A strong Chinese economy remains elusive. Well-publicized rocket failures make marketing of its commercial launch capability difficult. The Chinese have the ability to overcome their technical difficulties, but economics will limit China as a space power until the domestic economy can provide greater levels of government and commercial funding. ( More ... )

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Oberg, James. Space Power Theory. Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF Air University, 2001. [ 5 quotes ] [ page 64 ]

 

Despite numerous indications that China is interested in developing ASAT weapons and significant overall improvements in China's space program over the last two decades, China still lacks a number of capabilities that would be required for a viable ASAT program. These limitations include:

• Limited tracking capabilities. China continues to rely heavily on shared and leased space tracking facilities, which might not be available in the event of a conflict. Despite a domestic network, two foreign sites, and four tracking ships, the Chinese tracking system does not have a global reach.


• Limited launch capabilities. Although its launch capabilities have been improving, China still lacks the launch on-demand capability required for space warfare and for an effective ASAT system.


• Vulnerable infrastructure. China's immobile launch facilities, tracking facilities, space infrastructure, and possible ground-based laser sites would all be vulnerable to attack.

( More ... )

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Deters, Angela, Jing-dong Yuan et al. China's Space Capabilities and the Strategic Logic of Anti-Satellite Weapons. Monterey, CA: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, July 22, 2002. [ 5 quotes ]

 

The major and crucial difference, however, is the on-orbit presence. China does not have a continuous military space presence equal even to what the Soviet or the U.S. were able to muster in the 1960s. In the last decade, the number of Chinese launches has totaled only about twelve percent of U.S. launches. In any given period, the Chinese operate no more than 6-10 satellites with most being communications (or navigation) rather than sensor platforms. The operational life of Chinese satellites, which press reports state is considerably shorter than those of comparable U.S. satellites, also reduce China’s onorbit military presence. While China’s announced goal is to create a multi-satellite system for continuous operation, they have not committed the resources to achieve this. ( More ... )

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Lewis, James A. "China as a Military Space Competitor." Perspectives on Space Security. Ed. Audrey M. Schaffer. Washington, D.C.: Space Policy Institute, December 2005. [ 8 quotes ] [ page 95 ]

 

Chinese and Indian space progress has historically been linked to missile development efforts. As for the Chinese, they have "long aspired to be a space power" says Dean Cheng, an Asian specialist at the Center for Naval Analysis, yet he estimates the Chinese space budget to be only $1.5 billion to $2 billion annually. The recent launch of the Shenzhou, a manned mission to orbit the earth, has energized the Chinese space program. It is arguable whether or not the Shenzhou, very closely resembling a Soyuz capsule, was a significant Chinese scientific achievement as it drew immensely upon Russian design assistance but it can be said that manned space flight is definitely a sign of priorities in the Chinese government. However, the Monterey Institute of International Studies notes "the investment is clearly a significant drain on resources in a country still struggling to meet basic living standards for its population."

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Henderson, Scott A. The Third Battle: Is the U.S. Ready to Wage the Next Conflict in Space?. Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF Air University, March 2004. [ 7 quotes ] [ page 26 ]

 

The wholesale reconfiguration of China's space sector thus resulted in civilian, commercially competitive technologies with marginal military applications. Its re-institutionalization and restructuring that continues to this day all but precluded any ambitious military projects or planning for space warfare because the Chinese military was stripped off its previously predominant influence and, in our view, relegated to a distant secondary status in the hierarchy of priorities. This institutional history preordained an inherent technological tilt toward commercial applications that at best allow for minor military defensive-protective measures to evolve alongside. In broader terms, as Wu puts it, “…a large portion of the civilian space program, in terms of the technological sophistication, thus is not useful in modern military terms.” At the same time, she implies that the opportunity to pursue dedicated military space weaponry, let alone modern offensive space weapons, has been severely constrained.

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Blair, Bruce and Chen Yali. "The Space Security Dilemma." China Security. Vol. 1, No. 2 (2006): 2-15. [ 3 quotes ] [ page 14 ]

 

Chinese authors admit that while China's space program is more developed than most countries', it is still behind the United States and Russia and that this poses challenges for Chinese national security. The authors of a June 2002 China Aerospace article write that although China's space industry has built a solid foundation "it is still far from meeting the requirements for winning a local war under high technology conditions." China's deficiencies lie in two main areas: One is the application range still awaits expansion. At present, most of China's military space technology remains on an operational support level. Moreover, the projects are incomplete and still await further improvement as well as technological and system development in the areas of space attacks (jamming and destruction) and space defense. Two is that the technological level still awaits improvement. Taking China's remote sensing satellite technology as an example, it has deficiencies in areas such as image resolution, time resolution, operating life, and information transfer ability. Not only are the benefits of using satellites low, they are also only able to undertake partial general survey work, and the information requirements under detailed survey and emergency situations are obviously unable to be satisfied. Generally speaking, there still exists outstanding contradictions between the requirements of China's military satellite systems and realities which urgently await resolution.

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Pollpeter, Kevin L. "The Chinese Vision of Space Military Operations." China's Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs: Emerging Trends in the Operational Art of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. Ed. David M. Finkelstein. Alexandria, VA: CNA Corporation, December 2005. [ 9 quotes ] [ page 353 ]