. Reconsidering the Rules for Space Security. College Park, MD: Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM), 2008. [ 17 quotes ] [ page 58 ]
Finally, many senior political leaders who have embraced the SPACECOM vision lack the technical training to understand the scientific and engineering challenges involved. As one observer generally sympathetic to SPACECOM remarked: "During the Cold War, the performance requirements of key military systems were driven mainly by what was known about the dominant threat. In a "capabilities-based" planning environment, there is much more latitude for imagination. But if senior decisionmakers lack a grasp of technological realities, then the possibility of unexecutable requirements would exist even in an otherwise optimal acquisition system." From what can be discerned from available information, the magnitude of expenditure, the specific allocation to development projects, and the over- all management of the weapons acquisition process do not appear sufficient to overturn the traditional presumption that decisive dominance in space cannot be achieved. Steinbruner, John D. and Nancy Gallagher. Reconsidering the Rules for Space Security. College Park, MD: Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM), 2008. [ 17 quotes ] [ page 59 ]
"During the Cold War, the performance requirements of key military systems were driven mainly by what was known about the dominant threat. In a "capabilities-based" planning environment, there is much more latitude for imagination. But if senior decisionmakers lack a grasp of technological realities, then the possibility of unexecutable requirements would exist even in an otherwise optimal acquisition system."
Even if the military cannot learn many lessons about how to fix its space programs, there are a few lessons here for the rest of us. One lesson is that the military is not a good place to place your space bets. In the past few years people writing for The Space Review and elsewhere have proposed putting the military in charge of new large space weapons programs, or development programs like space solar power or suborbital transport. Given the military’s track record on its alphabet soup of programs—NPOESS, SBIRS, FIA, TSAT, MUOS, AEHF—why would anybody think that they could do a good job with SSP or an RLV tossed into the pot? A better long-term solution is to wait things out and hope that milspace gets its act together. A delayed start is far better than a prolonged and messy development. Day, Dwayne. "The Flying Spaghetti Monster: The American military space program in perpetual crisis." The Space Review. November 10, 2008.
The problem with milspace has been so bad for so long now that nobody seems to know what is the ultimate cause. The Air Force made a number of bad managerial decisions concerning its space programs back in the 1990s, such as outsourcing work and responsibility to the private sector. The service also lost a lot of institutional memory necessary for developing complex systems. The military has always had a problem with developing complex systems for various reasons, including its standard policy of rotating officers to new jobs after three years, meaning that few military officers ever stayed in the same space job long enough to acquire the requisite skills. The Air Force tried to counter this tendency by developing and maintaining The Aerospace Corporation in the 1960s, but made severe cutbacks at Aerospace after the Cold War that hurt its ability to provide the necessary support. Add to this a culture that primarily rewards fighter pilots with the top jobs and the service therefore ensured that space remained an unattractive career track for its officer corps. There’s also another problem: requirements creep. Both FIA and SBIRS were put in a downward spiral as new requirements were added to them during their lengthy developments. One DoD official has said that no system could satisfy FIA’s requirements. NASA is far more immune to this danger. There are practical and cultural reasons why requirements get added to military space programs, including the fact that threats change and prompt new requirements. But military space also reminds one of an old soldier’s saying—“nothing is too good for our boys in the service… and that’s exactly what we’ll give them.” Nobody will deny “the warfighter” anything he asks for, even if it is impossible. Day, Dwayne. "The Flying Spaghetti Monster: The American military space program in perpetual crisis." The Space Review. November 10, 2008.
The deleterious results of a broken acquisition system are apparent throughout the space sector. The Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS)-High and the Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) are two cases in point. While both are key parts of the missile defense system to be deployed by the United States, they have had to be restructured because of large cost overruns, schedule delays, and technical problems. For example, SBIRS-High, which is replacing the Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites and will provide rapid early warning and ballistic missile trajectory data, is now projected to cost approximately $10 billion, well over twice the amount of earlier estimates.28 Cost increases in excess of 25 percent during the last quarter of FY 2005 forced the Pentagon to recertify the program in December 2005. For FY 2009, DoD requested $2.3 billion for the program, though the Air Force is currently exploring a potential alternative or early replacement for SBIRS-High called 3GIRS. Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. Missile Defense, the Space Relationship and the Twenty-First Century. Washington, D.C.: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 2009. [ 10 quotes ] [ page 43 ]